
Glass__JJ_^L^ 



> * "^ 5..,^ 



i5. 




ROUMANIA'S CAUSE AND IDEALS 



BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



Concise Grammar of the Russian Language. 
Second Edition. 

London : John Murray 

Tale of the Armament of Igor (a.d. 1185). 
Edited and Translated. 

Folk-tales of Russia. Translated. 

Pros and Cons in the Great War. 



London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 




ROUMANIA II 

AND 

TRANSYLVANIA 



S ^ RAH OVA ^'-^STcOPOUs'* "'"'^••'TlsTOVA ^ 



•EPERJCS 




ROUMANIA 



AND 



TRANSYLVANIA 



NIS 



ROUMANIA'S 
CAUSE & IDEALS 



BY 

LEONARD A. MAGNUS, LL.B. 



London : 

Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. 

New York : E. P. Button & Co. 

1917 



o.y\* 



'^'^ 



^/ S^(0^ 



o 

CO 

A 



CONTENTS 



CHAP. PAGE 

MAP OF ROUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA Frontispiece 



INTRODUCTION . - - . 

TABLE OF SOUNDS AND SPELLINGS - 
I A SHORT HISTORY OF ROUMANIA 
II A SHORT HISTORY OF TRANSYLVANIA 

III THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA - 

IV A SHORT ACCOUNT OF BESSARABIA - 

V THE LEADING UP TO THE DECLARATION 
OF WAR IN AUGUST, 1916 — PRELIMINARY 
OBSERVATIONS 

VI THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA 
AND ROUMANIA PRECEDING THE WAR - 

1. ROUMANIA PERSISTS IN REMAINING NEUTRAL 

2. THE FIRST POSSIBILITY OF WAR AFTER 

TURKEY JOINED IN - 

3. ROUMANIA REMAINS NEUTRAL. DEATH OF 

KING CAROL - - - - _ 

4. ROUMANIA WILL NOT LET MUNITIONS PASS 

THROUGH TO TURKEY. THE EXAMPLE OF 
ITALY -----_ 

5. ROUMANIA NEUTRAL AFTER THE INTER- 

VENTION OF ITALY, AND PREVENTED 
FROM INTERVENING WHEN BULGARIA 
TAKES UP ARMS - - . . 



Vll 

xiii 
I 

15 
27 

51 

59 

74 
74 

79 
81 

85 
91 



CONTENTS 



VI 



6. THE BULGARIAN DEMAND - - - 

7. BULGARIA ENTERS THE FIELD 

8. THE PERIOD BEFORE THE FINAL ACT - 

9. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS - _ . 

10. THE DECLARATION OF WAR - - - 

11. WHAT FORCED ROUMANIA INTO WAR ON 

THE 27TH AUGUST? - - - - 

12. SUMMARY ------ 

APPENDIX, DECLARATIONS OF WAR 
AFFECTING ROUMANIA IN THIS WAR - 

A LIST OF USEFUL DATES 

LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED - 

INDEX - 



PAGE 

92 

106 

no 
119 
126 

141 
147 



151 

153 

159 
161 



INTRODUCTION 

There is so little known in this country of 
RoLimania, or, generally, of the East of Europe, 
that a short account of the real factors that have 
brought Roumania into the war is justified at the 
present time, even though the inevitable lack of 
authentic and irrefragable historical evidence 
renders any such preliminary essay nothing more 
than a provisional attempt at truth. In any case, 
the lapse of time before authoritative history is 
issued has always been very long. 

The first broad principle is that the Western 
nations have been screened by the Eastern — 
Russia, Poland, Austria, and the Balkans — from 
experiencing the devastating brunt of the Asiatic 
invasions of the Middle Ages. The fury of these 
assaults ravaged those countries and set the clock 
of early civilization back for many centuries. The 
West, sheltered behind this advance guard, pros- 
pered in comparative security. 

The Early Middle Ages were indeed the critical 
period of European national development. It was 



Vlll INTRODUCTION 

the time when the consciousness of nationhood was 
springing into active and fruitful Hfe. In the West 
the process was but sHghtly retarded — or perhaps 
merely complicated — by the overweening claims 
of that pale and persistent ghost of universal 
dominion, the Holy Roman Empire. The East of 
Europe had to endure the gruesome fight against 
the Mongol and the Turk; and, as it adhered to 
the "heretical" Orthodox Church, was under the 
further disadvantage of being cut off from the 
cultural influence of the West. 

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, both 
the Empire and the Turk, as deterrents, had been 
more or less relegated to the muniment-room 
in the castle of European thought : but, to the 
prejudice of Balkan peoples, their spirit survived 
in another form. The Balkan nations were destined 
either to be forgotten and relinquished to the Turk ; 
or, in the slow course of the dissolution of that 
Empire, to wait until they duly fell into the power 
of one or other of the claimants to the old Imperial 
prestige of Rome ; either to serve as extensions 
towards the sea of the landlocked domains of the 
Caesarean Habsburgs of Vienna, or to furnish an 
avenue to the open waters for the Byzantine 
Romanovs, who also pretended to the heritage and 
the tradition of the Second Rome at Constantinople. 

Of all these colossal struggles, England, insular 



INTRODUCTION IX 

and protected, as by a bodyguard, by all the other 
nations of the West, knew little and cared little. 

When Bismarck in 1877, in cynical callousness, 
pronounced that the Eastern question was not worth 
the bones of a Pomerani'an grenadier, as a 
Prussian, as the Chancellor of a Continental 
European Empire, he was, at any rate, not speaking 
in ignorance of it. Such indifference, on the part 
of Germany, was a disputable matter of expediency : 
William II differed in his estimate, and in 1892 
launched out upon a policy of Oriental aggrandise- 
ment : to us who are living in this period, it is 
too early to adjudicate on the wisdom of the new 
departure. 

But English indifference to th^e problems of 
the Balkans had become a tradition, almost an 
idee fixe. The precedent of disinterestedness of 

1877 was almost exactly followed in 191 2 and even 
1914. In 1856 (after the Crimean War), and in 

1878 (at the Congress of Berlin), we conservatively 
leaned our strength to the moribund and corrupt 
cause of the Turkish Empire. 

We thereby directly contributed to the possibility 
of the volcanic eruption of 1912 and 1914; regardless 
of the fact, that, as of old, the Sultan was the ally 
of the would-be despot of Europe, as he had been 
of Louis XIV and Napoleon. Even the Tsardom 
of Russia in 1878 gauged the true democratic 



X INTRODUCTION 

and national solidarity of Europe better than we 
did. 

The convulsion of this terrific world-war has at 
last demonstrated to us what is the true unity of 
Europe ; that a blow struck at international comity 
in the Balkans will reverberate in the fjords of 
Norway and Iceland, and shake the foundations of 
national polity all the world over. The lesson to 
be derived from the war is how to convert to 
purposes, pacific and constructive, this essential 
community of the free nations of Europe ; how, in 
a measure, to re-inaugurate the ideals of the Holy 
Alliance of 1815, without having recourse to the 
brutal and obsolete caesarism of the Dynasts who 
overwhelmed Napoleon. 

In this vast scheme of things, Roumania, too, 
has her place. In the dawn of European history, 
she acted as a buffer against the Asiatic hordes, 
and paid the price. As an independent kingdom, 
very late in the day, she had to elect to which 
group of powers she would adhere ; and she chose 
the Triple Alliance. The stringencies that dictated 
this selection are now very pertinent study for the 
British public. 

Those bonds might have been firm : they were 
based upon contiguity and common commercial 
interests. They were progressively slackened and 
snapped, because the despots who controlled the 



INTRODUCTION XI 

High Contracting Parties never acted honestly, 
unselfishly or democratically. 

Roumania at the last broke away from this 
partnership, under the greatest provocation : and 
the object of this book is to show how profoundly 
she was justified, and what a sacrifice she has laid 
on the blood-stained altar of liberty. 



In reading the foreign names in this book this table of values 
may prove useful. 





c 




i 


1 








rt 




u 


u 






1 

> 


"S 

a 

o 


i 


OS in 

in U 


is 


c/l 
O 


u 
u 

o 


English church 


c before e 
and i 


cs 


c 


c 


cz 


tsch 


English Tsar 


t 


c or 
cz 


c 


ts 


c 


z 


Ts soft 


— 


— 


c 


— 


c 


— 


dy in " didyer ! " 


— 


^■v or 
dy 


dj 


dy 
dy] 


dzi 




E as in French 


e 


e 


e 


e 


e 


e 


^te 














as in English 


e or ie 


— 


— 


e 


— 


— 


vet 














G in English 


g before 


g 


i 


g 


g 


g 


^ot get 


a u & h 
& consonants 












J in English jet 


g before e i 


ds 


d& 


dz 


dz 


dsch 


K in feill talfe 


c before a o 
u h and all 
consonants 


k 


k 


k 


k 


k 


L hard in pull 


— 


— 


— 


1 


1 


— 


L soft in lily 


I 


ly 


ij 


ly 


I 


I 


S in 5ash 


s 


sz 


s 


s 


s 


s 


SH in sash 


f 


s 


s 


S 


sz 


sch 


V in •yah>e 


V 


V 


V 


V 


w 


w 


ER in anger 


d e t 6 d 


— 


— 


y 


y 





Z in zone 


z 


z 


2 


«j 


z 


s 


S in leisure 


i 


zs 


Z 


z 


i rz 


— ~ 



All other consonants have approximately the same value as in 
English. All vowels, a e i o u, are to be sounded, as in German 
or Italian ; a o ii, as in German. In Magyar ^ 6 u represent the 
long values, e.g., French pew seitl ; pw filte ; German Holle, Hohle ; 
Mitller, Mw^ile. In Magyar the acute accent represents a long 

vovi^el. 

xiii 



ROUMANIA 



CHAPTER I 

The position of Roumania in Europe explains 
something of the special nature of her history, and 
of her participation in the Great European War. 

The Roumanian people occupy the Carpathian 
Alps and the mouths of the Danube and the right 
bank of the Dnestr. They command direct access 
to the Greek countries. They bar the road to the 
East, and block the avenue to an invader from the 
East. 

The race that holds this critical position will be 
subject to the most varied influences : to pressure 
from the Slav, the Greek and the Oriental. When, 
in addition to all of these potentialities, this race is 
alien to all its strange neighbours, something of 
a very special history may be expected. 

The Roumanians boast they are descendants of 
the Dacian colonists of Rome. Dacia was con- 
quered in 1 06 A.D., and the Roman colony spread 
over and beyond the Carpathians to the borders 
of the Theiss : and to this day Transylvania is 
Roumanian. 

The Roumanians present the strange spectacle 
of a Latin island in Slav territory. Their speech 



2 ROUMANIA 

is grammatically most akin to the Italian; but the 
vocalization is Slav, and the civilizing influence 
has been that of Constantinople, the Greek tongue 
and the Greek Church. In the sense in which 
English is a Teutonic language saturated with 
Romance elements, until it is unintelligible save 
to those who know Romance languages, and might 
properly be termed a Romance language, Rou- 
manian, though to a much slighter extent, re- 
sembles a Slav speech built into and upon a basis 
of Latin. Roumania is the bridge betw^een the 
Eastern and the Western civilizations of Europe; 
and striking as is the medley of her speech and 
history, she has, through all the ages of her 
existence, borne a vigorous and unquenchable in- 
dividuality, never submerged. 

The dominating factor in her risorgimento is her 
consciousness that she is of the Latin stock. 

When the Romans abandoned Dacia in 271 
A.D., the colonists are said to have retired into 
the Carpathians. 

The Bolgars, a Turanian race which overran 
the Balkans in 679 A.D., were converted to Chris- 
tianity in 864 A.D., and the Roumanian peoples 
were subject to the Bulgarian Empire, and the 
Bulgarian Church, the language of which was Old 
Slav, and was used in the ritual. This finally 
separated the Daco-Roumanians from the Latin 
world. ^ 

1 The first Bulgarian Empire was crushed b}' Constantine 
BcuXYapcy.T6vc(; in 1014 A.D. 



ROUMANIA 



About the end of the ninth century the 
Hungarians (Magyars) made an irruption, over- 
whelmed the Bulgarian Empire, and subdued the 
Vlakhs (Wallachs) or Roumanians. The Magyars 
seem to have derived their first civilization from 
the Roumanians : they adopted Latin as their 
official language; but they were converted to the 
Roman Church by the Bohemian Bishop Adalbert 
in the reign of Stephen the Saint (1000-1038). 

In the thirteenth century the Roumanian nation^ 
beyond the Carpathians was organized into the 
two principalities of Wallachia (or Muntenia, the 
highlands) and Moldavia : these remained separate 
and independent until the union into the Rou- 
manian State. The position bounded by the 
Carpathians and the river Alt was also called Little 
Wallachia or Oltenia. Moldavia dates from 
after the retreat of the Tatars, who had occupied 
the country for a century (i 241 -1345), and were 
driven out by an expedition under Hungarian 
leadership with the aid of Roumanians from the 
province of Maramure§ [Mdramdrossziget].^ 

But the repulse of the Tatars was only the fore- 
runner of a greater affliction; the Turks had in- 
vaded Europe, and incidentally crushed the Mon- 
gol Empire, just as in previous centuries the 
Tatars had subdued the Polovtsy, the Pecenegs, 
and so forth, and at the battle of Kosovo (1389) 

2 The Balkans, p. 255. I have drawn on this book for a large 
part of my matter at this stage. 

3 The Balkans. 



4 ROUMANIA 

the Balkan nations were finally crushed; and, 
amongst them, Roumania became a vassal state 
of the Turkish Empire, but never a mere province, 
like Serbia, Bulgaria or Greece, and later, 
Hungary (from the Battle of Mohacs, 1526, to the 
Peace of Karlowitz, 1679). The four tributary 
countries of the Turkish Empire were Moldavia, 
Wallachia, Transylvania and Ragusa.* 

The Roumanian provinces fought hard against 
Turkish dominion : Stephen the Great of Moldavia 
resisting for forty-seven years (145 7-1 504); and, 
at Racova in 1475, he "annihilated an Ottoman 
army in a victory considered the greatest ever 
secured by the Cross against Islam." He was 
betrayed by the Christian powers of Hungary and 
Poland, and his son Bogdan made a voluntary 
submission.^ 

" Michael the Brave, Prince of Wallachia (1593- 
1601), was the last to stand up against Turkish 
aggression." He defeated the Turks, and, for a 
moment, re-united the three provinces of Walla- 
chia, Moldavia and Transylvania, but not the 
Banat of Temesvar, He too was betrayed by the 
Christian powers who neighboured on him. 

" After the murder of Michael (1601) the rulers 
of the two Roumanian States were still mostly of 
Roumanian stock, but bought their appointments 
at Constantinople. . . . . In 1619 the Sultan 
sent an Italian to govern Moldavia. Nevertheless, 

4 Historians' History. 

5 The Balkans. 



ROUMANIA 5 

the national independence was not completely lost. 
In the early part of the seventeenth century there 
was a period of comparative order and pros- 
perity .... under Bessaraba in Wallachia, and 
Basil the Wolf in Moldavia (1633-1654 and 1634- 
1653). They introduced codes of written law, 
purified the Church, encouraged the foundation 
of schools and monastic colleges, and promoted 
literature and the arts. The country received its 
first printing press at this time; the first Rou- 
manian book printed on Roumanian territory ap- 
peared in 1640."^ 

About this time the first move to salvation from 
without w,as made. In 1674 both the principalities 
petitioned the Emperor Alexis of Russia for his 
protection, and in 171 1 Peter the Great entered 
into an alliance. 

The immediate result was that the native rulers 
ceased, and that the Porte appointed the Phanariote 
Greeks (so named after a quarter of Constanti- 
nople), whose administration was, in general, 
little else than organized brigandage."^ 

Tocilescu says of them : 

'* At Constantinople there is a Greek suburb 
called Phanar. In the second half of the seven- 
teenth century some families, settled in this dis- 
trict, became notable for their administrative ability 
and astuteness. In 1666 Paniotachos Nikussis was 
appointed interpreter to the Divan. From that 

6 Historians' History. 

7 The Balkans. 



6 ROUMANIA 

time to the Greek revolution in 1821 the office of 
Interpreter to the Divan was held by the Greeks 
as a family privilege. Their influence gained 
them at last the lordship of the Roumanian prin- 
cipalities: and in 1709 Nicholas Mavrocordato was 
made Lord of Moldavia. These two principalities 
were separately administered by Phanariot Greeks 
up to 182 1. 

" The whole system of government by the 
Phanariotes was one of pillage." 

By the peace of Kutchuk — Kainarji, 1774, 
Russia acquired a protectorate over the two prin- 
cipalities: by a convention of 1775, Austria, which 
in 1772 had partitioned Poland, annexed the Buco- 
vina,^ which had always been an essential part of 
Moldavia; and by the Treaty of Bucarest, 1812, 
Russia annexed Bessarabia (i.e., the part of 
Moldavia between the Dnestr and the Pruth). 

In 1 82 1, when the Greeks rebelled, the Phan- 
ariotes were at last overthrown; but the two 
provinces were now Russian protectorates, gov- 
erned by gospodars elected by the provinces; and 
by the Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, the Porte at 
length was only permitted to exact tribute, and 
might not in any way intervene in the administra- 
tion or occupy any fortified port : all Mussulman 
estates were expropriated. 

In 1848, Wallachia, Moldavia, the Bucovina and 

8 In the Bucovina there were in 1869 over 220,000 Roumanians 
(Slavici, p. 202), and at the present time, 273,254, or 34.8 per cent. 
(Mavrodin). 



ROUMANIA 7 

Transylvania all rose in insurrection against their 
respective masters, with the object of attaining 
national autonomy. The Turks invaded Wallachia, 
and the Russians Moldavia, and by the Treaty of 
Balta Limani, 1849, the Sultan was to appoint the 
two gos-podars : the tenure of office should be seven 
years; the candidates must be agreeable to both 
Russia and Turkey, who should both maintain 
troops in the country to preserve order. 

In 1853 the Roumanians again rebelled against 
this new domination, and the country was 
occupied by Russian troops. 

The Treaty of Paris, 1856 (ensuing on the 
Crimean War), at last released the principalities 
from the overbearing pressure of Russian friend- 
ship, and put them under a collective European 
guarantee; it also restored Southern Bessarabia 
(including Akkerman, Kilia, Ismail, Reni, and 
the left bank of the Pruth up to a point on a line 
with Hu.^i) to Roumania, including the delta of 
the Danube', which up to then had been Turkish. 
Turkey still held a nominal suzerainty. 

In the same year the seven years' term of the 
gospodars expired, and the question of the union 
of the provinces was again raised. Would the 
Great Powers still thwart the national ambition ? 
There was now no claim actively made on the 
remainder of Bessarabia, or on Transylvania, or 
the Bucovina. 

The Roumanians solved the difficulty by elect- 
ing Alexander loan Cuza as Prince of both pro- 

B 



8 ROUMANIA 

vinces. He was deposed in 1866, and in the same 
year Karl Ludwig zu Hohernzollern-Sigmaringen, 
a cousin of King William of Prussia, but of a 
branch, non-reigning and Catholic, was elected 
Prince of the State of Roumania, which was still 
under Turkish suzerainty. 

In 1877 this suzerainty was thrown off, and in 
1 88 1 Roumania became an independent kingdom. 
The price was a secret alliance with Russia; and 
it was the Roumanian valour at Plevna that 
secured victory to Russia in the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-8. 

By the Treaty of San Stefano, however, Bul- 
garia was aggrandised, and Russia obtained the 
Dobrudja and the Delta of the Danube, *' reserv- 
ing for herself the right to exchange these terri- 
tories against the southern districts of Bessarabia, 
restored to Roumania by the Treaty of Paris, 
1856. "9 

Berlin, which was interested in whittling away 
the acquisitions of Russia and Bulgaria at the 
Conference of Berlin, 1878, saw no pressing reason 
not to leave rancours be'hind that might disincline 
Roumania from Russia; and Great Britain, as in 
1914,1^ was only academically concerned with the 
Balkan problems. Roumania thus received the 

9 The Balkans. 

10 British Blue Book, No. 59, " His Majesty's Government can- 
not declare themselves ' solidaires ' with Russia on a question 
between Austria and Serbia, which in its present condition is not 
one affecting England." 



ROUMANIA 9 

Dobrudja, and lost her remnant of Bessarabia, the 
irredenta beyond the Pruth. 

In 1883 Roumania became the ally of Austria, 
and by implication joined the Triple Alliance: the 
conditions were apparently those stated in Dr. E. 
J. Dillon's article, p. 77. 

Take lonescu in 1891 recalls an interesting in- 
cident; that when the Bulgarians expelled the 
Prince of Battenberg in 1887, and their throne was 
vacant, it was offered to King Carol of Rou- 
mania. The opportunity was missed : " we refused 
it and committed the most unpardonable offence 
any nation can, preferring a present tranquility 
to the possibility of anticipating history." 

Take lonescu argues in 1891 that Roumania 
cannot rely on either Russia or Austria, but 
must form a federation of the Balkan States, 
" which can only live, if they reconstruct former 
history, and only admit of one political body be- 
tween the Mediterranean and the Carpathians." 

Possibly it was this consideration that deterred 
Roumania from joining in the Balkan League of 
1 913. It was previously directed against Austria 
— so it is said — and Roumania had nothing to 
redeem from Turkey." 

When the Second Balkan War broke out and 
Bulgaria, on Austrian instigation, attacked her 
allies and broke up the League, Roumania took 
no part until the last, when she intervened and 
put an end to the' fighting. 

11 Take lonescu, ha politique itrangere de la Roumanie, p. 34. 



10 ROUMANIA 

The Treaty of Bucarest of 191 3 was never fa- 
voured by Austria, who had miscalculated on the 
double chance that both Turkey and Bulgaria 
would have the upper hand. Roumania took a 
portion of the Dobrudja, and this unjust elxtension 
of her frontier estranged Bulgaria; and Austria in 
1 91 3 intended revising the Treaty of Bucarest by 
force of arms : the war contemplated against Serbia 
was frustrated by Italy and Roumania refusing to 
join, and Germany not being ready for a European 
war.i2 Austria in 1913 succeeded only in expelling 
the Montenegrins from Skutari, and establishing 
a principality of Albania. 

At the sitting, August 8, 191 3, of the Bucarest 
Peace Conference, T. Maiorescu announced that 
the Austro-Hungarian Government had notified 
its intention to submit the question of Kavala to- 
gether with other questions to a revision *' what- 
ever the result of the Conference on this point may 
be."i3 

** The natural counter effect of that action was 
the detachment of Roumania from the Central 

Powers This breaking away from the 

* traditional policy ' of adjutancy-in-waiting to the 
Central Powers was indicated by the visit of Prince 
Ferdinand to Petrograd, and the even more sig- 
nificant visit which Tsar Nicholas afterwards paid 
to the late King Carol of Roumania, at Con- 
stanza. "1* 

12 Serbian Blue Book, Appendix No. 2. 

13 Le traits de paix de Bucarest, 1913, p. 48 

14 The Balkans, p. 304. 



ROUMANIA 



II 



In 1913 (v. p. 75) Czernin was appointed to 
succeed Prince Fiirstenberg to ** patch up Austro- 
Roumanian relations." 

The rest is the history of yesterday. The nego- 
tiations that compelled Roumania to renounce the 
unnatural alliance with Austria are analysed in 
full in chapter VI. 

Modern Roumania has made enormous pro- 
gress : — * 

Population ... In 1866 : 

Two ruined 
Turkish provinces 



Agriculture 



Petrol 



Railways 



Industries 



People's Banks 



In 1866: 
457,608 tons 

In 1866: 
5,915 tons 

In 1866: 
None 

In 1866: 
None 



In 1902 : 
700. Capital 
4,250,600 francs 

Peasant Co-Operative 
Societies ... In 1903 : 



In 1914 : 
A united King- 
dom of almost 
8,000,000 

In 1913 : 

3^230,235 tons 
& large exports 

In 1912 : 

2,000,000 tons 

In 1912 : 

3,690 kilometres 

In 1912 : 
Annual produc- 
tion 400 million 
francs 

In 1910 : 

2,656. Capital 
100,000,000 francs 



Finance 



In 1911 
8 378 

In 1867 : Budget of In 1912 & 1913 
56,000,000 francs 



Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Greece. 

Budget Receipts, 191 i, 450 million. 

Foreign Trade, ,, 852 ,, 



Budget of 
500,000,000 francs. 

Roumania. 

583 million. 

1026 million. 



Mavrodin, La Roumanie contevi-goraine. 



12 ROUMANIA 

For the future one question remains. Assuming 
that in the eighteenth century there were only 
dynasties bargaining with no sense of democracy, 
with no knowledge or appreciation of racial as- 
pirations; granted that in the fifties and sixties of 
last century Russia was despotic, Napoleon III, 
vain and ambitious, whilst Prussia was grasping 
and unscrupulous, as ever, but had a genius to 
guide her whose dissimulation was deeper than the 
frank cynicism of Napoleon III; will not the spirit 
of the modern democracy of Russia and the Re- 
public of France have penetrated into the high 
court of diplomacy ? When the time comes, afte'r 
victory, to dictate the terms of peace, will the 
plenipotentiaries exert their power to obtain a dur- 
able peace ? 

The conditions of a lasting peace in Europe, 
and ultimately of a federation, are^ nationalism and 
democracy. Most of the wars of Europe since the 
fall of Napoleon have been caused by the terri- 
torial aspirations of the German despots at Berlin 
and Vienna, overriding national claims and pre- 
cedents, and careless of the soreness of an irre- 
deemable homeland. If we are waging war for 
Belgium and Serbia, for Transylvania and Poland 
and the Trentino against German and Austrian 
tyranny, it will be well if Russia, now released 
from the bondage of Potsdam, be generous to 
Roumania. Surrounded by a chain of complete 
and satisfied nations, she would have nothing to 
fear from her neighbours and friends. 



ROUMANIA 



Score out from the map of Europe such terri- 
tories as Alsace-Lorraine, Sleswig-Holstein, Bos- 
nia, Poland, Transylvania, the Trentino, and the 
result will be the effacement of all the points of 
conflict, of all specific grievances, and incidentally 
of all the aggressions of the Central German 
Powers. 

The situation of countries like Roumania, Italy 
and Serbia is almost unimaginable to an English- 
man. When Mary happily lost Calais, England 
became self-contained: her expansion has been 
co-extensive with her nationality. But Italy, Rou- 
mania and Serbia have doggedly persisted in the 
face of odds throughout all the centuries: every 
gain achieved, every advance made, has been 
thwarted and begrudged by those central powers 
who had a vested interest in their alien territories. 

From their point of view, these pretensions to 
hold other peoples in subjection were not quite un- 
warranted, for the Germans of the two Empires 
are landlocked, as also are the Russians, and every 
great nation must have an adequate sea-board. 
But is there no means of reconciling their objects ? 
The Germans boast that Rotterdam and Antwerp 
were German ports. Since the war, Antwerp, as 
a port, leads nowhere. 

It is, when these oppressed nations shall have 
been completed, that the trade of the landlocked 
German and Russian nations will flow most 
easily and readily, for the mutual benefit of all : 
it will be carried on by willing hands. 



14 ROUMANIA 

Russia, when the victory comes, will receive a 
sufficient reward in other directions, and access to 
the sea. If on her fringe there should lie a united 
Roumania, including the Bucovina, Bessarabia, 
Transylvania, as well as Wallachia and Moldavia, 
a united Poland, a united Serbia and other States 
which should be liberated from Austria, she 
will be all the stronger : and Prussia may then 
intrigue as she will; there will be no discontent 
on which she can batten. Her one and principal 
success in this war was when she gained over 
Bulgaria. Bulgaria had a grievance, the unjust 
seizure of Silistria and Balcik by Roumania. 

On the foundation of national States a European 
federation may arise. 



CHAPTER II 

TRANSYLVANIA 

The great province of Roman Dacia, which had 
been so thoroughly assimilated into the Roman 
Empire, broke up, as has been said, into the three 
separate principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and 
Transylvania. The last named is called Erdely 
by the Magyars (possibly from Erdo, a forest), 
and in Roumanian Ardeal (or Ardel). The Ger- 
man name, Siebenbiirgen (which in literal trans- 
lation is used in Polish, Cech, Swedish, Dutch, 
etc., Sedmiogr6d, Semigrad, Zevenbergen, etc.) is 
really derived from Zibinburg, i.e., the town on 
the Zibin or Zeben, Magyar Szeben, now called 
Hermannstadt, but in Magyar, Nagy-Sz6ben, and 
in Roumanian Sibiu (Latin, Cibianum). 

Transylvania, being beyond the mountains, 
suffered least from the barbarian migrations. The 
plains were overrun in succession by the Goths, 
the Gepidae, the Ugry, the Pecenegs, the P61ovtsy 
or Cumanians, and the Mongols, as well as by 
the Magyars in the course of their invasion; i.e.^ 
it was steadily devastated, century after century, 
from the ninth to the thirteenth by each wave of 
Asiatic savagery. 

15 



l6 ROUMANIA 

Stephen I, King of Hungary (i 000-1038), 
undertook the defence of Transylvania, and settled 
colonies of Magyars in it, called the settlers, the 
Sz^kelyek (or the Szeklers, from Szek, settlement). 
In 1 103 a Magyar bishopric was established. In 
1 141, Geza II, King of Hungary, populated the 
ravaged southern portions of Transylvania with 
Saxons. These districts were autonomous, and 
retained German law and language : the towns of 
Medias, Miihlenbach (Balta Moarei), Hermann- 
stadt (Nagy-Szeben), Schaszburg (Segesvar), 
Klausenburg (Kolozsvar, Cluj), Kronstadt 
(Brasso, Bra§ov), Bistri^a (Besztercze), amongst 
others, were founded or developed by these 
colonists. 

In 121 1 Andrew II gave part of the territory 
to the Order of Teutonic Knights to settle and 
colonize. 

In 1240 the Mongols invaded Poland and the 
West, after subduing the Russian State at the 
Battle of the Kalka, 1223; but were defeated in 
1 241 by the united powers of the Magyars and 
Roumanians of all three provinces. 

In 1 291 on one occasion the Roumanians were 
summoned to the Diet as a Fourth nation. 

The Turks crushed the Mongol power and in- 
herited it; and after subduing the Southern Slavs 
at the Battle of Kosovo, 1389, invaded the Rou- 
manian provinces, in 141 1 and 1423. 

For the whole of this period Transylvania was 
an independent principality, governed by its own 



TRANSYLVANIA 17 

Duke (Voivod), though generally in subjection to 
Hungary. 

From 141 1 to 1877 Moldavia and Wallachia were 
tributary to Turkey; but they were never mere 
provinces of the Turkish Empire, as Hungary 
itself became from 1526 to 1690. 

The Reformation spread widely over Transyl- 
vania; and when in 1526 the Hungarian crown de- 
volved on the German Emperor, Ferdinand I, 
John Zapolya, Voivod of Transylvania, invoked 
the aid of Sultan Suleiman and subjugated a great 
part of Hungary. 

After the Battle of Mohacs, 1526, the Turks 
conquered the whole of Hungary, and retained it 
up to the year 1690, excepting a strip extending 
from the junction of the Mur and the Drave to 
the East of Varasdin, following a line thence to 
Nagy-Kanizsa and Gyor (Raab), thence by a line 
following iSrsekujvar (Neuhausel), and the natural 
boundaries of the rivers Ipoly and Saj6 to Kassa 
(Kaschau), whence it proceeded to the Carpathians 
by the River Ondava. All the remainder of Hun- 
gary was a Turkish province, the kingdom of 
Slavonia (bounded by the Drave and the Danube 
as far as Peterwardein); and the Banat of Temes- 
var (the quadrilateral formed by the Theiss), the 
Danube down to Ormenyes, and on the north the 
river Maros. 

The principality of Transylvania was independ- 
ent, subject to Turkish suzerainty. This princi- 
pality was bounded towards the Banat of Temesvar 



l8 ROUMANIA 

by a line from Or§ova to Ormenyes, and a point 
just over the Vulcan Pass on the Western side; 
and thence in a more or less straight line north 
to a point twenty-four miles west of Deva and 
fifty miles east of Arad, i.e.^ somewhere near Zam, 
on the river Maros. From this point the political 
frontiers of Transylvania were practically identical 
with those of the present Counties of Hunyad 
(Hunedoara), Also-Feher (Aba de jos, Unter- 
weissenburg), Torda-Aranyos (Turda Arie§), 
Kis-kiiklillo (Cojocna, Klein-Kokelburg), Szol- 
nok-Doboka and Besztercze-Naszod (Bistri^a- 
Nasaud), and bounded on the other side by the 
international frontier of Roumania in the Car- 
pathians. 

The ethnological boundaries of the Roumanians 
are more extensive, and the compilers of the Ox- 
ford Historical Atlas of Modern Europe, Con- 
stantin D. Mavrodin,i and the writers of the 
lugo-Slav pamphlets are all in substantial agree- 
ment, as well as the authorities in the great 
Russian and German encyclopsedias. It seems to 
be established that the territory of the Roumanian 
population begins at Moldova Nova on the left 
bank of the Danube in the Banat of Temesvar, 
mounts up to Fehertemplon [Biserica Alba, Weiss- 
kirchen] and thence to Versecz, Temesvar 
[Timi§oara], Nagy-Szalonta [ Salon ta-Mare], Nagy- 
Vdrad [Oradea-Mare, Grosswardein], and thence 

1 La Roumanie contemporaine Paris, 19 15. 



TRANSYLVANIA 1 9 

through Borza (near Kolozsvar) to the Roumanian 
frontier. 

The writer in Meyer and Andreevski's encyclo- 
paedia further states that the line of division be- 
tween the Magyars and Roumanians starts at the 
frontier of Moldavia between the mouths of the 
Olt (Alt, Aluta) and Bistri^a, crosses the river 
Maros, and extends as far north as Saint Marton, 
near Munkacs. The great complication is, that in 
the heart of the Daco-Roumanian territories on 
either side of the political frontier, there exist solid 
blocks of Magyars {i.e., Magyar immigrants or 
settlers), of the Szekelyek (the families originally 
settled in the twelfth century), and Germans. The 
Magyars are to be found mainly in the Counties 
of Kolozsvar, Szolnok-doboka, Hunyad, Maros- 
Torda, Kiikiillo, Brass6, in parts of Fogaras, the 
Szekelyek in Udvarhely, Csik, Torda-Maros, and 
Torda-Aranyo; whilst the Germans still retain the 
old Konigsboden at Hermannstadt, Kronstadt 
(Brasso, Bra§ov), and the ancient colonies. The 
few settlements of Bulgarians are less incompatible, 
as they are rapidly absorbed both by the Magyars 
and the Roumanians. 

Transylvania within these boundaries was an 
independent principality subject to Turkish su- 
zerainty. In 1540, John Sigismund, the son of 
John Zapolya, withdrew from the extended fron- 
tiers, and Transylvania was once again within its 
national boundaries of the river Theiss. 

For one hundred and fifty years (to 1690), 



20 ROUMANIA 

Transylvania was thus separated from Hungary 
in every political sense. 

In 1 57 1, Stephen Bathori was on the throne of 
Transylvania, and in 1576 was elected King of 
Poland: and in 1599 Andrew Bathori was defeated 
in a war with Wallachia by Michael the Brave, 
who succeeded in reuniting all three provinces for 
seven years under one sovereign (until 1606). 

Michael, however, had to encounter the allied 
forces of the Sultan and the Emperor, and was 
overthrown; and Transylvania was overrun by the 
Imperial forces, and was administered by them 
with the result that Stephen Bocskay revolted 
and was recognised by the Sultan as Voivod of 
Transylvania. 

This fact is noticeable: Christian populations 
have often preferred Turkish suzerainty to Aus- 
trian rule. In 1822 Milos, the Liberator of Serbia, 
said: " If you sum everything up, you will agree 
with me that it would be better for the Serbians 
to endure the tyranny of the Turks than to lie down 
under the yoke Austria is making ready for 
them. ... i If the Austrian Government, under 
any pretext whatsoever, marches its army into our 
territory, we shall join hands with the Turks.*' 

In 1606, by the Peace of Vienna, liberty of 
conscience was guaranteed to the Hungarian Pro- 
testants, and Stephen Bocskay was formally ac- 
knowledged as Prince of Transylvania. 

In 1608 Sigismund Rdk6czy was elected to the 
throne, and in 163 1 George Rdkoczy I, who in 



TRANSYLVANIA 2 1 

1644 joined the alliance of France and Sweden 
against the Empire, and extended the frontiers of 
Transylvania. 

However, this dynasty became unpopular, and 
in 1660 there was civil war; as the outcome of 
which in 1688 Apafi, the Turcophil candidate to 
the throne, was compelled to acknowledge an Aus- 
trian suzerainty over Transylvania — this was only 
possible after Jan Sobieski had delivered Vienna 
from the Turks in 1683. 

Apafi died in 1690, and his son, Apafi II, re- 
nounced his principality in favour of Austria; but 
obtained a charter (ratified solemnly in 1697) 
guaranteeing the absolute independence of Tran- 
sylvania in all matters confessional and adminis- 
trative. This ancient charter, which conferred 
rights only on the nations of the Szekelyek, the 
Magyars and the Germans, nevertheless held good 
until 1848; and the modernization of it need not 
have involved the destruction of the national in- 
dependence built upon it. 

Thus Transylvania became re-attached to the 
Habsburg dynasty : possibly, had she had a non- 
elective throne, and a determinate line of princes, 
she might have remained independent. 

By the Treaty of Karlowitz, 1699, the Porte for- 
mally abdicated all suzerainty or sovereignty over 
Transylvania. 

The Transylvanians were not so easily satisfied. 
In 1703 Francis Rdk6czy rebelled, and received the 
support of the Szeklers and Magyars : but he was 



22 ROUMANIA 

defeated by the Imperial troops, and the Treaty 
of Szathmar, 171 1, definitely incorporated Tran- 
sylvania in the Hapsburg dominions. 

About this time many Bulgarians settled at 
Alvincz, D6va, Hermannstadt, and elsewhere. 

The Turks stirred up war once again; but their 
pretensions were finally sealed by the Treaty of 
Pozarevats (or Passarowitz) in 17 18. 

The Banat of Temesvar was recovered from the 
Turks in 17 18, and Belgrade, Shabats, part of 
Serbia, Little Wallachia and Or§ova ceded to 
Austria: all of these were lost in 1739 (Treaty of 
Belgrade), except the Banat. 

From this point onwards Transylvania has no 
independent history. In 1765 Maria Theresa 
created Transylvania a Grand Duchy; and under 
Joseph II a great national insurrection of the 
Roumanians broke out in 1784 under the leader- 
ship of Horia and Clo§ca. The Austrian Government 
at this time was acting tyrannically; but the con- 
stitutional rights of 1690 were re-affirmed, and 
re-asserted and maintained at every diet; those of 
1825, February, 1835, 1841, and 1846 stand out 
conspicuous. 

Towards the end of the eighteenth and begin- 
ning of the nineteenth centuries, a new German 
element was introduced into Transylvania, the 
Ldndler settlers from Baden, the Breisgau, Suabia, 
Salzburg, Styria and Carinthia. 

Whether under pressure of German-Austrian 
rule or not, the Szekler and Magyar classes in 



TRANSYLVANIA 23 

Transylvania (who had many electoral privileges) 
began agitating early in the nineteenth century 
for a union with Hungary. The Roumanian 
population protested, and the Wallachs desired to 
be acknowledged as the fourth nation (with the 
Germans, Szeklers, and Magyars) in Transyl- 
vania. 

In 1848 there was a monster meeting of the 
Wallachs at Balasfalva [Blasendorf, Blaj], and a 
petition for recognition was sent to the Emperor, 
with a deputation. Massacres, rebellion, riots 
ensued, and civil war : the Magyars did everything 
to crush the Roumanian aspirations. 

Still Transylvania remained an autonomous 
principality until 1867. 

A great opportunity was lost by the Central 
Powers in 1849, when the Roumanians addressed 
a petition to the Emperor of Austria, requesting 
that all the Roumanians of Transylvania and the 
two principalities (of Wallachia and Moldavia, 
which were not yet united) might be gathered into 
an autonomous nation with political and religious 
independence, governed by the Emperor of Austria 
as Grand Duke of Roumania. This new State was 
to use Roumanian as the official language, was 
to have a representative at the Austrian Court (as 
Transylvania had from 1690 to 1848), and was to 
include Bucovina and as much of Bessarabia as 
was then in the principality of Moldavia. 

The Austrians did not consent. It is a satire 
on the present war that the Central Powers were 

c 



24 ROUMANIA 

in 1848 offered their present scheme of a Central 
Europe on a fair and Liberal basis and decUned. 

In i860 a new charter was granted confirming 
and ratifying the old constitution, and the Tran- 
sylvanian Chancery at Vienna was re-established. 

In 1863 a diet at Hermannstadt reaffirmed the 
constitution of 1835, and proposed to send deputies 
to the Austrian Reichsrath. But the old franchises 
were restored; and in 1865 an artificial Magyar 
majority^ voted union with Hungary, which Aus- 
tria, weakened after Sadowa (1866), had to satisfy. 

This was the first beginning of a Hungarian 
Transylvania. 

Now Transylvania merely consists of Hungarian 
counties, which send 75 members to the Hungarian 
Chamber : every one of the liberties and national 
rights enjoyed under Turkish and even Austrian 
rule have vanished, not only for the Roumanians, 
but for the Saxon Konigsboden as well. In 1868 
the High Court at Kolozsvar (Klausenburg) was 
abolished. 

The whole problem of Transylvania, or the 
Roumanian irredenta^ dates back to 1867, and is 
the creation of the new autocratic Germany, as 
well as of the frantic efforts of the Magyar minority 
to retain the present domains of the Crown of St. 
Stephen. 

The Roumanians of Transylvania have always 
been loyal to the Habsburg dynasty : but their al- 

2 The Diet was packed : there were 89 Magyar representatives, 
31 Saxon and 13 Roumanian. [Roumanian Replyl. 



TRANSYLVANIA 25 

legiance to the Empire at Vienna may have been 
shaken when they were transferred arbitrarily to 
the Kingdom of Hungary. 

Transylvanian history thus falls into five 
principal epochs. 

1 000-1526. Independent Principality attached to 
the Hungarian Crown. 

1526-1690. Independent. 

1690-1848. Under the Austrian Crown, but inde- 
pendent. 

1 848- 1 867. Under the autocratic government of 
Austria. 

1867. Amalgamated with Hungary. 

The Roumanians, it is true, never had any 
rights under the old medieval charter of independ- 
ence (save that in 1291 Andrew II, of Hungary, 
admitted them as a fourth nation to the Transyl- 
vanian Diet). 

The land was Roumanian : the Magyars in the 
twelfth century dwelt in tents; but when the Ger- 
man Empire consolidated, and put an end to 
external forays, they too settled into towns, and 
colonized the strategical districts of Transylvania.^ 
The voluminous endeavour to prove themselves 
indigenous, and the Roumanians settlers, has not 
succeeded. 

3 Jung, p. 216. 



26 ROUMANIA 

But this medieval constitution does not justify 
the Magyars of the present day in treating them 
as an " inferior race,"^ a " tolerated race,"^ and 
subordinating the language and needs of the 
majority to the tyranny of the Magyar aristocracy. 



4 Roumanian Declaration of War, 

5 Magyar Reply. 



CHAPTER III 
THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 

The brief history of Transylvania has already 
outlined what is the substance of the cause that 
has at last provoked Roumania to arms. But 
some account still seems necessary of the official 
and systematic misrule in Transylvania. For this 
purpose we shall rely, as far as may be, on foreign 
and hostile evidence, so as to avoid any impugn- 
ment of interested witnesses. Friedrich Naumann 
himself admits (p. 91) that the Hungarian system 
of Government ruthlessly and permanently ex- 
cludes the little peoples from any share in the 
administration, and leaves them with a very com- 
prehensible feeling of rancour: and (p. 81) that 
it was with the rise of the Hungarians that the 
question of the Nationalities for the first time be- 
came really serious. 

Naumann is writing in 1915 : it may be helpful 
to trace expressions of opinion back a little farther. 

In i860 an anonymous pamphlet, ^' Die Sprachen 
und Nationalitdtsfragen in Oesterreich, von 
einem Romanen," was published at Vienna. At 
this time Hungary and Transylvania were both 
being more or less impartially oppressed from 

27 



28 ROUMANIA 

Vienna. This writer states: "Hungary is com- 
parable with Switzerland, as long as it enjoys a 
similar system of home rule. The various peoples 
should have the right to appeal to the Monarch 

in their own tongue In any case, a 

sovereignty in Hungary, a sort of State of Hun- 
gary within the State of Austria, seems to us to- 
day something as preposterous as the belief in a 
dualism in the Universe. A semi-sovereignty, 
both logically and practically, is only an expecta- 
tion for the reversion of the whole estate. A house 
divided against itself cannot stand Prac- 
tically a Hungarian, or rather a Magyar, autonomy 
would now — after the theoretic acknowledgement 
of the equal rights of all the nationalities — be 
one of the most disastrous anomalies imag- 
inable; the immediate result would be, either the 
rescission of national equality in Austria or the 
legitimate struggle of all the races and districts 
for equal independence. The former would have 
a precedent on a larger scale in the miserable 
conditions of Turkey : the latter would be in itself 
a logical result, but would lead inevitably to 

anarchy A historic claim is put up by 

renascent Magyarism in a manner unjustified and 
out of date : first of all, because the historic pre- 
tensions of Hungary are being resuscitated against 
those of Austria, which in this respect exist de 
facto and de iure are equally valid; secondly, 
because the true and substantive historical right 
that unites the Hungarian peoples, comprehends 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 29 

more than the Magyar race by itself What 

reliance can these peoples place in Magyarism, in 
the Magyar State or oligarchy after their bitter 
experiences up to the year 1849? [when the Russo- 
Austrian armies suppressed the revolt of the 
Magyars with the partial aid of Transylvania] . The 
Magyars in the eighteenth century kept on peti- 
tioning the Austrian government for fifty years to 
cede to them the Banat (which Austrian arms had 
liberated from Turkish rule), in order to introduce 
Magyar administration, and thus to enslave the 
Roumanians of that province who had not been 
altogether bereft of their rights even under the 
Turkish yoke." 

The writer also points out that, as long as the 
independence of Transylvania had been respected, 
Magyars and Roumanians had been on friendly 
terms from the tenth century onwards, until in the 
Diets of 1832, 1836, 1844, 1847 and 1848, Latin 
was replaced by Magyar as the official language; 
and other proselytizing followed apace. 

In 1877 Constantin Frantz [^Deutsche Antwort 
auf die orientalische Frage, 1877] remarks: "The 
Roumanians seem as though they had been 
snowed into the mass of the peoples surrounding 
them without a natural resting-place : and their 
nationality is in the gravest peril from the Mag- 
yars. If the Magyars conjure up to themselves 
the vision of a Magyar world, a Roumanian world 
would be just as imaginable." 

Julius Jung [Rdmer tmd Romanen, 1877, Inns- 



30 ROUMANIA 

bruck] remarks : '* Hungarian history is the story 
of the relations of tlie Magyar nobility, the en- 
serfed Roumanian peasantry and the German 
colonists, and of the relations to each of them of 
the Kingdom of Hungary The Magyar- 
German colonists wedged themselves into the 
Wallach territory. Each of the colonies, the 
Saxon settlers, the Szekelyek, and the Magyar 
nobles took exclusive possession of the dominion 
of the country, as the sole ' nations ' entitled there- 
to in right of conquest : while the Wallachs were 
nothing more than the servant, unprivileged mass.^ 
It was a different situation from any other in the 
colonizations of the Germans, or of any people, 
whether in ancient or modern history." 

In this connection from a different point of view 
— not less grasping — the remark of the Russian 
diplomat, F. N. Fonton, in 1812, might be quoted, 
at the time of the first annexation of Bessarabia 
[Kasso, p. 229] : " This people, the Roumanians, 
have a strongly national character : and I cannot 
disguise the fact, that, when I glance at the map, 
I feel utierly vexed that these eight millions of 
a people foreign to the Slavs are settled here on 
the delightful slopes of the Carpathian Alps, 
wedged in, as it were, between Slav races, and 
forming an obstacle to their reunion." 

An impartial onlooker might consider that this 

1 " According to our ancient laws the Roumanian people as an 
immigrant population [sic] was nothing but a tolerated people in 
Transylvania." [Magyar Reply, 1891]. 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 3 1 

compact national mass had as much right to their 
ancient boundaries as the Slavs, or the Germans, 
or the Maygars, all of whom are of later date. 

loan Slavici in 1880, a Roumanian, published 
his great history [Die Rumdnen in Ungarn, 
Siebenhilrgen and der Bukowina'] in German. 
His judgment on the conditions of his time is 
worth some brief extracts. 

" If ever a people has worked its way up from 
misery and degradation, it is the Roumanians," 
(citing G. von Rath [Siebenburgen, Reise- 
beobachtungen, 1879]); and Slavici adds: "The 
Roumanians have endured and still endure much, 
without letting it interrupt their development, 
without losing patience: for they feel that the 
future belongs to them. .... For centuries the 
Magyars have been the ruling race on the lower 
Danube, the principal Christian people in the 
East, the intermediaries between East and West : 
during the whole of this long period they have 
never succeeded in becoming the social cement of 
their subject races. Politically, they have constituted 

a capable stock, but not a civilizing element 

When the civilizing element at length made its 
appearance in the East with the Habsburgs, a 
regulated civilizing effort could begin. The at- 
tempt of the German element to solve the task for 
which the Magyars had proved their incapacity, 
has itself only partially succeeded. The peoples 
of the Monarchy found in the Monarchy a sure 
mainstay, and loyalty to the common dynasty has 



32 ROUMANIA 

held them long together; but the German people 
is too remote, and the German Kultur has been 
too much adulterated with other peoples, such as 
the Magyars and the Jews, as transmitted to the 
other nations." 

Hence, ^aguna, the Roumanian leader in the 
'sixties, aimed at the self-education of the Rou- 
manians in alliance with the German element, and 
in subjection only to the common sovereign. It 
was he who extorted from the Magyars the Law 
of the Nationalities [for which see p. 45]. *'So 
ran the law. But the legislators, even when voting 
never intended respecting it. ... . No one can 
be surprised at the trouble the Magyars put them- 
selves to, to force their language down others' 
throats : none would ever learn it save under com- 
pulsion." 

In the section dealing with the grievances in 
some detail, the learned and calm judgment of 
Slavici will be quoted afresh. 

To carry the story forward of the general con- 
siderations, to show how it is the elevation of one 
race — the Magyars — to an unjustified supremacy 
that has been the root of the Roumanian problem, 
and ultimately, the cause of any disaffection to 
the Austrian dynasty, a pamphlet by Take lonescu 
[^La Politique Etrangere de la Roumanie, 1891, 
Bucarest] provides further confirmation. In this 
publication Take lonescu insists that the only 
possible policy for Roumania is a foreign one, 
and can scarcely be one of alliance with either of 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 33 

the Great Powers, Russia or Austria, both of whom 
have despoiled essential parts of the national do- 
main. " Neutrality for the Roumanian State is 

neither desirable nor possible Belgium 

is only neutral, in as far as it is believed that Eng- 
land will not allow anyone to seize it 

But how could we who hold the keys of Southern 
Europe, commanding the avenue of the Russians 
to the Southern Slavs and the high road to the 

Dardanelles, remain neutral? " He 

thus characterizes Magyar policy. "The Mag- 
yars, foreign in speech and origin to all the 
European nations, alien by religion to all the 
Eastern peoples; strange by its social organiza- 
tion to all the Eastern peoples, which are essential- 
ly democratic; odious to all the nationalities by 
their mad and violent policy of Magyarization — in 
itself a suicidal policy— the Magyars, despite their 
great and incontestable qualities, have none of 
the indispensable attributes of an apostle. They 
can only guard Europe against .Pan-Russism, if 
in agreement with us, as they formerly could 
against the Turk, with us as advanced guard. They 
cannot play the part of propagator of Western 

civilization in the South-East of Europe 

Hungary must become a federative State or be 
effaced." The solution proffered by Take Tonescu 
in 1891 is a Balkan federation, which might work 
in harmony with a federalized Austria-Hungary. 
In all these declarations there is never any hostility 



34 ROUMANIA 

to Germany : the Magyar incubus is the great 
hindrance. 

The population of Transylvania and its racial 
proportions are a matter of great consequence. 

On Magyar statistics, according to the reply of 
the Magyar students of Kolozsvar in 1891, the 
census of 1880 revealed a total population for the 
whole of Hungary of 13,728,622 ; of whom 

46.65 were Magyar. 

13.62 ,, German. 

13.52 ,, Slovak. 

17.50 ,, Roumanian. 

2.57 ,, Ruthenian. 

4.60 ,, Serb. 

1.54 ,, unclassified. 



100.00 



For the census of 1890 the following figures and 
facts are drawn from German-Austrian sources; 
the classification being on the ordinary language 
used, not according to origin. These figures are 
so far inaccurate, as there exist 80,000 gypsies, 
15,000 Jews, 9,000 Turks and Bulgarians: some of 
whom have been distributed under other heads. 

TRANSYLVANIA 





Population 


Religions 






Per cent. 


Per cent. 


Roumanians... 


1,276,890 57 


Orthodox ... 694,890 30.87 


Magyars 


... 


697.945 31 


Greek Cath. ... 633,570 28.14 


Germans 




217,670 9.67 


Lutheran 328,034 14.57 


Others 




58,711 2.33 


Rom. Cath. ... 284,800 9.27 
Evangelical ... 208,758 9.27 
Unitarian ... 59,287 2.64 
Others 54.037 5-24 




2,251,216 100.00 


2,251,216 100.00 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 



35 



From the Roumanian side we read that in the 
whole of the Monarchy there were at the same 
census of 1880 [Reply of the RouMnanian Students 
of Bucarest, 1891] : — 



Germans 


10,170,000 


Magyars 

Roumanians 

Italians 

Cechs 


6,542,000 

2,623,000 

755,000 

7,140,000 


Poles 

Serbs 

Ruthenes 

Slovenes 


3.255.000 
2,918,000 
3,158,000 
1,128,000 




38,489,000 



The proportion of the Roumanians in the whole 
of the Monarchy, on the authority of A magyar 
Romanak es a magyar nemzet, thus constitutes 
2623/38489 or about 6.834 P^^ cent. This points 
to a diminution from the figures for the entire 
monarchy, as compared with the census of 1869 
[Slavici, p. 195], when there were 2,900,000 — or 
according to the statistics compiled by Keleti 
Karoly, on behalf of the Magyars, 2,321,000 
Roumanians in all parts of the Empire, a correct 
estimate probably being about 2,700,000. 

The census of 1890 (Roumanian reply) showed 
for the whole of Hungary a proportion of 54.22 per 
cent. Magyars and 15.9 Roumanians, with 12.22 
Germans. The variations in these figures can be 
accounted for in many ways : partly by the 
emigration of Transylvanian Roumanians into 
Roumania; but much more by the zeal of the 



36 



ROUMANIA 



Magyar government to demonstrate the Magyar 
character of their State. Personal and local names 
are Magyarized : anyone who can speak or write 
Magyar is set down as belonging to that nation- 
ality. 

The statistics for 1910 can be found in Nau- 
mann's Mitteleuropa for Hungary : — 



Magyars 


.. 10,050,000 


48.2% 


Roumanians 


2,950,000 


14-1% 


Germans 


2,030,000 


9.8% 


Slovaks 


2,030,000 


9.4% 


Croats 


1,830,000 


8.8% 


Serbs 


1,110,000 


5-3% 


Ruthenes 


470,000 


2.3% 


Unclassified 


460,000 


2.1% 




100.00 



whilst for the whole Empire, including Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, the proportion of the two ruling 
races of the Germans and Magyars, is only 12 and 
10. 1 millions respectively out of 51.4 millions, i.e.^ 
23-341 per cent, and 19.45 per cent. 

These figures despite fluctuations, arbitrary or 
natural, show the permanence of a large and com- 
pact Roumanian population, a very considerable 
minority in the Empire and in the Kingdom of 
Hungary, as well as a clear majority in Transyl- 
vania. 

There are no absolutely reliable statistics; and 
those of Keleti are suspected and impugned by 
nearly every authority, as vitiated by pro-Magyar 
policy. 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 37 

In a previous chapter the political and ethno- 
logical boundaries of Transylvania have been 
shortly sketched. It remains to consider how 
far the great majority, the Roumanians, receive 
justice, since they have been swept into a complete 
political amalgamation with the Kingdom of 
Hungary. 

In 1868, when the dualistic regime was formally 
sanctioned between Austria and Hungary, a series 
of fundamental laws was passed, conferring 
equality of rights of the Nationalities of Hungary 
and Transylvania; enacting that the trials should 
be held in the regional language, where one fifth 
of the local Council so desired ; that religious com- 
munities should be free and the schools belonging 
to them ; that the medium of instruction should be 
the native tongue ; that municipal Councils should 
be free and in the choice of their official language ; 
that all the laws should be published in the region- 
al languages ; that all public officials must be cog- 
nisant with the local language and so forth. 

All of these provisions seem to be an elementary 
safeguard, where a centralized alien government 
takes over the administration of compact masses 
of strange papulations. 

In the history of England there have been many 
oppressive and persecuting kings : very often 
religious and personal convictions have been pro- 
scribed, so as to conform to some ecclesiastical 
tyranny or fanatical devotion to serve the inclin- 
ations of the monarch and ruling aristocracy. But 



38 ROUMANIA 

all such notions are things of long ago ; and, even 
thus, Charles I never oppressed the Welsh for 
speaking Welsh : nor did Cromwell inhibit the 
use of Irish. Possibly a long-oppressed nation- 
ality acquires a morbid self-consciousness, which 
makes it distrust everything it cannot remodel in 
its own shape within its own boundaries. The 
bond of unity with the Magyars may be, as with 
the Prussians, the hatred and fear of other races. 

" Hungary will become Magyar, or else she will 
not exist," said Kossuth in 1848. The whole 
evidence to be derived from the writers of the 'six- 
ties corroborates this statement, but from the other 
side of the quesion : if Hungary could not exist 
without claiming and denationalizing non-Magyar 
territories, they preferred as the lesser evil a uni- 
form Austrian administration. This fact the 
Magyar apologists pervert. "The Roumanian 
Nationalists are the docile instruments of German- 
ism : the restoration of constitutional government 
[sic] leaves them cold and passive. "^ 

However, says Slavici in 1881 : ''§aguna had 
expressed three wishes in the name of the Rou- 
manian people, touching the Church, the School 
and the Language. His wishes were granted : 
the Roumanian Church was legally declared auto- 
cephalous : the Roumanians were assured of the 
right to institute their own schools, to maintain 
them, and to administer them : and the so-called 

2 Magyar Reply, p. 54. 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 39 

Law for the Nationalities in certain circumstances 
and in certain districts permitted the official use 
of the Roumanian language. So much for the 
law. But the legislators never contemplated re- 
specting the law, even when they were voting 
for it." 

(I.) Electoral Disabilities. 

The suffrage in Hungary is on a basis of prop- 
erty franchise of 72-80 florins a year.^ Voting is 
open, not by ballot : and the towns at which vot- 
ing takes place are scattered. There is urgent 
need for a redistribution of seats : some small 
Magyar towns have two deputies for 300 voters ; 
some Roumanian towns with 5,000 voters are un- 
represented. Of the 74 deputies, 35 are sent by 
four Magyar counties and 35 urban communes. 
There remain over S3 counties in which the excess 
of Roumanians over Magyars is as 18 to 7. 

In practice, only electors who can speak Magyar 
are allowed to vote ; and the military are employed 
to bar access to undesired voters ; and every de- 
vice is employed, such as arbitrary imprisonment, 
falsification of the counting, to secure the election 
of the Magyar candidate. The result is that of 
the 417 deputies only one is a Roumanian, whereas 
the proportion, on a basis of population, should 
be 75. 

All non-Magyar populations are equally affected. 

8 Jbid, p. 58. 



40 ROUMANIA 

In 1884 the Slovaks decided to abstain from the 
elections altogether ; and their suit was followed 
by the Serbs and Roumanians in 1892. On the 
other hand, there are seven Saxons who adhere to 
the Magyar Liberal party. 

It v/as in 1891, when the protest of the Rou- 
manian students of Bucarest appeared and was 
officially answered by the Magyar students of 
Kolozsvar. In that year A magyar dllam (the 
Magyar State) (22 vij, 1891) wrote : — 

"And moreover it is a fact that in the districts 
inhabited by the nationalities we find a body of 
officials, who in the name of the Hungarian State 
administer and render justice in a manner worthy 
only of the Turkish Pashas. We might enumer- 
ate hundreds of similar cases which all prove that 
the Governors themselves do not respect the Law 
of the Nationalities, so that even after the appear- 
ance of the Reply of the Magyars one sad truth 
remains incontestable, that in reality the Nation- 
alities are oppressed." [Reply of the Roumanian 
students'] . 

In the elections of 1896 this public voting took 
place only in the large towns, thus excluding the 
Roumanian peasantry, who were further incapaci- 
tated by a severe examination as to their know- 
ledge of Magyar, and by the electoral census 
being raised in Roum.anian towns to a sum 
three or four times as high as in Magyar towns. 
In 1896 two army corps were mobilized in Hungary 
to preside over the elections. The result was 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 4I 

that instead of 80 members, the Roumanians were 
represented by three in the Chamber [Mavrodin, 
p. 7]. " The exercise of the franchise by the non- 
Magyars is prevented or restricted by every imag- 
inable device or chicanery, and there is an 
elaborate governmental system of terrorism or re- 
pression. The whole machinery of the State is 
thrown into the scale against the non-Magyar 
voter, and his chances are rendered well-nigh hope- 
less by wholesale employment of troops and armed 
gendarmes to preserve order." 

At the present time the Magyar Lower Cham- 
ber consists of 413 deputies (excluding 40 sent to 
it from Croatia-Slavonia), and of these only 8, 
instead of 198 on a basis of population, are non- 
Magyars : i.e., 1.79 per cent, instead of 47.9. 

In the Austrian House even, which is grossly 
packed, the non-Germans outnumber the Germans 
by 26 (233 Germans, 283 non-Germans), and the 
elections are not supervised by the military [New 
Europe, No. 11] . 

(II.) Education. 

The matter of education is one of the sorest for 
a subject nationality. How are the young to have 
adequate knowledge of their own language and 
institutions ? What would have been the outcry 
in South Africa and Canada, if Dutch and French 
had been proscribed, and the use of the two lan- 
guages not been legal and obligatory for all pur- 
poses ? Even as things are, there are complaints, 



42 ROUMANIA 

if by accident one or two officials are not competent 
linguists. The Magyars have been faithful pupils 
of the Prussians in Poland and Sleswig ; they 
have bettered the example of their benefactors, 
through whose victory they obtained equality in 
the Dual Monarchy. 

Education and Church polity are inextricably 
connected, for it is the Churches that founded and 
maintained the first schools. 

Under the laws of 1868 all religious communi- 
ties were free together with their schools, in which 
the native language was to be the medium of in- 
struction, and the Magyar Reply of 1891 affirms 
that Roumanian is still so employed. The facts 
mentioned in the Roumanian Reply do not bear 
this contention out. Slavici says: "Although the 
Roumanians [who support their own voluntary 
schools] like other citizens pay their taxes, the 
Hungarian State contributes nothing to the 
improvement of Roumanian education. In 1848 
the Roumanians had a superior gymnasium, an 
ecclesiastical seminar and a Teachers' College at 
Blaj [Blasendorf], another superior gymnasium at 
Belenyes, and few hundreds of poor elementary 
schools. In 1879 they had four upper gymnasia 
at Blaj, Belenyes, Nasaud and Bra§ov and 
Szamos-tFjvar, etc., and 2,932 elementary schools. 
But the provision for their education is inferior to 
that of the Germans, the Slovaks, or the Magyars. 

Slavici published his book in 1880. In 1879 
Magyar was made a compulsory subject in all 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 43 

schools, and the secondary schools were almost 
entirely magyarized. 

There are insufficient schools for the Roumani- 
ans, e,g,y Sit Arad, where the Roumanian and 
Magyar populations are as 63 to 23 ; the pupils at 
the schools are as 45 to 405. So too at Caran.<jebe§. 
Further, no private schools may be opened at all ; 
and Roumanian endowed establishments are 
arbitrarily closed and converted to Magyar uses, 
e,g., at B^lenyes [Beju§]. 

There are no Roumanian universities ; the 
Austrian government under Count Lonyay refused 
permission, even during the relatively happier 
period of absolutism from 1849 to 1867. But at 
the Magyar universities at Pest and Kolozsvar the 
Roumanian students are only 5 per cent, and 11. 6 
per cent, respectively. 

In all the schools the names of the entrants have 
to be magyarized in spelling. [Roumanian Reply, 
pp. 58 . . .] 

In addition to this systematic persecution and 
repression, by Law XV. of 1891 any parents who 
are considered incompetent to look after their own 
children must send them in infancy to Infant 
Asylums, where they are handed over to Magyar 
foster-parents and denationalized. This practice 
has some curious Turanian parallels r the Turks 
used to recruit the Janissaries by a devchurme or 
children's poll-tax.^ Latterly, during last year's 

4 The same principle is now in full operation in occupied Serbia 
{Bir&evyya, Ved., ii i. 17). 



44 ROUMANIA 

Armenian atrocities, "the converts to Islam were 
offered the following terms : they must hand over 
all children under twelve years of age to the gov- 
ernment, which would undertake to place them in 
orphanages." So, too, the Tatars, when they 
ruled over medieval Russia, took a toll of young 
children, as a part of the scheme of taxation. 

In 1874, 1888, and 1889, a number of Slovak 
children were officially declared orphans and trans- 
ported to the Hungarian plain or puszta. 

These facts are mainly drawn from Roumanian 
sources ; but the allegations are not contradicted 
in the official Magyar Reply; the Russian Ency- 
clopaedia (which derives much of its information, 
both in matter and form, from German authorities) 
also states that — ''The teaching in the Hungarian 
schools must be in the native language of the 
pupils. In the year 1891-92 there were 28 schools 
in which the teaching was conducted in three 
languages. In 1891 a scheme of national infant 
education was introduced in Hungary, in spite 
of the opposition of the non-Magyar nations, and 
was intended as a step in the direction of crush- 
ing these nationalities." 

Not that the grievances are only Roumanian : 
they, as merely the largest subject people, are the 
most affected. Naumann says of the Germans in 
Transylvania: "Where the Germans in Austria 
or Hungary live dispersed and affronted, they are 
sure of our sympathy and protection ; but they 
should also, as far as possible, take into consider- 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 45 

ation that reciprocal justice raises the standard of 
a nation, and that there are other nations as well 
who want to live beside us." 

In the Austrian Bucovina, by common consent 
conditions are much more equable. 

There are two Roumanian Churches : one 
Orthodox Greek, and the other Greek Uniate, ow- 
ing allegiance to the Pope but using the Orthodox 
Ritual. The Greek Church is one in doctrine, 
but national in organization, unlike the Roman. 

(III.) The Church. 

The Roumanian Church in Transylvania was 
made autocephalous in 1868. Yet a Magyar Arch- 
bishop was immediately appointed, and a Magyar 
ministry was given control of the Church estates. 
In August, 1916, the appointment of Bishop 
Mangra raised a great outcry on account of his 
alleged Magyar proclivities. The ecclesiastical 
schools in Temesvar were taken over by the 
Magyars, and whilst 300,000 florins were allotted 
to the Magyar theatres, the amount assigned to 
the Roumanian Church was limited to 50,000. 

(IV.) Local Government. 

The municipal government is engineered so as 
to return only Magyars to power. In 1889 Baron 
Bdnffy held an inquisition into all the townships 
and expelled or fined all office-holders who could 
not speak the Magyar language. By decrees of 
1873 and 1874 it was laid down that all municipal 



46 ROUMANIA 

and local proceedings must be drawn up in 
Magyar ; and all judicial procedure must also be 
in that language. 

Yet the Law XLIX. of 1868, S. 7 provided that 
every inhabitant of a county in the country may 
use the national language of the commune at the 
tribunals of his district. The judge is to sum up, 
interrogate, etc., in the same language; and the 
proces-verbal also to be in the language assented 
to by the parties. 

All public or municipal officials are compelled 
to magyarize their names, and in the 21 counties 
of Transylvania out of 6,588 officials 405 are Rou- 
manian, instead of 3,310. [Roumanian Reply, 
1891]. 

The percentage of the population in some of the 
principal counties was as follows : — 





Roumanian 


Magyar 


Brass6 


36.18 


29.62 


Mdros-Torda 


35.04 


56. 5 


Maramdros 


25.91 


10.82 


Hdromsz^k 


12.78 


86.72 


Csik (Ciuc) 


12.02 


86.92 


Nagy-Sz6ben 


66.27 


2.18 



In Transylvania in 1891 amongst the officials 
in the ministries (where there should be 320 
Roumanians out of the 1,726), there were only 18; 
and in the High Court of Justice out of 428, 10 
Roumanians instead of 73. 

The provisions of Law XLIX. of 1868 that the 
authorities in the Transylvanian and other coun- 
ties should be selected from amongst men 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 47 

acquainted with the local language has been utterly 
disregarded ; and there is not one Roumanian 
Viscount (Lord-Lieutenant of a county) nor one 
Roumanian in the Supreme Court. 

The administration of justice has been entirely 
magyarized. Contrary to the fundamental laws 
of 1868, decrees were promulgated continuously 
from 1872 to 1888 that all the proceedings must be 
in Magyar, all the Counsels' speeches, all official 
correspondence, all registrations of land (with the 
incidental result that land-tenure has to depend on 
the good will or honesty of the official translator). 

The situation is not in the least comparable with 
anything Englishmen can imagine. Welsh is 
practically the only really live non-English 
language in England ; and Engish is not a small 
local tongue of a minority. The parallel would 
be, if the Welsh persecuted the use of English 
outside Wales, and made it the only official and 
governmental means of intercourse and business 
and education. 

V. Generally. 

The remaining forms of persecution of the Rou- 
manians are rather more non-descript. There is 
no right of association for any purpose, whether 
agricultural, literary, academic, commercial, trade 
unions, etc., etc. ; even Austrian and Prussian 
administration is less tyrannous; Roumanian 
societies exist at Vienna. 

Except for the Magyar and German press, there 



48 ROUMANIA 

is no liberty, and libel actions are taken on any 
pretext against publishers. Up to 1885 such ac- 
tions were brought up before the Assize Court at 
Hermannstadt [Nagy-Szeben, Sibiu], where the 
juries and judges were German, so that the 
charges failed before a non-national, but not hos- 
tile tribunal. In that year the Court was trans- 
ferred to Kolozsvar [Klausenburg, Cluj], where 
the whole apparatus iudicandi was securely 
Magyar, and no such miscarriages of Magyar 
justice have since failed of effect. There is still 
no Roumanian daily newspaper. 

The petty persecutions for dancing the national 
dances, wearing the national colours, reading the 
books published in the free kingdom of Roumania, 
singing Roumanian songs, and so forth, are too 
numerous to mention. Full evidence will be found 
in the books mentioned in the bibliography. 

In 1892 the Roumanians petitioned the Emper- 
or, but the Hungarian authorities frustrated the 
move. In 1894 there was a monster trial for trea- 
son at Kolozsvdr (like the Agram trial of 1908); 
the Hungarian counsel admitted at the end to the 
defendants : '' You are the condemned, but we are 
the vanquished." 

The administration of the law at the hands of 
the Magyar police is correspondingly and system- 
atically brutal and inhuman to a unimaginable 
degree. There is nothing but a reign of sheer 
force. 

The entire policy is dictated by one motive, the 



THE GRIEVANCES OF TRANSYLVANIA 49 

persuasion contained in Kossuth's phrase that 
Hungary must be Magyar or perish. There is no 
notion of federaHsm or conciHation. Thus in 
1885 a charge of 17% on the direct taxes was im- 
posed to pay for the expenses of magyarization in 
the County of Szathmar. The process involves, 
inter alia, the penahzing with fines or imprison- 
ment of those who will not transform their names ; 
all placenames are translated or altered beyond 
recognition or understanding by the local 
residents, and the expenses are put down to the 
recalcitrant victims. This picture might seem 
overdrawn ; but the Magyar apologists do not dis- 
pute, but rather corroborate and excuse these pro- 
ceedings; and allegations in the pro-Roumanian 
writings are supported by the German and 
Austrian authorities. The root of the evil is the 
dualism of 1867 which raised one of the races of 
Austria to a co-partnership in the profits of repres- 
sion. German as a lingua franca in the Austrian 
medley would not have been unacceptable. The 
arrogance of the Magyars was intolerable. Now, 
as the price of renewing the Ausgleich (which ex- 
pires on the 31st December, 191 7, and had to be 
confirmed by the 31st December, 1916), the 
Magyars are demanding Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
part of Serbia as their patrimony. 

The relations of the two partners in the dual 
monarchy have only been cordial, when they agree 
as to the proper treatment of other nations equally 
numerous and less favoured by fortune. Towards 



50 



ROUMANIA 



the Austrians, the Magyars have always shown 
themselves grasping and grudging. For the good 
of the world, such relations do not augur any per- 
manent friendship. 

Note. — This book is only concerned with the Roumanians ; but 
it is pertinent to state that in Hungary (outside Transylvania) the 
following Counties are almost entirely Slovak, viz., Arva, Liptau, 
Trentschin, Turec, Zips, S^ros, Zolyom, Nyitra, whilst Pozsony, 
Bars, Hont, N6grdd, Gomor, Abanj-Torna, Zemplin and Ung are 
Slovak to nearly 50 per cent.5 



S New Europe, No. 15. 



CHAPTER IV 

BESSARABIA 

The district now known as Bessarabia originally 
formed part of Roman Dacia, and in European 
times has always been part of Moldavia. In the 
Middle Ages it was ravaged by all the hordes 
that poured from Central Asia and the Steppes, 
and it provided few means of natural defence. 

When after 171 1 {i.e., after the treaties of Karlo- 
witz and Pozarevac, when Turkey had to recede to 
her boundaries up to 1856, beyond the Danube) 
Russia began to surge forward to redeem the 
Balkans and reach Constantinople, between 171 1 
and 1812, Bessarabia changed hands five times; 
it was the Russian land-road to her objective. The 
population is partly Roumanian, partly Little- 
Russian. 

In 181 2, by the Treaty of Bucarest, all of the 
Bessarabia^ was ceded to Russia. 

In 1829 (by the Treaty of Adrianople) Turkey 
had to cede the estuary of the Danube as well {i.e., 
the Northern Dobrudja); but by the Treaty of 
Paris, 1856, this was restored to Moldavia under 
Turkish suzerainty, and included in that single 

1 The derivation is uncertain, H^sdeu derives it from a rank 
Ban $orah (in Dacian Sarabes head) ; Roum. Basarab. 

51 



52 



ROUMANIA 



principality. The boundary was the river 
Yapluk. 

In 1878, by the Treaty of Berlin, Bessarabia 
was restored to Russia, but the Dobrudja and the 
Delta of the Danube, a Turkish and non-Roumanian 
country, ceded to the new State of Roumania. 

The racial frontier of Roumania is said to be 
the Dnestr ; and until Bessarabia was redeemed 
by Russia, it never had any special name, being 
an integral part of Moldavia. 

The population according to Russian authorities 
is accounted for as follows : — 



Races. 




Religions. 






Per cent. 


Orthodox 


1,368,668 


Moldavians^ 


... 47.9 


Rom. Cath 


9»307 


Russians 


... 27.8 


Armenian Gregorian 


3,849 


Jews 


... H.8 


Protestant 


44,214 


Bulgars 


••• 5-3 


Dissidents from the 




Greeks 


.1 


Orthodox Church 


21,900 


Turks and Tatars 


... 2.9 


Mahomedans 


930 


Germans 


... 3.1 


Jews 


•180,918 


Misc. 


.17 







Between 48% and 70% are Moldavians, or 
Roumanians; the remainder are Ruthenes or 
Little-Russians and Great-Russians. The Little- 
Russians are, in the main, to be found in the 
districts of Akkerman, Izmail, Bender (BenflepH) 
and Orgeyev, and also in the north-west corner, 
the uesd of Khotin. 



2 But according to Mavrodin, 63 per cent. ; and, 48 per cent, 
officially, but in fact 70 per cent., according to Laskov, BeccapaGiH, 
Ki> CTOJi'feTiio npHCOBAHHeHiH Ki> PoccIh Bessarabia. (The centenary 
of its union with Russia) Kisinev, 1912. 



BESSARABIA 53 

The Great-Russians in Bessarabia are immigrants 
and principally represent the official classes. 

There are also some Bulgarians near Komrat 
and Bolgrad, and 400 families of Armenians. 
Gypsies also exist in Bessarabia ; they made their 
first appearance in 1417 and were enslaved between 
1504 and 1509. 

A few Germans live at Akkerman, and Jews are 
also scattered over Bessarabia. 

The Moldavians principally inherit the uezd of 
Kisinev (Chisineii) and the banks of the Pruth. 

The Russian administration of Bessarabia has 
always left much to be desired. According to 
Kasso [A. A. Kasso : " Poccifl na flyna^, h 
o5pa30BaHie 6eccapa6cKOH o5jiacTH," Moscow, 
1913], Harting, the Governor of Bessarabia, in 
1813, intended standardizing Bessarabia with the 
other provinces of the Empire ; and the Moldavians 
tried to remonstrate with the Tsar ; and in the 
years 1 825-1 828 Bessarabia was assimilated to the 
other Russian province. Russian was made the 
only official language; and the use of Moldavian 
(i.e., Roumanian) forbidden in official procedure. 
Kasso admits that the early administration was 
very defective ; but, at any rate, it was of a piece 
with the general government of the country. 
There was no differentiation against the Rou- 
manian population, no attempt to russify them 
compulsorily. 

At the present time, Mavrodin says, the two 
millions of Roumanians in Bessarabia can neither 



54 ROUMANIA 

pray, nor be taught, or read in their own language, 
nor receive any pubHcations from free Roumania. 
"Ending this system would not only bring good 
fortune to the Moldavians of Bessarabia, but 
would also mitigate the rancour of the crime com- 
mitted in 1878 against our kingdom : and Russia 
would completely recover the sympathy of the 
Roumanian nation to which she is allied by bonds 
of religious and common memories in the past." 

It is in very different terms that Mavrodin 
inveighs against the Magyars. 

The Education and Language Question in 
Bessarabia. 

Mavrodin 's remarks as to the present situation 
have already been quoted, and a high standard is 
hardly to be expected. There is no Roumanian 
university — but Bessarabia suffers no less and no 
more than other subject peoples of Russia from 
the disabilities and intolerance practiced up to re- 
cent times, and has no specific grievance of 
specialized oppression. 

At all events, the Russian law on education is 
more generous than the Magyar, though the 
execution is lax. 

According to Laskov, at the time of the annexa- 
tion in 1812, no schools existed: the Phanariote 
gospodars of Moldavia occasionally opened Greek 
schools. 

In 1 81 3 an ecclesiastical seminar was instituted, 
in 1 816 a secondary school, and in 1828 schools 



BESSARABIA 55 

in the principal towns, such as Kisinev, Behsy, 
Khotin, Akkerman, Bender, Izmail, Reni, and 
Kilia; and in 1829 Jewish schools at Kisinev. In 
1909 there were altogether 109,000 pupils. There 
is no indication in Laskov that the instruction was 
not in the native language and by the medium of 
the native language : for the five years' curri- 
culum at the school established in 18 16 comprised 
compulsory French, Russian, and Moldavian. 

Further, the general regulations for subjects in 
Russian schools insist on religion, Russian and 
ordinary or special subjects : such as German and 
the local language (e.g., Esthonian or Courland- 
ish, the Caucasian languages). The medium of 
instruction is always the native language. In 
the provinces of Kiev and the south the religious 
supervision of non-orthodox schools is left to the 
proper religious authorities ; it is only in Poland 
(Vilna, Volhynia, Kovno, Grodno and Minsk, 
Mohilevsk and Vitebsk) that the local language 
(Polish) is used as the medium of instruction only 
during the first two years of elementary education. 
[Andreevski, Encyclopcedia]. 

This aim at liberality is a contrast to Prussian 
methods, e.g., in Sleswig, where children have to 
be taught in deaf-and-dumb show, because Danish 
is prohibited. [Le Slesvig du Nord, Copenhagen]. 

Tocilescu [^Manual de Istoria Romdnilor, Buca- 
rest, 1900] thus describes the manner in which 
Russia acquired Bessarabia ; — 

" By the Treaty of lasi, 1791, Russia advanced 

E 



56 ROUMANIA 

her western frontier to the Dnestr; by that of 1812 
she brought it up to the Pruth, soon afterwards 
taking the mouths of the Danube. In fact, Russia 
being threatened by Napoleon with war, could 
no longer maintain an army on the Danube, and, 
consequently, would have been very glad to con- 
clude a peace with Turkey on any conditions. 
Napoleon even warned the Sultan not to accept the 
peace which the Russians wanted, much less to 
approve their claims, because he had declared war 
on Russia. Unfortunately, the Porte's foreign 
affairs were then in the hands of the brothers 
Moruzi, who, like all the Phanariote Greeks, were 
sold to Russia. The Dragoman Dimitri Moruzi was 
commissioned to conclude peace at Bucarest and 
let his brother Panaiot take his place. When he 
received Napoleon's message, instead of translating 
it and giving it to the Sultan, he sent it on to 
Dimitri, who handed it to the Russian ambassadors 
in place of giving it to the Turkish minister, 
Galip Effendi. Galip Effendi, being ignorant of 
the circumstances, seeing that the Russian 
ambassadors no longer claimed both principalities, 
but would be content with Bessarabia, signed 
the peace (12th May, 1812). Shortly after this 
treachery of Moruzi was discovered, and 
though rather late, he received his due reward : 
Dimitri was beheaded on the 8th November, and 
his brother Panaiot also." 

Take lonescu in 1891 says of Bessarabia: ''It 
was the first to be snatched from South-Eastern 



BESSARABIA 57 

Europe, on the pretext of rescue from Turkish 
tyranny. An excellent opportunity was presented 
to the Russian government of proving to the 
Eastern Christians that a Russian supremacy is 
not incompatible with a national and proper life 
amongst her subjects or confederates. But what 
has Russia done in Bessarabia ? She has spared 
no device to denationalize it with unheard-of speed. 
The religion being the same, it became a tool for 
Russification. The lack of a Roumanian middle 
class made it possible to widen the gap between 
the peasantry and the governing classes. Russia, 
who in Poland championed the peasants against 
the nobles, has, in Bessarabia, propitiated the 
hoyar class by systematic bribery, so as to leave 
the peasantry without natural leaders. She has 
forbidden, uniting violence with Machiavellianism, 
in this Roumanian country, the reading of any 
Roumanian book or paper." 

Whether the extraordinary advance of democ- 
racy in Russia, the rise of a Duma powerful 
enough against Court influence to cast out two 
ministries during this war, has altered matters for 
the better, we do not know.^ 

Possibly the war has made Russia gentler. At 
any rate the welcome given to the Russians in this 
war is symptomatic : whereas the Hungarian Parlia- 
ment has sat continuously during the war and has 
not temporized with the Roumanians. On the 

3 This was written before the Russian Revolution. 



58 ROUMANIA 

contrary, as soon as Roumania declared war, the 
Magyar Government confiscated all the funds of 
the Roumanian municipalities in Transylvania 
[Independance roumaine, loth Oct., 1916]. 

The Roumanian people are evidently less af- 
flicted in Bessarabia than in Transylvania. 



CHAPTER V 

THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO 
THE WAR OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA. 

Preliminary. — The principal authority is the 
third Austro-Hungarian Red Book : and the 
slender volume, officially issued, challenges com- 
parison with the second, the one bearing on the 
war with Italy. 

The contrast is very pronounced. In the Italian 
volume there are 205 diplomatic excerpts, no gaps 
or discontinuity, and full reports not only of the 
despatches of the Austrian Ambassador and the 
Austrian Chancellor, but also of the interviews at 
Vienna, at Berlin and elsewhere. The collection 
is so full, and corresponds so well with the Italian 
Green Book, that it is a reliable source of history. 
The appendices contain extracts from the Triple 
Alliance, and other pronouncements bearing on 
the Treaty relations. 

For the two years of negotiations with 
Roumania we have only no documents : 25 for the 
year 1914, 25 for the year 1915, and 60 for 1916; 
and there are no documents quoted for any of the 
winter months; no references to the obligations of 
Austria under the Treaty of Triple Alliance or 

59 



6o ROUMANIA 

Otherwise, no references (save one, No. 90) to any 
demand by Roumania for territorial compensa- 
tions, whilst the lacunae in the correspondence are 
most noticeable. Unlike the previous Red Book, 
this ofificial emanation must be ranked with the 
German White Book and the first Austrian Red 
Book, as a compilation availing itself of the ofificial 
devices of suppression, and, possibly, re-editing, 
to obtain the desired effect, that of demonstrating 
that Roumania for two years protested a specious 
and unconvincing neutrality, and, with the most 
bare-faced treachery, without even any skilled 
sophistications, at the end of two years, sprang a 
declaration of war on a long-suffering ally. The 
most improbable feature of this ofificial tale is either 
the incredible fatuousness of a Roumanian govern^ 
ment that imagined it could be beguiling the 
intended foe, or an Austria which would not have 
acted much sooner in the face of such undisguised 
villainy. 

So much for the deficiencies of this ofificial book 
on internal evidence. It remains to supplement 
it from other sources. 

First, from Austrian ofificial sources. The Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book on Italy (henceforward re- 
ferred to as A. H.I I.) contains some of the clauses 
of the Triple Alliance. Italy and Roumania both 
entered the Triple Alliance in the year 1883, ^^ the 
same ground and with the same objects. They 
were both of them fundamentally embroiled with 
Austria, who retained lands belonging to their co- 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 6 1 

nationals, in the Trentino and Transylvania, 
countries which were being systematically op- 
pressed and denationalized. There could be no 
relations between either and Austria, save war or a 
very sharply defined alliance. Bismarck attained 
the latter result at the Conference of Berlin, by 
inducing France to occupy Tunis, and Russia 
to re-assume the whole of Bessarabia : the two 
states were too weak to stand in splendid isolation, 
and had to gravitate towards one or other of the 
great alliances. 

But the terms were rigid. If Italy and Roumania 
were to be debarred from their natural extension 
into their native territories, it could only be on 
a mutual ordinance of self-denial; any advance 
by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans or the ^gean 
was to be accompanied with compensatory 
advances in territory to Roumania and Italy; 
and no advance was to be made or contemplated 
without an entire preliminary accord. 

This arrangement, artificial in its essence, 
bolstered up through all the lighter crises in the 
Near East, was shattered by two great changes : 
when Italy waged war with Turkey for Tripoli 
(which was outside the bounds of Article VII.) 
and thus compensated herself for her loss of Tunis; 
and when Roumania, after the Balkan war, secured 
some share in the redistributed territories. The 
Austrian contention (in A.-H. II) that the 
provisions of xA.rticle VI T applied intact to the 
Balkan territories, after Turkish sovereignty was 



62 ROUMANIA 

at an end, was refuted by Italy, and absurd in 
itself. 

The clauses published in A.H. II are cited 
infra. The negotiations between Italy and Aus- 
tria were based on Article VII ; and Italy, backed 
to a certain extent by Germany, extorted very large 
promises of concessions in the Tyrol and Dalmatia, 
the fulfilment of which was left uncertain. ^ So, 
too, the Rec of Petrograd states on the 15th 
August, 1916 :^ "Last year's experience with Italy 
proves which of the partners in the Austro-German 
firm is held materially accountable for failure 
in war. The liabilities are always payable in 
Austrian coin. Last year, Germany wrung out of 
Austria her assent to territorial compensations for 
Italy. LTnfortunately, in the case of Roumania, 
Roumania is claiming territories belonging to the 
dual monarchy, incorporated not with the wizened 
frame of Austria, but with the vigorous energetic 
body of Hungary." 

The clauses mentioned are — 

"Article I. — The Contracting Parties promise 
each other mutually peace and friendship, and will 
not enter into any alliance or treaty directed against 
any one of these States. 

"They engage to practise the habit of an 
exchange of thought on political and economic 
questions of a general nature, such as may arise, 

1 vi., " Pros and Cons " in " The Great War." 

2 Cf. The Times, 27th July, 1915. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 63 

and, in addition, promise each other mutual support 
in the realm of their own interests. 

" Article III. — If one or two of the Contracting 
Parties be attacked without a direct provocation 
emanating from its own side, and should find 
itself or themselves at war with two or more Great 
Powers who are not parties to this Treaty, the 
casus foederis shall simultaneously spring into 
being for all the Contracting Parties. 

"Article IV. — In the event of a Great Power, 
which has not subscribed this present Treaty, 
threatening the safety of the States of one of the 
Contracting Parties, and the State thus menaced 
considering itself obliged therefore to declare war 
on such another Power, the two remaining allies 
pledge themselves to- observe a benevolent 
neutrality towards their ally. Each of them 
reserves to itself the right to take part in the war, 
should it deem fit to make common cause with its 
ally. 

"Article VII. — With the intention of conserving, 
as far as possible, the status quo in the East, 
Austria-Hungary and Italy hereby engage to 
utilize their influence with the object of preventing 
any territorial alteration that might be prejudicial 
to one or the other of the Powers signatories to 
this present Treaty. For this purpose they will 
communicate to each other all items of news that 
might serve to enlighten each other mutually on 
their own objectives, as well as on those of other 
Powers. However, in the event of circumstances 



64 ROUMANIA 

rendering impossible the conservation of the status 
quo in the Balkans, or in the region of the Turkish 
coasts and islands in the Adriatic and ^gean 
Seas ; and in the event, whether resultant from the 
action of a third Power, or from an}^ other cause, of 
either Austria-Hungary or Italy seeing itself obliged 
or forced to modify the status quo by an occupation 
temporary or permanent, in all such events such 
an occupation shall only take place after a 
preliminary agreement between these two Powers; 
and such agreement shall be based on the principle 
of a mutual compensation for each and every 
advantage, territorial or otherwise, which either of 
these Powers might gain over and beyond the 
present status quo; such previous agreement to 
give satisfaction to the authenticated interests and 
claims of both Parties." 

Thus this first omission of these fundamental 
clauses suggests the nature of some of the gaps 
in this correspondence. These have, as far as 
possible, been eked out from other sources. But 
it follows that, as in No. 4, Roumania distinctly 
intimated that no casus foederis arose under the 
Treaty, the obligation to compensate was also 
brought to life. The position of Roumania, as 
of Italy, was that of a junior partner, aggrieved by 
the forcible action of the principal partner, but 
not in a position to vindicate his right immediately. 
Such a victim would not be considered to be in the 
wrong, if he lay low, bided his time, and selected 
the moment opportune to himself, not to his 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 65 

culprit partners, to seek redress. The complete 
pretermission of any such negotiations is the second 
great deficiency in this slim Red Book. It suggests 
that there is much to conceal, and good politic 
reasons for reticence. 

Thirdly, one more general observation may be 
made. These despatches are purely Austrian, and 
their strict accuracy cannot be checked (as was the 
case with A.H. II, which is very faithful, and 
tallies with the Italian Green Book); and, on a 
general comparison of the style, these despatches 
do give countenance to a surmise that they have 
been edited for the gallery. There are precedents, 
at the Friedjung Trial, 191 3, and elsewhere, of 
official forgeries in Austria, and still more recently 
at the trial of Kramar [New Europe, 4, i. 17], the 
Cech leader, when a letter sent by Kramar to 
Count Thun was proved to have been falsified for 
the purposes of the Court-Martial; and the witness 
to the forgery was Count Thun himself. Austria 
had valid reason to suspect both the Italian and 
the Roumanian premiers of a desire to reacquire 
their terre irredente ; but in the Roumanian 
documents the dramatic insistence by Count 
Czernin on the " betrayal, treachery, lies," 
of Bratianu is unconvincingly frequent and 
indiscriminating. A diplomat would have used a 
style less gross, less strident, and more trenchant, 
especially such masters of refined and clear German 
style, as the diplomatic agents of Austria appear 
to be from their three official publications. 



66 ROUMANIA 

Lastly, before proceeding to the analysis of these 
diplomatic papers, it should be observed that 
Roumania, though it is a constitutional country, 
accords the King a much greater independence 
of his ministers, than Italy — or, of course, Great 
Britain. The King can apparently receive foreign 
Ambassadors apart from his ministers, and state 
his own views, and, subject to their consent, make 
agreements binding on his country. There was 
evidently some divergence of view between both 
King Charles and King Ferdinand with the 
Cabinet. 

Roumania is, as one of the most advanced of the 
Balkan States, also one of the most constitutional, 
and the King has no despotic powers : a psycho- 
logical fact which the ambassadors of the two 
Empires failed to recognise. Their experience in 
Bulgaria and Greece, and their home traditions 
may have misled them. 

The dramatis personae in the prologue to the real 
conflict now being enacteid in Roumania are : — 

Roumania. 
King Charles and King Ferdinand. 
Ion C. Bratianu, Prime Minister. 
Take lonescu, Conservative Democrat Party 

leader. 
Nicholas Filipescu j Conservative 

Alexander Marghiloman i Democrats. 
Porumbaru, Foreign Minister. 
Costinescu, Financial Minister. 



the negotiations of roumania and austria 67 

Austria-Hungary and Germany. 
Count Berchtold, succeeded by Baron Burian, 

Austrian Chancellor. 
Ottokar Count Czernin (also von Wodianer, 
his deputy), Austro-Hungarian Minister 
at Bucarest. 
Gottfried Prince zu Hohenlohe; and Herr von 

Jagow, at the Foreign Office at Berlin. 
Consul-General von Felner, Austro Hungarian 

Consul at Gala^T. 
Freiherr von Giskra, Austro-Hungarian 

Minister at the Hague. 
Count Hadik, Austro-Hungarian Minister at 
Stockholm. 
The following interesting study of Count 
Czernin (Austria-Hungary's new Foreign Minister), 
who, till last August was minister in Bucarest, is 
from the pen of the distinguished Roumanian 
statesman. Take lonescu, and appeared in his 
newspaper, La Roumanie, a few days before the 
evacuation of the capital. 

Count Czernin was no longer in the service, 
when in 191 3 Vienna thought fit to replace Prince 
Fiirstenberg, who had not been able to prevent 
Roumania's entry into the war against Bulgaria, 
and in consequence, the Peace of Bucarest. 

It was the Archduke Ferdinand who chose 
Czernin. He had long singled him out as his 
future Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in the 
meanwhile he sent him to Bucarest with the defi- 



68 ROUMANIA 

nite mission of patching up Austro-Roumanian 
relations once more by means of serious con- 
cessions, which the Magyars were to make to the 
Roumanians of Transylvania. 

Take lonescu says : — 

"I met Count Czernin for the first time soon after 
his arrival at the opening of the new Industrial 
Museum. He took me into a corner, and despite 
the crowd all around us, explained to me that he 
had come to B nearest with the sole object of con- 
solidating our relations by the large concessions 
which the Magyars were tO' make to the 
Roumanians. He assured me that these concessions 
would be made, whether the Magyars liked it or 
no; but that it was certain that Budapest would 
see reason in the end, since it was not merely a 
matter of justice, but of sheer necessity. Without 
these large concessions on the part of the Magyars, 
the Austro-Roumanian alliance could no longer 
continue. 

" There was a measure of true courage in this 
firm declaration. I had no doubt whatsoever that 
Count Czernin was under an illusion as to the 
possibility of serious concessions, but it was very 
honourable on the part of an Austro-Hungarian 
Minister to acknowledge that they were necessary. 

" At the same time, it seemed very strange that 
he should make such a definite declaration to me 
at our first meeting, and in the midst of a crowd 
that jostled us at every turn. It merely confirmed 
my former opinion of Austrian diplomatists. In 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 69 

course of time, it became obvious even to Count 
Czernin that the story of Magyar concessions to 
the Roumanians of Hungary would remain a mere 
Arabian night's entertainment, and he spoke of it 
less and less whenever I met him 

• ••••• 

" Then when I answered that the issues of war 
and peace did not rest with me, he declared : — 

*' ' You will go to war with us. That is an 
understood thing. It is both your interest and 
your duty. Why, if I were a Roumanian, I should 
attack Austria; and I do not see why you should 
not do what I would do in your place. It certainly 
is not a noble action to turn against an ally; but 
history is full of such villainies, that of Austria, 
as well as of other states; and I do not see why 
Roumania should be the only exception.' " 

This article by Take lonescu can be confirmed 
from other sources : Czernin informed a Hungarian 
journalist on Jan. 20th, 1914, that the Roumanians 
in Hungary had no rights : and this state of things 
was unjust. 3 

The following extract from Dr. E. J. Dillon's 
article in The Fortnightly Review ^ October, 191 6, 
explains the treaty obligations of Roumania prior 
to the War : — 

(p- 536) "As soon as Germany had burned her 
boats and appealed to the sword, the question 

3 Debate, Hungarian Parliament. [29th Sept., 1916]. A Vildg, 
17, recalling that Czernin 's appointment in 19 13 raised stormy 
protests : as it was considered he held opinions incompatible with 
the Hungarian Constitution. 



70 ROUMANIA 

became urgent what course her Allies would strike 
out. Besides Bulgaria, whose engagements were 
unknowm to the Entente Powers, there were Italy 
and Roumania to consider. The latter country was 
allied to the Central Empires by a Treaty concluded 
in the year 1883, and renewed several times since 
then, the last occasion being in the year 1912, 
during the Balkan War. This compact, which was 
extended to Italy in 1888, was not based on that of 
the Triple Alliance, but on the earlier Austro- 
Hungarian-German Alliance. By its terms, the 
co-operation of the four countries in dealing with 
the Near East was established, the defence of the 
Hohenzollern dynasty in Roumania was promised 
in case of need; Roumania bound herself to con- 
struct fortifications against Russian aggression, not 
to conclude any political or economic alliance with 
any other State without the knowledge and assent 
of her Allies, and not to encourage disaffection 
among the Roumanians of Austria-Hungary. 
Should opportunity serve, Roumania's efforts to 
widen her frontiers at the expense of Russia, 
Serbia, or in the Dobrudja would be backed by 
her Allies, and in case Austria were attacked by 
Russia, Turkey or Serbia, it would be Roumania's 
duty to go to the assistance of the Habsburg 
Monarchy and place all her forces and all her 
strongholds at the disposition of her Ally. Lastly, 
if, while the Treaty was in force, Austria-Hungary 
should put the Balkan States under her, Roumania 
would profit largely by Hungary's acquisitions. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 7 1 

*' Now this covenant, which afterwards compre- 
hended Italy, had one flaw :^ concluded by King 
Carol alone, it had never [p. 537] been submitted 
either to the Parliament or to a Cabinet Council, 
and was therefore null and void. Each Prime 
Minister, after he had taken office, was cognisant 
of the arrangement, but was bound to absolute 
secrecy. Now the Monarch, although only a con- 
stitutional ruler, enjoyed a degree of freedom of 
initiative in matters of foreign policy which is 
usually reserved to autocrats. This privilege, how- 
ever, was based exclusively on the tacit consent 
of all parties in the State, and no serious protest 
was ever raised by any of them against his openly 
avowed prepossession for the Central Empires in 
general, or for Austria in particular. But this 
concession neither implied nor involved a change 
in the constitutional law of the realm which lays 
it down that treaties with foreign countries, to be 
binding, must have been ratified by the legislature. 
The circumstances that this one was countersigned 
by the Premier goes for nothing, because he has 
no authority to discharge the functions of the 
Parliament. 

" On the outbreak of the war, Italy, who also 
had a treaty with the Central Empires, was con- 
sidering her position, when King Carol called a 

^ 4 Furthermore, in 1913, Bratianu warned both Berlin and Vienna 
that the Treaty could not be fulfilled by anyone in Roumania, unless 
full account were taken of Roumanian national interests, and war 
on Serbia would mean a European war. (Speech at las'i, Novoye 
V ferny a, 4. i. 17). 

F 



72 ROUMANIA 

Crown Council at Bucarest for August the 3rd, to 
discuss the situation and concert means of action. 
He was a straight, honourable man, who held that, 
having given his promise in 1883 to the Central 
Empires, it was now his duty to redeem his word. 
To the Ministers and ex-Ministers assembled in the 
Council Hall, he revealed the existence of the 
treaty, accentuated the benefits which it had con- 
ferred , on the people, and proposed to discharge 
the duties of ally which he had taken over in the 
name of the nation. But his words evoked no 
responsive echo. A number of the members 
repudiated an obligation taken over without their 
authority, without their knowledge, without the 
usual tests and the constitutional ratification. 
Some, like Carp, fell in with the King's pro- 
posal, but it was in danger of being rejected. Then 
the Monarch appealed to their sense of honour, 
and asked what figure Roumania would cut in 
Europe, if she left friends of thirty year's standing 
in the lurch, especially as Italy, who was in the 
same boat as Roumania, was certain to keep her 
promise and draw the sword with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. 

" His stirring words made a deep impression on 
all the members of the Council, for they believed 
that Italy would take the course traced by the 
King. In fact, for the previous forty-eight hours, 
Bratianu had been expecting a telegram from 
Rome informing him of Italy's decision. It was 
already three o'clock in the afternoon, and no 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF ROUMANIA AND AUSTRIA 73 

dispatch had been delivered. The members of the 
Council were growing nervous, for a decision had 
to be come to in one sense or the other, the 
Monarch having put the question. The King, in- 
deed, had Italy's readiness to meet her obligations 
as an argument. And it was undoubtedly a telling 
consideration; but was it true? Just as one of the 
scales was about to descend, and the Council, under 
the impression of the King's address, and on the 
assumption that Italy would declare war on France, 
Russia, and Britain, was on the point of recording 
its vote, a messenger entered and announced the 
Italian Minister in Bucarest, Baron Fasciotti, who 
requested to be received on a matter of great 
urgency. Silence fell upon the assembly; and the 
King, rising and requesting the members to await 
his return, left the hall, and ordered the messenger 
to usher in the diplomatist. A few minutes later, 
the Monarch returned, and straightway informed 
the members that Italy had decided upon neutrality. 
Most of the statesmen present looked relieved, and 
the King, addressing them, admitted frankly that it 
was superfluous, in the circumstances, to continue 
the discussion; for if Italy, whose engagements 
with the Central Empires did not essentially differ 
from those of Roumania, deemed it compatible 
with her honour to remain neutral, there was no 
pressing motive why Roumania should act differ- 
ently." 



CHAPTER VI 

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 

AUSTRIA AND ROUMANIA 

PRECEDING THE WAR. 

I^oumania §i. — On the 22nd July, 191 4, Count 

S!™il!f{Jj Berchtold at Vienna instructed Ottokar 
remaining 

neutral. Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister at Bucarest to inform the 
Roumanian Government that Austria intended 
handing in a 48 hours' ultimatum to Serbia [No. 
i]. Whether or not an explanatory memorandum 
is suppressed (such as appears in the Italian Red 
Book No. 2 of the 20th July), to the effect that 
Clause VII. of the Triple Alliance does not apply 
(in view of the inheritance of Turkey in the 
Balkans having since 1883 fallen to the Balkan 
States) is doubtful : but it is probable : for on the 
26th Berchtold informed Czernin that Serbia had 
refused the Austrian offer — in itself a gross mis- 
statement. [No. 2]. In this despatch Berchtold 
emphasizes that Austria does not intend any terri- 
torial aggrandisement at Serbia's expense, and 
hopes that the war will remain " localized." There 
is implied in this note a belated admission that 
Austria's act, without consultation, is contrary to 

74 



NEGOTIATIONS 75 

the terms of the Alliance : for it adds " The loyalty 
and wisdom of His Majesty (King Charles) led 
us to expect a strict neutrality'^ on the part of 
Roumania. We, having regard to our alliance, 
would not in further eventualities take any measure 
that affects Roumanian interests, without sounding 
our ally's wishes. If Russia were to take hostile 
action against us, we should reckon on the loyal 
co-operation of Roumania as our ally." 

On the 28th July, Czernin had an audience of 
the King himself, and the upshot of the con- 
versation was : — 

1. In a war between the Monarchy and Serbia, 
the King guaranteed Roumania's strict neutrality. 

2. The King was satisfied with the declaration 
that the interests of Roumania would be regarded 
in any subsequent actions. 

3. The King, despite his personal goodwill, 
would not promise military aid against Russia : 
but no power on earth would move him to mobilize 
against the Monarchy. [No. 3; 28th July, 1914]. 

However, other national forces were at work. On 
the 4th August, Bratianu, the Premier, informed 
Czernin of the result of the Crown Council at 
Sinaia. " After a fervid appeal by the King to 
set the Treaty in motion, the Council decided with 
one dissentient that no party dared take such a 
responsibility. It has resolved that as Roumania 
was neither consulted nor informed in advance of 

1 Italics inserted by editoc. 



76 ROUMANIA 

the Austro-Hungarian dem.arche at Belgrade, no 
casus foederis had arisen. It also resolved that 
military precautions should be taken to hold the 
frontiers : and therein it was benefiting the 
Monarchy, and covering some hundreds of miles." 
[No. 4]. 

After this clear indication that Roumania was 
not an autocracy, it might have been supposed that 
Austria would deal with the constitutional situa- 
tion, as such; but this, as will be seen, was too 
great an effort of imagination. 

Austria evidently remonstrated with Berlin (as 
she did in the Austro-Italian negotiations), and 
Berlin persuaded Austria to accept the decision and 
" in future to respect Roumanian interests, but 
with the certain expectation that Roumania would 
hold her Moldavian frontiers, and guard against 
a Russian irruption." [4th August, 1914; No. 5]. 

This joint declaration of the two Central Em- 
pires had an "excellent effect," and "did more 
to conciliate Roumania and those Empires than 
anything in the history of the past forty years." 

These were Bratianu's words [No. 6; 5th 
August]. The key-note is "that Roumania's 
interests would be respected by both Empires in 
this difficult situation." 

Czernin (like Macchio at Rome in the Italian 
negotiations) was cynical on the situation. He 
said that Italy's decision to remain neutral had 
influenced the Crown Council at Sinaia : that King 
Charles was, sincerely, pro-German; but that 



NEGOTIATIONS 77 

Roumania would join the victor, either in loyalty 
to her allies, or to share in the distribution of the 
Austrian Empire. But she would resist a Russian 
invasion. [No. 7; 6th August]. 

Take lonescu affirmed that Roumania would be 
neutral to the end of the war — in a pamphlet of 
1891^ he argued it was inconceivable for Roumania 
to assist either of the oppressors of the Roumanian 
race, Hungary and Russia — Bratianu inclined to 
think that Roumania might proceed against Russia. 
[No. 8; 8th August]. 

Roumania The attitude of Roumania at the out- 
and break of war in July, 191 4, was largely 

contingent on that of Greece. On July 
25, 1914, Pasic, the Serbian Premier, asked for an 
indication of the attitude of Greece in view of the 
rupture between Austria and Serbia. Venizelos 
replied that Greece would hold her forces in re- 
serve to oppose Bulgaria if she eventually attacked 
Serbia,^ so as to assure respect for the Treaty of 
Bucarest. " Simultaneously with this, Venizelos 
got into touch with the Cabinet of Bucarest, and 
proceeded with them to a joint friendly dhnarche 
to Bulgaria, in vvdiich it was made clear that 
Roumania would insist upon the maintenance of 
the Treaty of Bucarest (1913), as indeed they had 
undertaken to do in a secret annexe to that docu- 
ment." 

However, '' Germany was at this time already 

2 La politique itrangere de la Roumanie, Bucarest, 1891. 

3 Crawfurd Price, p. 47. 



78 ROUMANIA 

casting around for allies. She was reasonably sure 
of Turkey, and Bulgaria (according to a declara- 
tion made this summer [1916] by the President 
of the Bulgarian Chamber to the Hungarian paper, 
the Pester Lloyd) was already committed to her. 
M. Venizelos' warning of July 25 effectually held 
back Bulgaria, and a suggestion of a new Balkan 
combination, as a result of which Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece were to re-model 
the map of the Peninsula in their own favour at the 
expense of Serbia, which was thrown out by Talaat 
Bey at B nearest, was also checkmated by the same 
hand."* 

Turkey proceeded to war two months after the 
arrival of the Goehen and Breslau at Constanti- 
nople; the reason of her delay was twofold, firstly, 
unwillingness to act as the catspaw of Germany, 
secondly, that the object of this "sale" was 
ostensibly to enable Turkey to attack Greece and 
reacquire the islands off the coast of Asia Minor.^ 
Grey declared that the Turkish Fleet should not 
be allowed to sail outside the Dardanelles;^ and 
thus this possible war was frustrated, and the 
Turkish forces were directed against Russia, 
literally by force majeure on the part of the 
Central Powers. 

When the Turkish fleet was led by German 
commanders against Odessa, and Turkey was thus 

4 Crawfurd Price, p. 51. 

5 Cf. Belgian Grey Book, IV., No. 53, quoted on p. 87. 

6 Turkish White Paper, Nos. 55 and 56, 3rd Sept., 1914. 



NEGOTIATIONS 79 

jockeyed into the war,^ Greece was again anxious 
to intervene : but made it conditional on obtaining 
the support either of Bulgaria or Roumania.^ 
Roumania refused, because a victory of the 
Central Powers, or the Entente, would both 
probably result in an aggrandisement of Bulgaria, 
as a reward either of intervention on the side of the 
Central Powers, or as a sop from the Entente for 
her neutrality. 

These considerations to a certain extent supple- 
ment the partial story in the Third Austro- 
Hungarian Red Book, the hesitation of Roumania 
and Greece were alike ascribable to the diplomatic 
haze in which Bulgaria was skilfully concealing her 
real intentions; while the Entente was suing for her 
favour. 

The first §2. — There is a gap in the Austrian 

possibility papers partly supplemented by the 

when Turkey negotiations with Greece : and the 
Joined in. despatches attenuate from this point 

onwards. The entry of Bulgaria 
and Turkey was being mooted. No. 53 of the 
Second Belgian Grey Book is very much to the 
point. The Belgian Minister at Constantinople 
reports to Davignon that Turkey is on the point 
of entering the field. "The Ottoman army is 
much too weak to create any effective diversion 
against Russia. But Roumania seems to be on the 

7 On the 29th Oct., 1914 [R.O.B., Nos. 90 and 91]. 

8 Crawfurd Price, p. 55. 



8o ROUMANIA 

point of taking a hostile attitude towards Austria, 
which she could not manage without making 
sure of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria. 
Possibly Berlin intends putting pressure on 
Roumania and Bulgaria at the weak point in their 
armour, viz., their Black Sea Coast, which they 
could not defend against a bombardment by the 
Turkish fleet. Yesterday and the day before the 
Breslau and Goeben did firing practice in the Black 
Sea." 

It was generally expected that Turkey would 
declare war on Greece to secure the islands on the 
coast of Asia Minor. [Belgian Grey Book, No. 
43; 7th September, 1914]. 

This despatch lends colour to the Austrian 
surmise of the 23rd Aug., 1914, that Russia with 
large promises and grave intimidation (grosster 
Terrorismus) had been working on both Sofia and 
Bucarest, and making the ministers personally 
answerable for an anti-Russian policy. [No. 9]. 

On the 13th September, Czernin reported to 
Berchtold that the Roumanians were deeply 
impressed by Russia's advance in Galicia; that 
Bratianu considered the Austrian position to be 
critical; that agitation was rife for co-operation 
with the Entente. [Nos. 10 and 11].^ 

" The cry, ' We want Transylvania,' is the order 
of the day. Bratianu every day becomes more 
ambiguous and anxious : the King is the only 

9 Cf. Times, 20th Sept., 1914. 



NEGOTIATIONS 8 1 

brake acting on the downward road." [No. 12; 
19th September, 1914]. 

i^oumania §3- — Turkey was formally ushered 

remains into the war by Germany on Nov. 5th, 

Death of ^914 • ^ut the preparations were going 

King Charles, on all the tim.e preceding, as is 
evident from the British and Russian 
despatches. Roumania, as the controller of the 
only road to Turkey, was affected : Serbia being, 
as yet, unconquered. 

Bratianu refused leave for the transport of muni- 
tions to Turkey : the Roumanians were eager for 
war against the Monarchy, and any such per- 
mission would cause a popular outbreak. Czernin 
objected that such conduct could hardly be termed 
" benevolent neutrality," and was scarcely com- 
patible with treaty obligations. [No. 13; 22nd 
September, 1914]. 

There is no mention in the preceding documents 
that Roumania had ever promised a henevolent^^ 
neutrality: merely "strict," "absolute." [v. No. 
3 and No. 7]. It was Austria who declared she 
would still regard Roumania as an ally : in 
diplomatic language, this would be unilateral, not 
synallagmatic. 

King Charles was ailing, and the Crown Prince 
accorded Czernin an audience on the 23rd Sep- 
tember. 

An unwonted personal touch com_es into these 

10 Editor's italics. 



82 ROUMANIA 

dry narratives. The Crown Prince is described 
as irresolute, shifting his point of view, making 
unreHable statements [No. 14], being evasive, 
having little authority [No. 42], having little self- 
confidence or energy [No. 73], as impulsive and 
weak [No. 80], as using ambiguous language 
[No. 108]. 

Evidently, he was not a man of the stern 
resolution of his uncle, and held different opinions; 
and this personal factor is of some considerable 
weight in the subsequent history. 

Baron Jehan de Witte has said that King Charles 
was the first King of Roumania, but that King 
Ferdinand will be the first King of the Rou- 
manians. ^1 

At the interview of the 23rd Sept., 191 4, the 
Crown Prince de'clared that " everyone wanted to 
make war on Roumania," " he did not know what 
the end would be : only one thing was out of the 
question, war against Russia." But he considered 
the popular demand for war against Austria as 
suicidal : that Roumania would, if Russia won, be 
Russia's vassal, or if Austria won, Austria's 
victim. He is also alleged to have said that war 
against Austria would be a breach of honour and 
a felony. Czernin regarded the Crown Prince as 
the passive instrument of his surroundings. [No. 

14]. 

Rumour was busy : on the 28th Sept., 191 4, 

11 Toekomst, Dec. i6th, 1916. 



NEGOTIATIONS 83 

there was talk of another Crown Council and an 
invasion of Transylvania. [No. 15]. 

The King was fast sickening. [No. 16 and 17]. 
He died on the loth October. [No. 21]. No 
Crown Council was held, as the Conservative 
Marghiloman and the progressive Take lonescu 
agreed that " on mature consideration they would 
support the policy of the Government, and there 
was no reason for a change." [2nd October, 1914; 
No. 18]. 

On the 9th October the crisis was over; and the 
reservists were disbanded. Czernin suspected that 
Bratianu was coquetting with the ministers of the 
Entente but thought the hour was not ripe for 
intervention. 

Czernin thus judges King Charles : '* The King, 
ill and exhausted, had only one thought — rest and 
an end of this nerve-shattering fight [against the 
popular demand for intervention in Transylvania]. 
He would rather die than be guilty of a dastardly 
act unparalleled in history. And he stood quite 
alone.'* 

Czernin says that on the 29th Sept., 1914, every 
preparation had been made to attack Austria. The 
Crown Council was to decide on an invasion of 
Transylvania — "an idea, in support of which nearly 
everybody of authority had been won over, if 
for different motives." There was open talk of 
the abdication of King Charles and the enthrone- 
ment of the Crown Prince. 

" Forty-eight hours later the Opposition and the 



84 ROUMANIA 

Government compromised on ' neutrality,' and the 
disbandment of the reservists." 

'' The situation is, for the instant, saved." 
Czernin continues: "We shall remain on top, if 
our army fulfils our high expectations. But there 
will be many anxious moments." [No. 20; 9th 
October, 191 4]. 

What happened in those fateful forty-eight hours 
is not revealed. Possibly Bulgaria was recalcitrant. 
The crisis had arisen on the matter of the transit of 
munitions to Turkey. In the course of it, the pro- 
German King Charles died. But it may be 
surmised from similar incidents disclosed in these 
negotiations that an ultimatum was addressed to 
Roumania, whose intervention would have been 
very inopportune to the Central Powers; for it was 
on the 29th September that the Turco-German fleet 
started hostilities in the Black Sea by bombarding 
Odessa. 12 

King Ferdinand on the advice of both 
Marghiloman and Take lonescu continued the 
policy of neutrality. 

The attitude Meantime, in November, the 

of Greece. Austrians invaded Serbia for the 
second time; and the vSerbian resistance 
(as might have been expected) was much feebler. 
Venizelos again ofifered to intervene, if Roumania 
would do so simultaneously; if Bulgaria would 
remain neutral, and if the Entente would give two 

^2 R.O.B., Nos. 90 and 91 ; Turkish White Paper, No. 177. 



NEGOTIATIONS 85 

army corps as a security; the Serbian army being 
too much reduced. 

Roumania refused; "as early as September, 1914, 
she had declared that she no longer considered the 
Treaty of B nearest as a necessary base for regu- 
lating the status quo in the Balkans"; and she 
apprehended, that if the Central Empires emerged 
victorious, their triumph would result in the de- 
struction of Serbia and the enhancement of Bul- 
garia; but that the Entente would also incline to 
strengthen Bulgaria, as a reward of intervention 
on their side, or as a sop for her neutrality .1^ 

On 6th March, 1915, King Constantine refused 

to accept Venizelos' proposal to send Greek troops 

to the Dardanelles, and Venizelos resigned. The 

pro-German or neutralist ministries that succeeded 

him would not in any case move against Austria 

to succour Serbia. Roumanian intervention would 

therefore have been a very forlorn hope in the 

Balkans, unless the intervention of Italy should 

restore the balance. 

Roumania §4. — The accession of King Ferdi- 

will not let nand did not involve any change of 
munitions . -^ • • j 

pass through policy. Roumania adhered to a rigid 

to Turkey. neutrality: on the 17th Oct., 1914, 
of Italy^.™^^ absolutely declining to allow the trans- 
port of horses or munitions to Turkey 
[No. 23] and persisting in this determination. 
[Nos. 24, 27, and 30; i,e,, until May, 1915]- 

13 Crawfurd Price, pp. 55 and 56. 



86 ROUMANIA 

She was equally neutral against Germany : on 
the i6th Nov., 1914, von Waldthausen, the 
German Minister left B nearest; the reason is not 
stated ^Times']. On or about the 22nd Nov., 
1914, a German commercial agency at Bucarest 
was closed, as suspected of espionage. [Times ^ 
22nd Nov., 1914]. 

The Austrian Red Book is most inconsequential 
at this point. On the 14th Nov., 1914, Czernin 
"reports there are only two parties : those who do 
and those who do not deem the time opportune to 
strike at Austria. The refusal to supply Turkey with 
arms was very serious; and the only hope lay in 
military success against the Russians, who held 
Lwow (Lemberg), Przemysl, and were advancing 
from the lines of the San and the Vistula. [No. 

24]- 

Quite significantly, on the 2nd Dec, Czernin 

anticipates that Roumania will strike in the spring, 
with the consent of all parties, the Court, to '* earn 
the cheap laurels anew, which she plucked in the 
last Balkan War." The sole deterrent would be 
an Austrian success. The King was still 
ambiguous in his language: but "all the sym- 
pathies of Roumania were with France, and 
passionate hatred against the Central Powers 
poured forth in every word written or spoken." 

At this point there is a gap of three months : 
and at present one can only surmise what may- 
have been suppressed. Italy was successfully 
cajoling and bullying Austria into territorial com- 



NEGOTIATIONS 87 

pensations; and it was generally supposed that she 
and Roumania were acting in concert. Possibly, 
Austria was also being induced to offer territorial 
compensations for her breach of the Articles of the 
Alliance. 

Serbia was being spared further invasions, partly 
through Italian intervention; as Italy had intimated 
to Austria that a renewed attack without full pre- 
liminary consent would be considered a breach of 
Article VII. of the Triple Alliance; and that even 
a temporary occupation would bring this Article 
into force. 1^ 

On 23rd Jan., 1915, Sir Francis Elliot at Athens 
once again approached Venizelos, offering conces- 
sions in Asia Minor, if only Greece would range 
herself by her exhausted ally, Serbia. The con- 
dition again was the restitution by Greece of some 
part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, and the interven- 
tion of Bulgaria. But Bratianu would not 
co-operate and King Constantine also would not 
cede Kavala and Drama; so that the offer to Greece 
was futile : whilst Roumania clearly distrusted 
Bulgaria too much to offer her the old frontier 
of 1913.^^ 

The subsequent efforts in April and May to 
induce the Gounaris ministry to intervene for the 
Entente were equally fruitless. ^^' 

The Entente cannot have been idle with respect 

14 A,-H. II, No. 74, 12th Dec, 1914. 

15 Crawfurd Price, p. 62. 

16 Crawfurd Price, p. 91. 

G 



88 ROUMANIA 

to Roumania at this period, for on or about 
28th Jan., 191 5, the British Government advanced 
Roumania ;£5,ooo,ooo on account of exchange 
difficulties with the countries able to supply war 
materials, so as to put Roumania in a position to 
face eventualities. ITimes, 28th Jan., 1915]. 

Germany was now relieving the pressure on 
Austria by the attacks on Warsaw, the second of 
which failed in January, 191 5. The Russian 
advance in the Carpathians had been definitely 
stayed. 

The intentions of Bulgaria were still doubtful, 
for on the 22nd February, 191 5, a Roumano- 
Bulgarian transit agreement was signed. {^Times']. 
Roumania was evidently preparing, for on the 2nd 
March, 191 5, a bill was passed authorising the 
declaration of a state of siege when ever the 
Government thought it necessary. [Ti7nes~\. 

At this point the Austrian despatches cease their 
curious hibernation : for on the 4th March, 191 5, 
Czernin reports that the Italian Minister at 
Bucarest is more insistent, and that the King told 
a politician that " he would follow Italy as an ally, 
in the event of Italy's attacking Austria." [No. 
26]. 

Italy had just persuaded Berlin to bring Vienna 
to heel, and make some genuine proposals. [A.-H. 
II., 109 .... ]. 

On the 1 8th March the King absolutely refused 
to allow munitions of war to pass to Turkey, and 
Czernin despaired of success. This despatch [No. 



NEGOTIATIONS 89 

27] leaves the reader in some doubt as to the 
precise nature of "our wishes" that had been 
frustrated. 

On the 30th March Roumania refused permis- 
sion to German troops to pass through her terri- 
tory. [Times, 30th March, 1915]. 

Lwow and Przemysl had now been taken by 
the Germans. 

There is a further gap in the correspondence. 
Roumania still refused to pass munitions through 
her territory, confiscated bags of munitions that 
were consigned to the German and Austrian 
legations at Bucarest. [Times, 2nd April, 1915]. 

The approaching break with Italy, and the 
Austrian victories in Galicia were counterbalancing 
factors : and both Bratianu and the King wanted 
to maintain neutrality, but said that Italy's 
determination made things very critical, and the 
Opposition — now an interventionist party — might 
carry the day. Italy might after all accept 
Austria's offer : so said Czernin. This touch 
seems to show that Roumania and Italy were 
acting together. [24th April, and nth May, 1915; 
Nos. 28 and 29]. 

On the point of Turkish munitions Bratianu 
remained obdurate. [21st May, 191 5; No. 30]. 

On the 23rd May, 191 5, when Italy declared war 
on Austria, Baron Burian (who had replaced 
Berchtold) played a stronger hand. 

He instructed Czernin as follows : — 



90 ROUMANIA 

" Hesitating to recognise her true interests, en- 
ticed by the dazzling offers of the Entente, Rou- 
mania has already come into close contact with our 

enemies But for Roumania, the question 

is not what she may get, but what she can keep. 
Any gains at the cost of the Monarchy would be 
precarious. Quite apart from subsequent re- 
acquisition by the Monarchy, a victorous Russia 
would not suffer a situation in which Roumania, 
strong and firmly encamped, blocked the way to 
the Straits, impaired Russian predominance in 
Bulgaria, and held a decisive position of advantage 
over the remaining Slav States. 

" Roumania's permanence depends on the 
defeat, not on the victory of Russia. 

" We also, after Russia's crushing defeats, 
should insist with more emphasis than ever on 
Roumania's co-operation with us." [No. 31]. 

The King in reply assured Czernin he would 
do all he could to remain neutral; but " princes 
could not always do exactly as they liked." Take 
lonescu and Filipescu argued that Berlin and 
Vienna would never, as things stood, forgive 
Roumania. Czernin rejoined that Roumania 
could still win back the good graces of those 
Courts. [26th May, 191 5; No. 32]. 

The threat had succeeded : the moment for in- 
tervention was not propitious. Italy went to war 
unseconded. 



NEGOTIATIONS 



91 



I^oumania §5- — Austria had prevailed on 

Tell^llntion ^^^"^^^'^f ^o remain neutral, and 
of Italy, and Still vainly tried to induce her to 

prevented from side with the Central Powers. fQth 
intervening when ,^,1 1 . ^ ^r 

Bulgaria took ^^^^ ^^^ 23rd June, 1915; Nos. 33, 

up arms. 34 and 35] . The Roumanian Army 

was all but mobilized [Times, 17th 
June, 1915]; the vital question to the Central 
Powers was the road to Turkey : the road through 
Serbia was still unassailable. 

The parties in Roumania were now four in 
number : the Liberals, the Conservatives following 
Marghiloman, the section following Lehovary, and 
those adhering to Take lonescu. The third and 
fourth were both active pro-Entente; the Liberals 
held their hand; the Conservatives were against 
the war with Austria. [26th June, 1915; No. 36]. 

On the 13th July Czernin was still insistent on 
the question of the Turkish munitions: Bratianu 
held out no hopes. [No. 37 and 38]. i^ 

On the 28th August, the King and the Ministry 
agreed not to put any obstacle in the way of an 
offensive against Serbia; and so solved the question 
of transport for Austria. [No. 39]. 

These very short and spasmodic telegrams throw 
little light on the real inducements. 

The Times of the 13th July, 1915, possibly 
explains the situation, and indicates one whole 
series of communiques that have been suppressed. 

ir Cf. Times, 14th July and 4th Sept., when Roumania seizes and 
confiscates munitions being clandestinely smuggled into Turkey. 



92 ROUMANIA 

The Central Powers are said to have offered 
Roumania the Bucovina up to the river Seret, as 
the northern boundary, so as to comprehend the 
Roumanian inhabitants, in return for a friendly 
neutrahty. 

But, as a reward for prompt military help, 
Roumania should receive the Bucovina up to the 
river Pruth, and an extension of territory to the 
Iron Gates on the Danube, to include the town of 
Mehadia; on the solemn guarantee of the German 
Government. 

This is probably accurate : it so exactly resembles 
the offers to Italy; a German guarantee, execution 
deferred : and no mention of Transylvania. The 
most essential and vital claim was not Austria's 
to offer; and Hungary was irreconcilable. 

Russia, on the other hand,^^ had promised 
Bessarabia and Transylvania as an inducement. 

However this may be, Austria had scored again : 
Roumania would again be neutral with regard to 
Serbia, and the provisionment of Turkey by that 
route. 

The Bulgarian §6. — The Story of this period (§5) 
demand. [^ ^ reflection of the negotiations 

passing between all the Great Powers 
and Bulgaria. The Austrian despatches can be 
partly supplemented from semi-official statements 
in the Press. Bulgaria was being munitioned, 
even from Denmark, ^^ and was assiduously wooed 

IB Times, 13th July, 1915. 
19 Politiken, 2. vj. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS 93 

by the Quadruple Entente. She was promised 
Serbian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia (as far as 
Kavala), and the Enos-Midia frontier as against 
Turkey. She asked for more : and wanted to know 
what compe^nsation would be adjudged to Serbia 
and Greece, and what she was to gain in the 
Dobrudja.20 It was claimed at Sofia that Bulgaria 
ought to be restored to the frontiers settled at the 
Conference of London, 1913 : and on these 
conditions she would oppose not Russia, but 
Pan-Germanism.2i 

Such rectifications would have been hard enough 
to enforce by the " Concert of the Powers " : it 
was very much complicated by the fact of the 
Great European War, and the influence on the 
little Powers of the Balkans of the ebb and flow 
of fortune in the field : for Russia was beginning 
her great and disastrous retreat. There were 
rumours that negotiations were proceeding for a 
separate peace with Russia. ^^ 

The offers On the 30th June the Quadruple En- 
of the tente sent in its offer to Bulgaria ;2^ but 

these were apparently unacceptable, for 
Ghenadiev claimed the whole of the Dobrudja, as 
well as Macedonia.^'' 

20 Berliner Morgenpost, 22. vj. 15. 

21 Echo de Bulgarie, 23. vj. 15 ; Mir, 23. vj. 15 ; cf. Berliner 
Tageblatt, 2. vij. 15 ; Pesti Hirlap, 12. vij. 15. 

22 La corrispondenza miliiar, 13. vij. 15. 

23 Stampa. 30. vj. 15. 

24 Festi Hirlap, 12. vij. 15. 



94 ROUMANIA 

In the meantime the Quadruple Entente was 
trying to make Roumania, Greece and Serbia con- 
sent to these sacrifices : Roumania required the 
Roumanian territories in the Banat of Temesvar, 
Bucovina and Transylvania. Russia objected to 
giving up Northern Bucovina, and the Western 
Banat, as not being Roumania in population (not 
to speak of cessions in Bessarabia, of which there 
is no m^ention until late in 1916);^^ Roumania 
insisted on the possession of Czernowitz and the 
boundary of the Pruth.^^ The negotiations came 
to a standstill. ^'^ But, after tlie fall of Lemberg, 
Russia was willing to concede Czernowitz and 
the line of the Pruth;^^ and promised that the 
Dardanelles should be internationalized.^^ 
Offers of The Central Powers, too, up to 

the Central ^^j-^jg point had not been idle. They 
Powers. . . 

offered P.oumania a rectification of the 

Transylvania frontier and in Bucovina, 

and a grant of autonomy to the remainder of 

Transylvania.^^ This much was offered in return 

for neutrality : for active participation, Bessarabia, 

Bucovina up to the Pruth, and extension up the 

Danube to Mehadia.^^ Evidently these overtures 

did not succeed : for Roumania was pronounced to 

25 Corriere delle Sera, lo, vj. 15. 

26 Novoye Vremya, iS. vj. 15. 

27 Rec, 6. vij. 15 ; Corriere delta Sera, 9. vij. 15. 
98 Zilricher Post, 15. vij. 15. 

29 Nicu-we Rott. Ct., 17. vij. 15. 

30 Tribtina, 27, vj. 15 (Report from Sofia). 

31 Times, 13. vij. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS 95 

be anti-neutral, in stopping munitions to Turkey ;^^ 
the Central Powers would have to consider 
whether their Treaty to Roumania bound them 
any longer .^^ They began terrorizing. " When- 
ever the Germans have a victory over the enemy, 
they at once begin to threaten us. We can imagine 
what will happen if Germany is victorious. "^^ 
They exercised economic pressure on Roumania, 
reducing her State revenue by 36,608,306 francs;^'^ 
they concentrated at least 160,000 troops on the 
Hungarian frontier.^® 

As a result, Roumania had to relax her inhibi- 
tion on the transit of war material and men to 
Turkey;^" the interventionist party, Ac^iunea 
Na^ionald, was defeated ;^^ and these endearments 
from the Central Powers induced renewed relations 
with the Quadruple Alliance, under pressure of 
the contingencies in Bulgaria and Greece. 
The Central Radoslavov, the Bulgarian minister. 

Powers and ^^s said to be pro-German ;39 the 

Bulgaria, up to „ r> 1 • 

August, 1915. Roumano-Bulganan agreement as 

to transit of goods was said to be 

illusory .^9 The Bulgarian attitude was undecided 

32 Deutsche Tages Ztg, 12. vij. 15. 

33 Frankfurter Ztg, 12. vij. 15. 

34 Adeverul, 18. vij. 15. 

35 Tdgliche Rundschau, 26. vij. 15; La Politique (Roum.), 25. 
vij. 15. 

36 Adeverul, 27. vij. 15. 

37 Moskov. Ved., 22. vij., 15 ; Adeverul, 13. viij. 15. 

38 La Politique, 28. vij. 15. 

39 Berliner Tagehlatt, 2. vij. 15. 



g6 ROUMANIA 

even at the end of July; they feared that the 
arms of the Entente might solve the Turkish 
question without calling in Bulgaria, and that 
Germany could not advance a loan;*^ but this 
last doubt was dissipated, for Germany issued 
Bulgarian Treasury Bills earty in August to the 
extent of 120 million francs at 7%.^^ The offer of 
the Entente was too shadowy ; neither Greece nor 
Serbia evacuated their portions of Macedonia ;^^ and 
Bulgaria pledged herself to a benevolent neutrality 
towards Turkey.*^ 

Hence Roumania was left as the one obstacle 
in the munitionment of Turkey : and the Central 
Powers had reconciled Turkey and Bulgaria. 
The Central The Quadruple Entente was anxious 

Powers and to propitiate Bulgaria, who held 
Greece' and ^^^^ keys of Constantinople; and to 
Bulgaria effect this, had to induce Roumania, 

reconcie . Serbia and Greece to renounce their 
gains in the Second Balkan War, 1913. 

Greece was dubious as to her advantage in 
joining the Allies : what would she benefit, if 
Constantinople fell (the Dardanelles expedition 
had not collapsed in July, 1915); what compensa- 
tions would Bulgaria receive; what would happen 
if Bulgaria were obdurate, or attacked Macedonia 

40 Echo de Bulgarie, 30. vij. 15. 

41 Kdln. Ztg., 3. viij. 15. 

42 Journal de Geneve, 2. viij., 15. 

43 Le Temps, 2. viij., 15; Kreuzztg, 16. viij. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS 97 

for herself ?** This attitude evidently pleased the 
Kaiser, for he telegraphed to Queen Sofia of 
Greece: "Thanks to you and to Bulgaria and 
Roumania, our triumph is assured. "^^ Greece 
would not consent to cede Kavala to Bulgaria,*^ 
though Great Britain had offered Cyprus as a sop, 
to induce Greece to keep her Treaty-bond.*''' 

The Kaiser's language was not mere bombast. 
For, on the 17th July, a treaty had been signed 
between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and 
Bulgaria, under which Bulgaria was to receive the 
whole of Albania, Greek and Serbian Macedonia 
(thus including Salonica and Kavala). This was 
only published on the nth October: and was 
vouched for by the British Minister at Athens.*^ 

The arrangement was consummated in October, 
191 5, when the Bulgarian railways were placed at 
the disposal of Germany : Bulgaria promised to 
attack Serbia : Germany was to invade Serbia from 
the North with 300,000 men; and Bulgaria was to 
receive Bulgarian and Serbian Macedonia, and 
was free to settle accounts with Greece.*^ 

The beginning of August seems to have found 
Bulgaria definitely inclining towards Germany; but 

44 'Neue Freie Presse, 17, vij. 15. 

45 Journal des Balkans, 18. vij. 15. 

46 Ndvoye Vremya, 29. vij. 15 ; Messager d'Athenes, 10. viij. 15. 

47 Cf. Times, 27. x. 15. 

48 Times, 17. vii. 15; 11. x. '15; 8. x. '15; Haxptq, 'EuTia, 
10. X. 15. 

49 Echo de Paris, 7. x. 15, quoting Kamhana. 



98 ROUMANIA 

the former still demanded Kavala and the hinter- 
land.so 

But Germany still had one task left over; the 
reconciliation of Greece and Bulgaria was now 
attempted by the Central Powers;^i and was con- 
summated by a treaty in November, 191 5. 

The provisions are stated to have been : — 

1. A benevolent neutrality from Greece to Bul- 
garia. 

2. The Bulgarian forces to be guarded by 
Greece from any sudden attack. 

3. The Expeditionary Force at Salonica to be 
regarded as uninvited guests. 

4. The Treaty of Alliance between Greece and 
Serbia to be considered null and void. 

5. Bulgaria renounced her pretensions tO' Greek 
Macedonia, and would aid Greece to extend her 
frontiers (i.e., against Italy) in Albania. 

This treaty was signed by King Ferdinand of 
Bulgaria, King Constantine of Greece, Radoslavov 
for Bulgaria, and Zaimis on behalf of Greece .^^ 

How this treaty could be reconciled with that 
of the 17th July (first disclosed on the nth Oct.) 
may be left to the ingenuity of the Germans who 
promoted both. 

The Quadruple The Quadruple Entente, if it was 

Entente and to placate Bulgaria, also had to exact 

from Serbia, its own ally, a return 

50 La Trihuna, 8. viij. 15. 

51 Berliner Tagehlatt, 25. viij. 15. 
59 Adeverul, 19. xj. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS 99 

to the conditions ail-but ratified at the Conference 
of London, 191 3. 

Austria-Hungary in August, 191 5, was very 
much exhausted, ^^ and seems to have been anxious 
to conclude a separate peace with Serbia. Serbia 
had compromised with Italy on her claims to 
Dalmatia and raised no objection to the Italians 
having the coast-line. ^^ 

By the end of August, 191 5, the Quadruple 
Entente had induced Serbia to yield up her share 
of Bulgarian Macedonia, and part of her claim to 
the Banat of Temesvar; thus reconciling both 
Bulgaria and Roumania. 

Bulgaria demanded in addition as her price, 
Rodosto (on the Sea of Marmora), Kavala, and 
the Dobrudja.55 Bulgaria also required to know 
what compensation Serbia was to receive.^^ 

" It has taken a year for the Entente to decide 
to give Bulgaria what she asked, and the latter 
now waits to know Serbia's answer. "^^ 

Clearly the Entente were not able to give Bul- 
garia her frontier as settled by the abortive Con- 
ference of London : it might have been equally 
clear that Bulgaria was playing for time into the 
hands of Germany. 

The Entente also vetoed any attack by Serbia 

53 Adeverul, 6. viij. 15. 

54 Interview with Pasic ; Corriere della Sera, 23. viij. 15. 

55 Le Matin, 29. viii. 15. 
5ii La Trihuna, 8. viii. 15, 

57 Journal de Geneve, 11. ix. 15 ; Journal des D^bats, 17. ix. 15 



lOO ROUMANIA 

on Bulgaria, in anticipation of Bulgaria's joining 
the Central Empires ;^^ in which the latter had her 
proper place, rather than in a Balkan League.^^ 
Delcasse resigned his portfolio as Foreign Minister 
of France, probably in disapproval of this decision. 
Yet in the middle of September Bulgaria, who 
was, like all the Balkan States, merely pursuing 
her own interests, was sounded by the Entente 
whether she would attack Turkey and accept the 
Serbian concessions :^^ this action was represented 
by the Austrians as a cringing of the Entente and 
the Tsar before Bulgaria. ^<^ 

The Entente The attitude assumed by 

and Roumania. Roumania during these negotia- 
tions was necessarily very cautious. 
By the 6th August, 191 5, apparently matters 
had been accommodated between the Entente and 
Roumania, who would not join Germany under 
any condition, and might join in a new Russian 
offensive (which did not eventuate). ^^ This 
rumour of a treaty between Roumania and the 
Entente was also officially contradicted.^^ But any 
such intervention must be on the rising tide; they 
could not aid the Russians in retreat: "It is in 
the interest of the Allies that Roumania's inter- 

58 Koln. Ztg., 3. xj. 15. 

59 Munchener Netieste Nachrichten, 17. ix. 15. 

60 Neue Freie Presse, 26. ix. 15. 

61 Adeverul, 6. viij. 15 ; Le Matin, 29. viij. 15. 

62 Berlingske Tidende, 6. viij. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 01 

vention should be the coup de grace. "^^ '' Her 
army may cross the Carpathians [i.e., in the event 
of participation] without anxiety : the Balkan 
Alliance assures her safety on the Danube. "^^ 

Germany was dissatisfied with the continued 
prohibition of the transit of munitions to Turkey, 
though submarines in sections were allowed 
through/'^ 

But by the 23rd August some pressure must have 
been put upon Roumania, who, it was said, would 
be benevolently neutral, and would not attack 
Bulgaria ;^'5 and on the 31st a declaration of war 
on Roumania by the Central Powers was said to 
be imminent ;*^^ this rumour was, however, denied.^^ 

If such a course had been threatened, it would 
explain Roumania's passivity towards the pro- 
jected invasion of Serbia. [A.-H., III.; 28th 
August] . 

At all events, Russia's offers were insufficient. 
She had secured the neutrality of Roumania, 
nothing more. The crucial point was Bessarabia; 
and Roumania put no trust in the Russian 
promise ;^^ and had to recognise the claims of 
Bulgaria, and do nothing to counter them.''''' 

63 Adeverul, 8. viij. 15. 
C4 Adeverul, 15. viij. 15. 

65 Frankfurterztg, 14, viij. 15 ; Aachener Allgemeine Ztg, 23, 
viij. 15. 

66 Aachener Allgemeine Ztg, 23. viij. 15. 

67 Tribune de Geneve, 31. viij. 15. 

68 Neue Ziircher Ztg, 1. ix. 15 (quoting Viitorul). 

69 Miinch. Neueste Nach, 16. ix. 15. 

70 Trierscheztg, 17. ix. 15. 



I02 ROUMANIA 

On the 24th Sept., 1915, Czernin delivered a 
virtual ultimatum. [A.-H., III., No. 46]. Feel- 
ing may have been kindled in Roumania by the 
arbitrary conduct and barbarity of the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities in Transylvania.'^^ 

Moreover, the Germans were boycotting 
Roumanian trade, and causing great loss.'''^ 

The Roumanian Press was being bribed and 
corrupted by both R^ussia and Germany : the 
latter founded a new League of the People [Liga 
Populara] to forward their interests. "^^ 

It had often been rumoured that Roumania and 
the Quadruple Entente had entered into a definite 
compact. The text of the agreement was published 
in Russia in October, 191 5. The stipulations 
were : — 

The Quadruple Entente undertook to cede a 
portion of Bucovina, of 14,000 square kilometres 
[probably this was a fair division], and not to 
conclude peace, until Roumania had been able to 
annex Transylvania, Bucovina, and a part of the 
Banat [thus giving effect to the compact with 
Serbia] . 

Roumania was to put 500,000 men into the field, 
and not to make a separate peace with Austria- 
Hungary without the consent of the Entente. 

Should Bulgaria join the Entente, Roumania 
should return the strip of the Dobrudja annexed 

71 Echo de Paris, lo. x. 15 ; Adeverul, 19. xj. 15. 

72 Deutscher Aussenhandel, 20. ix. 15. 

73 La Roumanie, 24. ix. 15; Kreuzztg, 11. xij. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS IO3 

at the conclusion of the Second Balkan War [i.e., 
the quadrilateral of Silistria — Tuturkai — Balcik — 
Mangalia]. 

Roumania should observe a benevolent neutrality 
until she intervenes. 

Should Bulgaria join the Central Powers, 
Roumania should send 250,000 troops to aid the 
Serbs. "^^ 

It will be observed that the attitude of Bulgaria, 
and her engagements, were still unknown; that it 
was assumed that Russia would guard the Danube 
frontier, or else that Bulgaria would not declare war 
against Roumania; and that the main effort of 
Roumania was to be directed against Transylvania 
— a very distant road to cutting the backbone of 
Central Europe (viz., the Continental route to 
Turkey, through Pest, Belgrade and Nis): lastly, 
there is still no mention of Bessarabia. 

These preparations (in conjunction with the un- 
readiness of the Allies at Salonica) furnish a 
further reason and justification of the ultimatum 
delivered by Austria on the 24th Sept. [A.H., 45]; 
as also of the fact that munitions were for a 
time allowed to pass through to Turkey ;^^ and 
smuggling of them was very common;'''^ also that 
German agents were buying petrol at Gala^i in 
very large quantities.''"'' 

74 Russkoye Slovo, 5. x. 15 ; Neue Freie Presse, 5. x. 15. 

75 Echo de Paris quoting Dimineata, 5. x. 15. 

76 Journal des Debats, 7. x. 15 ; EjLlTigog 25. x. '15. 

77 Adevenil, 9. x. 15 ; La Politique, 25. ii. 16. 

H 



I04 



ROUMANIA 



On this important matter of petrol some figures 
may be useful. "^^ 

EXPORTS FROM ROUMANIA.^^ 



1914. 

To Germany 99? 165 

Austria-Hungary 84,253 

Bulgaria 18,689 

France 50,028 

Great Britain ... 77,971 

Russia 7,016 

Turkey 3^)4^3 

other countries. .. 285,439 



Total 

Or in percentages : — 

To Germany and 

Austria 
,, France and Gt 

Britain 

,, Russia 

,, Bulgaria 

,, Turkey 



654,024 
1914. 
28.04% 



1915- 
154,688 

225,699 

33,568 



578 
8,191 

6,363 
429,087 

1915- 

88.64% 



19.57% •■• 

1.07% ... 0.13% 

2.86% ... 7.83% 

4.81% ... 1.92% 

,, other countries 43.65% ... 1.48% 

On the 8th and 9th Oct., 1915, Bulgaria, before 
going to war, published a long memorandum ex- 
plaining her motives for adhesion to the Central 
Powers.^^ 



78 Univcrsitl, 4. iv. 16. 

79 For the figures as to grain, v. pp. iii and 112. 

80 Frankfurterztg, 8 and 9. x. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS IO5 

A typical piece of German propaganda at this 
time deserves mention : it was intended to arouse 
distrust in Russia, and is absolutely unsubstan- 
tiated, viz. : that Great Britain and Russia had made 
a secret treaty against Roumania and Bulgaria, 
by which Russia was to acquire Constanta, 
Constantinople and Burgas.^^ The truth at the 
bottom of this may be that German agents tried 
to detach Russia from the Entente with the bribe 
of Constanta, just as in 191 6 they were endea- 
vouring to seduce Russia to a separate peace with 
an offer of the whole of Moldavia. ^^ 

The anti-interventionists at Bucarest were 
naturally encouraged by the course of events, 
and a demonstration v/as made towards the end 
of October, 191 5, to overthrow the Bratianu 
Cabinet :^' followed by a great anti-German 
demonstration, at which Take lonescu and 
Filipescu spoke. ^* 

There were insistent rumours for some time 
following these last events of a German incendiary 

81 Koln. Volksztg, 24. X. 15. 

82 Literary Digest, 9. vij. '16 ; Sunday Telegram, 17. vij. '16 ; 
and cf. Le Genevois (quoted by the Gazzetta Ticinese, 17. iii. 17) 
and Berner Tagwacht, 6. x. 16 : stating that Roumania was to be 
offered by the Central Powers to Russia in part, together with 
Armenia and parts of Galicia, in return for a separate peace and 
a free hand elsewhere. 

83 Journal de Geneve, 27. x. 15 (quoting Wiener Correspondenz). 

84 Miinch. Neueste Nachrichten, 28. x. 15. 



I06 ROUMANIA 

plot against Filipescu, Take lonescu, Bratianu, 
and Costinescu.^^ 

This intermediate chapter will supply some of 
the missing links in the official story as put 
forward by the Austro-Hungarian Government. 
I^oumania §7- — But vSerbia could not be 
is quiescent ^ crushed without the aid of Bulgaria. 
enters the ^^' Dillon, in Land and Water, 
field. of gth October, 191 6, says of the 
negotiations of the Allies : ' ' Four 
great powers entered into conversation with the 
four or five Balkan States, so that nine foreign 
secretaries and about sixty ministers pleni- 
potentiary were thereupon engaged in interchang- 
ing views Months passed in this elaborate 

effort to get Bulgaria to outline her demands, and 
to move Serbia to accord them. And all that 
expenditure of time and labour was made in the 
single-minded belief that Bulgaria's statement was 
true, and that her freedom of choice (which it 
presupposed) really existed. .... Serbia, heroic 
in her voluntary sacrifice, as in her terrible 
martyrdom, accepted the situation and gave up 
Macedonia. [Be it observed, Serbia alone of the 
Balkan Kingdoms has a national dynasty, not a 
German prince]. Bulgaria could no longer lurk 
and weave unavowed plans in the safe retreat of 

justifiable neutrality Mobilization was 

resorted to, when the game of neutrality could be 

85 Deutsche Tagesztg, 13. xij. 15; La Stampa (quoting Wiener 
Allg. Ztg.), 19. xij. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS I07 

prolonged no further The first care of 

Sofia and BerHn was to tranquillize Roumania and 
Greece. The game was being played by two 
partners. Germany had already spread far and 
wide the terrifying tale that she was about to hack 
her way through Serbia, and to pass thence through 
Bulgaria into Turkey. The attitude of the brave 
Bulgars would then be shaped by dire neces- 
sity 

" Four Bulgarian divisions were despatched to 
keep watch and ward over Roumania 

" As soon as 25,000 Bulgarian Comitadjis over- 
ran Macedonia, Serbian troops would have to be 
despatched from the North-Eastern front, leaving 
Germany's road to Turkey inadequately de- 
fended " 

These preliminary quotations explain the 
fragm.entary despatches in this section : Roumania 
was on her guard, too, against Austria, for there 
were 200,000 German troops concentrated at Brasso 
on the Roumanian frontier [Times, 30th Aug., 
191 5]. They could be moved either into Rou- 
mania, or North-Eastern Serbia by Or§ova. 

On the loth Sept., Bratianu and Czernin had 
a " ver}^ earnest conversation." Austria had closed 
the Hungaro-Roumanian frontier to all intercourse 
and traffic whatsoever; Roumania had had to 
protect herself. Bratianu asseverated once again he 
had no treaty with the Entente; but Roumanians 
were expecting an attack from Austria — a proba- 
bility he himself discounted. Czernin adds in his 



I08 ROUMANIA 

own despatch: " I repeat I am convinced that no 
attack from Roumania need be anticipated in our 
present military situation." [No. 40 and 41]. 

Not content with the answer given by Bratianu, 
Czernin had an interview with the King on the 
14th Sept. Czernin demanded the withdrawal of 
the Roumanian troops (which were ail-but mobil- 
ized, V, Times, 7th, 15th and 29th Sept.); and, 
apparently, there was some dispute between the 
King and General Iliescu and Bratianu. The 
King shilly-shallied — according to Czernin, who 
insisted that the King as oberster Kriegsherr had 
only to command. [The Austrians in all their 
negotiations with Italy, Serbia, etc., never under- 
stand a constitutional monarchy]. 

At last the King promised to withdraw his troops 
at once if the Austrians opened the frontier and 
withdrew theirs. The frontier was opened on the 
same day. [No. 42]. 

Bratianu (whom Czernin interviewed next day) 
consented to withdraw the troops in a fortnight, 
after the defensive works had been constructed. 
*' He would be a lunatic to attack the Monarchy 
now, when he refused, whilst the Russians were 
beyond the Carpathians." [No. 43]. 

On the 22nd the troops were still on the frontier. 
Czernin took it on himself to inform the King that 
his orders were disobeyed. [No. 44]. 

On the 24th September Czernin acted summarily, 
and told Bratianu " he had no orders, and was not 
speaking officially. But, as a private individual 



NEGOTIATIONS IO9 

acquainted with Berlin and Vienna, he must notify 
him that Roumania was not in the position of 
Greece [which was then governed by Venizelos 
and bound by alliance to Serbia]; and a mobiliza- 
tion would force the Monarchy to ask for explana- 
tions. He had better weigh the consequences." 

Bratianu bridled at the distinction made between 
Roumania and all the other Balkan States that had 
mobilized. Czernin pointed to the hostility of the 
Roumanian press. 

On that day, the 24th Sept., a Cabinet Council 
was on the point of meeting [No. 45] : and was 
satisfactorily intimidated. [No. 46]. 

Burian approved this brusque action [No. 47] 
and Roumania was effectively deterred from any 
further military measures. [No. 46; 24th Sept.]. 
Burian remarked [No. 47] : '' To-day, when even 
Bulgaria has shaken herself free of the terror of 
the Moscovites, Roumania ought to be able to 
pick up pluck enough to resume the road to which 
history, the true interests of the country and pru- 
dence all point." 

Again Austria had scored. Bulgaria entered the 
war, and Roumania was mute and neutral. The 
time was not ripe for action : Bratianu could not 
publish his reasons.^e Serbia was crushed and the 
road to Constantinople clear. 

As a mere incident one other fact might be men- 
tioned at this stage. 

86 Le Temps, 2. x 15 (in reply to a parliamentary delegation). 



no ROUMANIA 

In the beginning of 1915, when the Bulgarians 
had renounced the Balkan League, and found 
harbour with the Central Powers,®^ the official 
pundits discovered a new racial afhnity between 
the Magyars, Bulgarians and Turks; and Pan- 
Turanianism came into fashion, to the discarding 
of Panslavism, which, anyhow, had incited Russia 
to create Bulgaria in 1878 ex nihilo. 
The period §8. — The Roumanian people were 
before the none the less pro-Ally, because their 
government was still forced to passivity. 
On or about the 5th Oct., there was a popular 
demand for full mobilization, and the Bulgarian 
Dorts on the Danube were closed to Roumanian 
traffic [Times, 5th Oct., 1915]; on the 7th 
troops were sent to the Bulgarian frontier and 
Giurgievo was fortified. There must have been 
danger of treachery and espionage, for officers of 
Bulgarian origin were sent into the interior of the 
country : and the army was kept on a strong war- 
footing lihid., 7th Oct. and i8th Oct., 1915]. On 
the 1 8th it was reported that the army of 600,000 
could be increased to 1,100,000, but for lack of 
munitions : 220,000 were concentrated in the 
Carpathians [ihid., 22nd Oct., 1915]. 

On the 3rd Nov. Burian was apprehensive of a 
Russian violation of Roumania, with her con- 
nivance : both Czernin and Bratianu dissipated the 
notion. [Nos. 48 and 49]. 

87 Thus Radoslavov in Koln. Ztg., 3. xj. 15; lasul, 2. iij, 16; 
Universul, 15. iij. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 1 1 

There is another prodigious gap in this series 
of documents, over the winter. In the meantime 
Serbia was overrun, Riga was attacked, and all- 
but abandoned, the Allied forces driven back to 
their position before the offensive of 1915 which 
culminated in the capture of Monastir; the 
Dardanelles were evacuated; the British advance 
on Kut proved disastrous; it was only the Russian 
advance in Armenia, and the German defeat at 
Verdun that redeemed the situation. 

What negotiations were pending between Rou- 
mania and the Great Powers can at present only 
be guessed. 

The sale oi One Other great issue for Rou- 

Roumanian mania was the sale of her cereal 

thrcritica"" harvests : it furnished a large part 
period of 1915. of the national income, and all the 
belligerents were in need of her 
supplies, which were too large for home consump- 
tion. 

The economic progress made by Roumania has 
been mentioned elsewhere (p. 19). 

On English reports, it appears that on the 22nd 
Jan., 1916, Great Britain purchased ;£io, 000,000 
of Roumanian wheat [Times, 22 nd and 31st 
Jan., and i6th Feb., 1916]. But, by way of com- 
pensation, Roumania had to supply the Austro- 
German Empires with 1,000,000 tons of maize, 
150,000 tons of barley and 100,000 tons of oats 
[Times, 4th Feb., 191 6]. And on the 14th Feb- 
ruary the Central Empires entered a protest against 



1 1 2 ROUMANIA 

the purchase by Great Britain, though Germany 
had already bought 200,000 tons, but had not been 
able to fetch it for lack of trucks [^ihid., 14th Feb., 
1916]. 

In January, 1916, the export of grain was for- 
bidden (which marks a change of policy from 
November, 1915); and this caused Roumania 
financial loss and deprivation in Germany.^^ 

But in that same month 600,000 truck-loads were 
ordered for Great Britain ;'^^ and 80,000 waggons 
of corn for Germany .^^ q^iq note must be made 
regarding this last purchase (as it bears on military 
possibilities); Roumania had not sufficient trucks 
to convey this quantity .^^ 

In exchange Germany would send anything, save 
war materials though Roumania had passed 
cotton through to Turkey .'^^ 

Yet the pro-German party represented that after 
the contract with Great Britain, " the Government 
had lost all right to pose as neutral. "^^ 

The matter was compromised and both sets of 
belligerents were to get their deliveries on the ist 
June/^ 

The Central Powers were evidently putting 

88 Independance Rownaine, 13. xj. 15 ; Vorwdrts, 5. i. 16. 

89 Koln. Ztg., 15. i. 16. 

90 La Politique, 22. i. 16. 
01 La Politique, 2, ii. 16. 

92 Univefsul, 14. ii. 16 ; 3. ii. i6. 

93 Steagiil, 14. ii. 16. 

94 Adeverul, 13. ii. 16; La Politique, 10. iii. 16; Adeverul 11. 
iii 16. 



NEGOTIATIONS II3 

economic pressure on to Roumania; thus they 
granted leave for the import of Roumanian wine 
in April, 1916.^^ 

In 1916 Roumania — having no other market — 
had been compelled to sell to the Central Powers : 
from Jan. ist — May 14th, 548,236,790 kilos of 
cereals ; 

April I St — May 14th, 230,926,879 kilos of 
grain. ^*^ 

These figures merely demonstrate what were the 
disabilities of Roumania as a neutral. She had 
no market, save the Powers hostile to her, and was 
subject to constant economic pressure and military 
demonstrations. 

Also, in this unchronicled interval, the 
Roumanians had not been neglecting military 
precautions. They succeeded in leaving both sets 
of belligerents in doubt as to their choice.®''' By the 
7th Feb., 1916, the special army credits amounted 
to ;{^24,ooo,ooo, reservists abroad were summoned 
home : the Roumanian Bank collected a large gold 
reserve: the new '17 and '18 classes would bring 
the effective strength of the army up to 1,000,000. 
On the 15th Feb. the mobilization is stated to be 
completed; the Carpathian passes and the banks 
of the Danube in the new Dobrudja territory were 
being fortified ITimes, 7th, loth, 12th and 15th 
Feb., 1916]. 

95 Pesti Hirlap, 28. iv. 16. 

96 Universul, 7. vj. 16. 

97 Berliner Tagehlatt, 29. i. 16. 



114 ROUMANIA 

l^oumania's Although the road to Constantinople 

relations with ^^s now Open to the Central Powers, 
Germany and , ^.., . ^ i ^i_ 

Russia. they still were trying to avail them- 

selves of the Roumanian railways, and 
shells for Turkey were despatched, to take only 
one of many instances, concealed in large crates 
of sugar. 

Whether there were any hagglings proceeding 
in the form of the offer of territories by way of 
compensation or enticement from the belligerents, 
there is no record to hand : but it is, at the least, 
probable. 

If only Russia would make concessions in Bes- 
sarabia, late as the offer was, she might win Rou- 
mania over.^^ Filipescu in February apparently 
went to Petrograd,^^ and returned a month later, 
with very little practical result. i<^^ The negotiations 
as to cessions in Bessarabia failed. ^^^ It was 
considered that Briand's visit to Rome fore- 
shadowed renewed pressure on Roumania.^^^^ 

Very probably a German ultimatum was launched 
at Roumania, requiring her to demobilize. She 
refused, because Bulgaria had been aggrandised, 
and she hereby might enter into the war by the end 
of March. 103 Bratianu was pleged to the Entente; 

98 Journal de Geneve, 2. li. i6. 

99 Vossische Ztg., 23. ii. 16. 

100 Weserztg, i6. iii. 16. 

101 Limhurger Koerier quoting Minerva, ,26. ii. 16. 

102 Kdln. Volksztg., 12. ii. 16. 

103 'EorTUTptVY) 25. ii. 16; Nea KkXciq 5. iii. 16. 



NEGOTIATIONS II5 

and the British Embassy at Petrograd was striving 
to effect a Greco-Roumanian accord. 1^* 

At the same time Bratianu and Radoslavov had 
been discussing economic arrangements .^^^ 

A grand move was expected from Russia over 
the Bessarabian frontier ;i^^ but Skoloiidis (the 
Greek Premier) declared for neutrality. 1*^''' 

Possibly the Dual Monarchy might make a bid 
for Roumanian neutrality, as she did last year \_v. 
p. 97] : but the utmost concession Tisza would 
offer in Transylvania was the teaching of 
Roumanian by Magyars in the elementary 
schools. 1^^ 

Meantime, Germany had been trying to mobilize 
even the ' ' activists, ' ' or pro-Germans, of Sweden 
to influence the government of Roumania.^^^ 

In March, 1916, the Red Book at last breaks 
silence. On the 7th March^i^^ Burian requests the 
same defensive neutrality on the Russian as on 
the other frontiers. [No. 50]. Czernin had an 
interview of the King (loth March), who con- 
sidered that there was no danger of a Russian 
invasion. 



104 Steagul, Adeverul, lasul, 2. iij. 16. 

105 Berliner Tageblatt, 17. ii. 16 (quoting Ndvoye Vretnya). 

106 Deutsche Tagesztg, 3. iii. 16. 

107 Nsa 'EXXa-, 5. ii. 16. 

108 Adeverul, 7. iii. 16. 

109 DetUsche Tagesztg, 13. xij. 15 ; Berliner Tagehlatt, 15. iij. 16. 

110 The same point had been reaffirmed on the ist January, that 
Roumania would not give passage to the Russians. [Deutsche 
Tagesztg, 1. i. i6]. 



Il6 ROUMANIA 

As a fact troops were heavily concentrated on 
the Austro-Hungarian frontier, which was closed; 
and there was no Russian army on the Eastern 
frontier. 11^ 

Czernin also interviewed Porumbaru, the Foreign 
Minister by himself. Porumbaru objected that 
Roumania could not be held responsible if the 
Russian troops " made a surprise move, without 
the assent of the Roumanian Government "; to 
which Czernin rejoined that, after this third warn- 
ing, Roumania would be held accountable for all 
the consequences. 

The danger, in Czernin 's opinion, lay in 
Bratianu's apathy and bad will. [No. 51]. 

From all these signs, war with Austria was 
anticipated at the end of March; what postponed 
it is not clear. Probably Russia was too weak 
and too grudging. The press was urging that 
Roumania ought to strike on the Danube at the 
Bulgars, before attempting an invasion of Tran- 
sylvania (where confessedly the Russians had not 
massed troops) ;ii^ when the moment was favour- 
able. Marghiloman, the Conservative, was now in 
agreement with Bratianu;!^^ and the anti-Russian 
party is told that, if only Roumania were a nation 
of 13 millions and had the Bucovina, Banat and 
Transylvania and Bessarabia, she would be a 
power to respect. 11^ 

111 Adeverul, 14. iij, 16 ; Ind^pendance Roumaine, 15. iij. 16. 

112 Adeverul, 23, iij. 16; Universul, 24. iij. 16. 

113 Steagul, 13. iij. 16 ; Preporets (Bulgarian paper), 14. iv. 16. 

114 Univetsul, 26 iv. 16. 



NEGOTIATIONS II 7 

There was a certain amount of impatience, for, 
on the 1 2th May, it is said that Roumania cannot 
wait indefinitely on Russia, before she decides on 
invading Transylvania; the prolongation of her 
neutrality spells territorial loss. 

The Allies at Salon ica (where there were 
400,000^^^ troops to match the 350,000 Bulgarians) 
can keep the Bulgarians busy; Roumania need 
only concern herself with the Carpathians 'M^ whilst 
any agreement with the Central Powers is merely 
commercial. 11*^ 

About this time, too, Carp, MaTorescu, and other 
pro-Germans proceeded to Austria; and Austria 
solemnly deprived Take lonescu of the insignia of 
the Iron Crown. ^^^ 

These comments may explain why the Austrian 
Red Book resumes its despatches : why on the 
1 2th May Bratianu is said to have spontaneously 
expressed the opinion that neither combatant had 
won; that Roumania had better bide her time. 
[Nos. 52 and 53]. 

Czernin gave Bratianu to understand that " a 
draw was as impossible as a defeat of Austria, and 
there would be no chance given to Roumania for 
co-operation after an Austrian victory." [Nos. 52 
and 53]. 

115 Cf. Echo, 28. ix. 16, quoting interview with Radev in Voss. 
Ztg. 

116 Adeverul, 12. v. 16. 

117 Bitzevyya Ved., 12, v. 16 ; La Roumanie, 14. v. 16. 

118 La Roumanie and L'Inddpendance Roumaine, 23. v. 16. 
lonescu thereupon returned the Insignia of the Red Eagle as well. 



Il8 ROUMANIA 

On the 26th May the King spoke in admiration 
of the Austrian offensive in Italy, but said that 
" at the time " co-operation with Austria was 
impracticable. He expressed himself delighted at 
the economic rapprochement with the Central 
Powers. [No. 54]. 

Of the meaning of this last phrase there is no 
hint given in the Red Book. From The Times 
(ist, 2nd May, ist, 9th June) it appears that 
the contract to supply 500,000 tons of wheat to 
Germany had been fulfilled: 1,000,000 tons of 
cereals had been exported to Germany; whilst half 
of the 800,000 tons promised to Great Britain had 
been delivered. According to the Neue Freie 
Presse of Vienna [Nov. 30th, 1916] between Dec, 
1915, and Aug., 1916, Roumania sold the Central 
Powers over 20 million centners of corn. 

Roumania also engaged to supply Turkey with 
petrol, benzol, and wheat in exchange for tobacco. 

In June, 1916, Brusilov's great offensive was 
producing a marked effect on Roumanian public 
opinion [No. 55, loth June : cf. Times, 24th 
June, 1916]. The Russians had advanced to 
Buczasz and Stremenec on the Strypa, and by June 
22nd had occupied Czernowitz and Luck, and were 
thus on the Northern Roumanian frontier on the 
river Pruth. 

A Russian cavalry patrol crossed the Roumanian 
frontier at Her^a (on the Pruth) and was disarmed 
and interned. Another detachment crossed the 
Pruth at Mamorni^a, and overwhelmed the 



NEGOTIATIONS IIQ 

frontier-guard. Prompt measures were taken to 
prevent further infractions [Nos. 56, 57 and 58]. 
Another patrol by mistake penetrated as far inland 
as Dorogoie [No. 59]. This news was by no 
means unwelcome at Galati [12th June; No. 59]. 

On the 17th June Czernin was fully satisfied at 
the proper attitude observed by Roumania; 
Bratianu inclined to think that these infractions 
might have been baUons-d'essai to see how 
Roumania would behave. 

Take lonescu and Filipescu were urging instant 
action by Roumania : but the King was adverse. 
[No. 60]. 

Czernin had been home to Vienna, and on the 
19th June sends a despatch summarizing the situa- 
tion. " Bratianu was sitting between two stools; 
he must not miss the opportunity of sharing in 
the Entente's victory, but he must throw in his lot 
as late as possible, and with the least hazard. 
Generally speaking, we stand in Roumania as 
we were a year ago. The evanesced hopes of 
Transylvania are budding anew : the break-up of the 
Monarchy is reassuming shape and form : and, as 
he had said a year ago, Roumanian policy will 
be decided by the fortune of war." [No. 61]. 

§9. — Czernin 's ''diagnosis of the psychology" of 
Roumania, was so far accurate : the situation had 
not changed materially in the course of the year. 
But popular agitation was slowly sapping the 
cautious prevarications of the government. Probably 
Russia was offering large baits to Roumania. 

I 



1 20 ROUMANIA 

Czernin surmised that Bratianu demanded a 
progressive Russian campaign in the Bucovina, 
an insurance against Bulgaria, and a certain amount 
of armaments, before he would join in ; also that 
Roumania should get the Bucovina, Transylvania 
and the Banat, and should declare war against 
Austria, not against Germany. [No. 66].^^^ There 
was, therefore, no instant danger [24th June; No. 
62]. The munitions were to arrive, partly by 
sea at Archangel and Vladivost6k, partly on the 
*' Bistri^a " [which was torpedoed by the Germans 
on or about the i6th October together with the 
Roumanian vessel '^Mercator"] [Times, i6th Oct., 
1916, 5d]'^^ [No. 65] : and Roumanian officers had 
been designated to receive them [12th July; No. 71 
and 72]. 

Bratianu is said to have stated that diplomatic 
negotiations were on foot with Russia, which would 
take over two mxonths; he could therefore partially 
demobilize the army .1^1 

These negotiations were slow : in 191 5 Russia 
would not admit the Roumanian claim to 
Czernowitz; now Russia demanded Bucovina. ^^^ 

119 This proviso again shows the exact similarity with the Italian 
negotiations of 1914-15. Italy's declaration of war in 1915 was 
only against Austria, with whom she had a lawful quarrel : on 
Aug. 28, 1916, she at last formally declared war against Germany. 
Germany, by declaring war on Roumania, at once destroyed the 
last ceremonial shreds of the Triple Alliance. 

120 This fact together with the submarine activity ofif the 
Norwegian coast provides a partial clue to the shortage of 
ammunition in Roumania. 

131 Kdln. Ztg., 28. vj. 16. 
123 Steagiil, I. vij. 16. 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 2 1 

Costinescu was the only minister in favour of 
accepting the proposals of the Entente. ^^^ 

However, Russia is said at last to have promised 
the Bucovina, Transylvania, Maramaros, the 
Roumanian Banat, the Theiss up to Groszwardein 
(Nagyvarad), and the districts of Kahal, Bolgrad 
and Izmail in Bessarabia. i^* This is the first time 
Russia had conceded anything in Bessarabia ; and 
these offers were still considered insufficient : for 
Russia did not propose sending an army 
numerous enough to "aid effectively." It was 
urged that Roumania must not take the final step 
save to gain her national ends.^^^ It was also 
suggested that Roumania had been guaranteed 
Bulgarian territory from Ruscuk (Ruse) to Varna 
in addition. 1^^ 

These press accounts cannot be authoritative, 
but they help to define the situation described in 
a despatch from Burian to Prince Hohenlole. 

At Berlin [i8th July, 1916; No. 74] Burian gives 
a hint of the contents of some of the negotiations 
with Russia: viz., a secret treaty; a promise of 
certain Austro-Hungarian territories; a military 
convention between Russia and Roumania; a free 
passage for the Russian troops in Roumania; the 
fiixing of a period, as brief as might be between 
the contract and the declaration of war. 

123 Steagul, 9. vij. i6. 

124 Steagul, 15. vij. 16 ; Russkoye Sldvo, 28. vij. 16. 

125 Kreutzztg, 20. vij. 15, quoting Independance Roumaine. 

126 Neue Ziircher Ztg., 30. viij. 16. Something of this is probably- 
true but it is coloured by German propaganda. 



122 ROUMANIA 

The Entente intended an offensive against 
Bulgaria, so as to divert the Bulgarian troops. 
[i8th July, 1916; No. 74]. 

The King was still doubtful of the ultimate suc- 
cess of the Russian offensive [24th June; No. 62] : 
and denied that the last Cabinet Council had voted 
any resolution to join the Entente: at any rate, 
says Czernin, this intimation [25th June] was the 
first from the lips of the King that " the course 
of following Italy's example had been mooted in 
a Cabinet Council : and the implication was clear 
that Bratianu might avail himself of a further 
Russian advance, to quit *' neutrality." [No. 63]. 

Similarly Bratianu denied any such resolution 
[June 27th], and declared he would endeavour to 
withstand any pressure tending towards war. [No. 

64]. 

On the 27th it is anticipated that a Crown Coun- 
cil will be summoned to solve the crisis. '^^^ 

Meantime munitions were passing through Rus- 
sia for Roumania [No. 65]; and a very serious 
explosion occurred at the State Powder Factory 
at Dude§ti.i28 

Czernin considered that Roumania would not 
take the final step for six or eight weeks from 
the 28th June, as the Entente had not been suc- 
cessful enough, the munitions had not arrived, and 
the harvest had not been reaped. 

Czernin hints that Russia had declined to de- 

127 Viitorul, 27. vij. i6. 

128 RtUskoye Sldvo, 28. vij. 16. 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 23 

liver the munitions without a binding declaration 
from Bratianu. 

The despatch No. 66 is one of those which 
shew signs of special re-editing : it winds up with 
a windy declamation : ' ' The hesitation of a Hohen- 
zollern to incur the despicable treachery of blood- 
guilt to his own kin is at least observable." [No. 
66]. 

On the 30th June, there was another interview 
with Bratianu, who asse^verated the strain of hold- 
ing back. The Russians were advancing : the Buco- 
vina was his for the asking : should the Russians 
penetrate into Transylvania, there would be no 
holding back the people. "Roumanian policy, 
like all else in Europe, is an immediate and 
direct reflexion of military results; only more so 
than it was last year." 

Czernin repeats his expectation that the crisis will 
come about in six or eight weeks. [Nos. 67 and 68]. 

On the 7th July Czernin reports that the Powers 
of the Entente have " singly " (not collectively) 
intimated to Roumania that if she does not strike 
now, she will have no voice in the peace negotia- 
tions. 

Filipescu and Take lonescu, the pro-belligerent 
were not admitted to the Cabinet. [No. 69]. 

On the 1 2th July Czernin reports further pre- 
parations, the anti-Zeppelin blackening of the 
street-lamps, laying in of provisions in the larger 
towns; he anticipated the crisis in four week's time. 
Costinescu, the Minister of Finance, now adhered 



1 24 ROUMANIA 

to the war-party [Nos. 70 and 71] : an allegation 
he denied [No. 75; i8th July]. 

On the 1 8th July Burian instructed Czernin to 
approach the King, not Bratianu, and to inform 
him that one of the treaty obligations was not to 
entertain any alliance or obligation directed against 
any of the contracting powers : a duty which the 
Monarchy had scrupulously observed; when enter- 
ing into new relations with other States, it had 
always regarded the treaty obligations towards 
Roumania. [No. 73]. 

Burian omits to state that Roumania was never 
consulted when the first Serbian note was 
despatched : and Austria therefore broke the 
spirit, if not the letter of the Alliance. [C/. No. 
4 antea]. 

In a despatch of the 19th July, Czernin surmises 
that war may be declared in the second half of 
August, when the foreign munitions were due to 
arrive. [Nos. 76 and 77]. 

Bratianu staunchly denied having entered into 
any binding agreement : he would rather resign 
than enter into the war at this time (26th July). 
He was waiting, until the Russians had a reverse, 
which would cool the ardour of the Roumanians, 
but to refuse to entertain the suggestions of the 
Entente would provoke a revolution. [No. 78; 
26th July]. However, should the Monarchy dis- 
integrate, " la Roumanie ne peut rester a I'ecart.'* 

Czernin also interviewed the King separately, 
who regretted he could not follow the example of 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 25 

his uncle (King Charles), who had said : *' If Italy 
attacked Austria, it would be an abomination 
(Schweinerei) of which a Hohenzollern could not 
be guilty." The only remedy, now, was to 
terrorize the Roumanian Government with the fear 
of an invasion by Germans from Transylvania and 
500,000 Bulgarians in the Dobrudja. [No. 81]. 

On the 26th or 27th Czernin had an audience of 
the King, and conveyed to him the message in No. 
73 (v. aniea). The King for the time being would 
not betray neutrality. It nevers occurs to Czernin, 
that the King, in complying with Bratianu's ad- 
vice, was not a mere passive agent, but positively 
constitutional. [No. 80]. 

In the interview with Bratianu [Nos. 78 and 81] 
the phrase occurs: "We (the Monarchy) would 
not revive the ancient theme of treaty obligation 
and political morals: but Bratianu might like to 
know, we could face a declaration of war quite 
coolly." Amongst the many lapsed documents, 
does this refer to a formal rescission of the Treaty 
of Alliance, and a formal breakdown of the nego- 
tiations for the cession of territory : presumably on 
the question of Transylvania ? The speculation is 
not so wild : the analogy of the Italian negotiations : 
the demand for Trieste, and the abrupt refusal of 
Italy to continue the dilatory measures furnish a 
likely analogy. 

At any rate, in point of fact, whoever may have 
been the real aggressor, the Austrian Embassy 



1 26 ROUMANIA 

made early preparations to leave Bucarest. These 
were started on the ist iVugust [No. 82] : the 
Dutch Government was approached [Nos. 88, 94 
and 100; 7th August]. On the 14th Aug. con- 
fidential documents were clandestinely removed. 
[Nos. 94 and loi]. 

The declaration §io. — The last section has scarcely 
of War. carried the narrative any farther : it 

has merely re-iterated and re-acer- 
bated the points of difference, the vague suspicions, 
the distrust and secret precautionary measures. As 
Czernin forecast, whether from knowledge of what 
was projected by the Central Powers, or by Rou- 
mania, or by a process of intelligent anticipation, 
the war came about in the latter part of August, 
1916. 

The Kolnische Zeitung [Times, July 28th, 1916] 
had cautioned Roumania not to be enticed by 
the allurements of the Entente; nor to submit to 
"decisive language" from Russia and England: 
" the example of Italy should be a warning to 
Roumania." 

It is generally safe to interpret German official 
prognostication by the opposite : to read "Menacing 
notes from the Central Powers" in place of "Ter- 
rorism by England and Russia." 

The course of the last negotiations can be briefly 
traced. 

On the first of August Czernin objected to the 
concentrations of troops on the Hungarian fron- 
tier, and Bratianu tried to explain them away, and 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 27 

denied that he was contemplating abandoning 
neutrality : Czernin attributes this reluctance to the 
poor success of the Russians and the military 
menace of the Bulgarian troops. [Nos. 83, 84, 85; 
ist, 2nd and 3rd of Aug., 1916]. 

As a result of this Bulgarian activity the in- 
habitants of Giurgevo were in a state of feverish 
excitement and moving away. [7th Aug.; No. 89]. 

The outlook was dubious. Czernin states on the 
3rd Aug. that orders had been given a fortnight 
previously with the intention of striking. [No. 
85]. Burian sought for instructions at Berlin, 
requesting authorization to present the following 
note : — 

" Confiant dans les assertions de M. Bratiano 
que la Roumanie repousserait par la force toute 
atteinte armee a sa neutrality, eventualite qui — a 
I'instar de I'incident de Mamorni^a — pourrait se 
renouveler d'un jour a I'autre dans des dimensions 
bien autrement s^rieuses, le Gouvernement 
Impe^rial et Royal dans I'intention d'^clairer et de 
rassurer d^s k present le Gouvernement Roumain, 
lui fait savoir que dans le cas oti le Gouvernement 
Roumain ne se trouverait, ou ne se croirait pas a 
meme de s'opposer efficacement a une invasion 
de I'armee russe, il prendra de sa part toutes les 
mesures militaires que la s^curit^ des fronti^res 
austro-hongroises exigerait, et qui seraient jug^es 
necessaires pour retablir un ^tat de choses qui per- 
mettrait a la Roumanie de garder sa neutrality.'* 
[7th Aug., 1916; No. 87]. 



128 ROUMANIA 

This Step was approved by Prince Hohenlohe. 
[8th Aug., 1916; No. 91]. 

On the 8th Aug. Czernin had another conversa- 
tion with Bratianu. Bratianu at last made the 
long-expected request for blackmail : Austria might 
help him to maintain neutrality by a territorial offer 
in the Bucovina. The despatch continues: " I was 
the better able to de^cline, as I not only know your 
[Burian's] intentions in this matter, but have 
always been of the opinion that a territorial conces- 
sion in return for neutrality was quite out of the 
question. Roumania would accept such a conces- 
sion, but would still attack us later on, when she 
thought we were beaten, thus to get more." 

The conversation began with Czernin 's remon- 
strances at the continued movements of the troops. 
Czernin said plainly: that " if Bratianu wanted to 
have war, he might and should; but he must not 
think me such a simpleton, as not to see through 
his preparations." 

Bratianu rejoined that these measures were pre- 
cautionary, and a concession to the national feel- 
ing. The Bulgarians might attack. 

Czernin, thereupon, suggested to Bratianu that 
he might demobilize, declare absolute neutrality, 
and Czernin would guarantee immunity. 

" Bratianu replied that we had hundreds of spies, 
whilst he knew little of the Bulgarian movements : 
furthermore, he could not demobilize for internal 
reasons. Czernin must trust him, and he would 
do all he could to maintain neutrality." [No. 90]. 



NEGOTIATIONS I2g 

The vigour and heat of this despatch make it 
noteworthy. 

But is it probable that Bratianu, who, whatever 
his faults, as seen by his enemy, was astute and 
cautious, would have blurted out a sudden request 
for Austrian territory ? 

For, evidently, Burian had given instructions for 
this contingency : these are not published in the 
Red Book. 

The offer to guarantee the neutrality and in- 
violability of Roumania can hardly have been 
serious: if it were, Bratianu's reply is eminently 
discreet; he might have said much more. 

Moreover, there is no mention of the presentation 
of the formula agreed upon with Prince Hohenlohe 
[No. 87]. Was this strong threat never used? 

The only plausible explanation of this despatch 
is that it is one of a suppressed series, in which 
specious offers had been made of Austrian or 
Hungarian territory, as compensation for Austrian 
aggrandisement in the Balkans; and Czernin's 
remark that Roumania would swallow such a con- 
cession, merely to fall on Austria later, is exactly 
paralleled by Merey's^^^ observation (in the Second 
Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 33; 5th Aug., 
1914). 

'' I fear that Italy is trying to force us to 
continue the discussions of compensations and, 
excluding other compensations, may end by de- 

129 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome. 



I30 ROUMANIA 

manding the Trentino. Sooner or later Italy may 
quit her neutrahty. If our group win rapidly, Italy 
may attach herself to it, and her demands for 
compensation be more modest; in the contrary 
event she might try to strengthen her moral 
pressure by military threats." 

Other similar parallel passages might be quoted : 
the Austrians never understood their Southern 
allies' point of view, and always attributed foul 
motives. It was an unholy marriage in the first 
instance: the contract had been violated on the 
first occasion when it might have come into force. 

The inconsequence of this part of the book is 
the best demonstration of its special pleading, if 
not, of the distortion of the documents. Until the 
Roumanian Government publishes an official 
account, there can be no true history. 

The replies made by Czernin at the interview of 
the 8th August met with Burian's full approval, 
[gth August; No. 92]. 

It is quite possible, that, if we had the full docu- 
ments, we should find that, as in the case of Italy, 
Roumania had formally rescinded the Treaty of 
Alliance, and was negotiating as a free agent. 

On the loth August Burian reports to Czernin 
that information was to hand that Roumania had 
concluded a military convention with Russia : and 
that a similar convention with the Quadruple 
Entente was in course of settlement. The only point 
of variance was said to be that Roumania stipu- 



NEGOTIATIONS I3I 

lated for a strong offensive from Salon ica. [No. 

93]- 

It may be significant that King Constantine of 
Greece was giving the Entente more trouble than 
usual at this period. 

These negotiations with the Entente were not 
going altogether smoothly: for, on the nth 
August, Cze'rnin reports that the differences which 
arose a week ago were not appeased : and that 
Bratianu was averse to signing the agreement. 
[No. 95]. On the other hand, Hungary professed 
she would not regard Roumania as an enemy until 
she opened the door to the Russians. ^^^ 

Meanwhile military preparations were proceed- 
ing apace : the classes 1896 to 191 4 were summoned 
and being equipped [nth August; No. i6] : and 
trains between Braila and Gala^T went at night 
darkened : the street-lamps in Bucarest had been 
blackened for some time. (v. No. 75). [No. 106; 
24th August]. 

The King was still in absolute agreement with 
a policy of war. On the 12th August he said he 
hoped to get over this crisis [No. 97]; and on the 
14th, Burian (who never grasped that the King, 
though personally consulted, was a constitutional 
Monarch and acted on advice) surmised that the 
King was not cognisant of the extent of the mili- 
tary preparations; that he was rushed into the 
conflict in the dark by Bratianu. [No. 99]. Such 

ISO Pesti Hirlap, 14. viij. 16 



132 ROUMANIA 

conduct would have been treachery. There was 
no sign of Roumanian intervention as yet in Ger- 
many. ^^^ 

On the 19th August, Czernin reported to Burian 
that " according to confidential information in 
Court circles" [sicj^^^ the King is gradually being 
made to realise that a Bratianu Ministry will no 
longer do, and must be replaced by a Conservative 
MaTorescu group. Bratianu is going too fast; and 
the King is reluctant to fight the Central Powers, 
until they are finally defeated. [No. 102]. It is 
curious that Czernin, according to these documents, 
had no audience of the King from the 27th July 
[Nos. 80 and 81] to the 26th August [No. 108], 
nor with Bratianu between the 8th August [No. 
90] and the 26th Aug. [No. 109]. 

This gap of interviews is closely paralleled in 
the Italian Book, when, after the great break and 
the denunciation of the Treaty of Alliance on May 
3rd, there were no interviews between May 6th and 
May 17th and i8th, when the alliance was de- 
nounced. This period in Italy was occupied with 
the reconstruction of the Government for war. 
What was happening in Roumania between the 
8th and 26th August ? This time the Austrians 
do not tell a full and complete story. 

On the 2 1 St August King Ferdinand returned 

131 Frankfurterztg, 17. viij. 16. 

132 Cf. that in 1915 the King's physician, a German, had to be 
dismissed as he was convicted of spying for Germany [Nieuwe 
Courant, 18. viij. '15]. 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 33 

to Bucarest, and Maiorescu left Gmiinden in 
Austria : on what mission he was at the Austrian 
Court does not appear. Russia also allowed the 
munitions ordered to be sent to Roumania.^^^ 

On the 20th August Czernin reports to Burian, 
though not as a certainty, on the strength of news 
from abroad, that a political convention was de- 
finitely signed between Roumania and Russia, and 
the remainder of the ambassadors of the Entente 
at Bucarest had been instructed to adhere to it. 
[No. 103]. 

On the 22nd August Burian requests Czernin 
to draw the attention of the King and Bratianu 
to the large concentrations of troops on the 
Hungarian frontier and the comparative denudation 
on the Russian. [No. 104]. 

On the 25th extraordinary military credits of 
600-800 million francs v/ere issued. [No. 107]. 

According to The Times of the 22nd August, it is 
still evident that the course of events is doubtful; 
for, in the same columns, Karl von Wiegand in 
the New York World, reports that Roumania will 
not enter the war; and that she has discharged all 
Germans and Austrians and Jews employed in her 
munition works; leaving only 900 persons working 
on them. " That, v/ith the present supply, it would 
be national suicide to enter a war which mieht last 
more than a week." 

Whereas the Kreuzseitung of the 20th or 21st 

133 Libertatea, 21. viij. 16. 



134 ROUMANIA 

States that the negotiations which took place on 
the 20th with the Roumanian Minister of War, in 
the presence of the Russian miUtary attache, must 
be considered as a proof that Roumania has joined 
the Entente. 

The next day's news shows the same uncertainty. 
The Bulgaro-German troops invaded Greek Mace- 
donia, offering Greece full guarantees and indemn- 
ities (thus rendering an advance from Salonica 
hazardous and forestalling any offensive) : whilst 
the Frankfurtersseitting is informed that the 
Roumanian Government has ordered diplomatic 
messengers to travel via Russia and Sweden. 

Yet a Zurich telegram announces that a third 
contract has been signed between the Roumania 
Exportation Commission and the Central Powers : 
the goods to be delivered before the end of Sep- 
tember. 

On the 25th, according to the Berliner Tagehlatt, 
the temporary tranquility apparently prevailing in 
Roumania must not be interpreted as meaning 
that that countrv does not think of intervention. 
'* Bratianu will certainly intervene, but it appears 
that the various governments have not yet come to 
an understanding whether Roumania at the peace 
negotiations shall have a co-decisive, or only an 
advisory voice." 

This daily quivering of the pendulum is reflected 
in the last despatches as published by the Austrian 
Government. 

Czernin learned that a Crown Council was to be 



NEGOTIATIONS 135 

convened in about a week's time, and all parties 
to be summoned, including the ministry, Filipescu 
and Take lonescu, Carp, Maiorescu, Marghiloman 
and Rosetti. [23rd Aug.; No. 105]. 

This Council was convened for the 27th August. 
[26th Aug.; No. 108]. It would decide the ques- 
tion of peace and war. 

On the 26th Czernin had an hour's audience of 
the King. He argued that Roumania was no 
longer, strictly speaking, neutral; whereas Austria- 
Hungary desired nothing more nor less than 
correct neutrality; and did not dread war, but 
must consider that any further preparations would 
directly involve a decisive attitude on the part of 
the Monarchy. 

" The King replied in his characateristic vague 
manner. He said to-morrow would decide. He 
did not want war, but could not assume such a 
responsibihty himself: hence the Crown Council. 
He hoped he might remain neutral. He believed 
that his army would not be willing to oppose any 
Russian invasion. He was not the master of his 
own wishes." 

It was possible that the Bratianu ministry might 
be dismissed, and be replaced by a Conservative 
one under Maiorescu, who had not a majority in 
the Chamber, "although as the King affirmed, 
90 per cent, of the people did not want war." 

"The Kinp- fullv understood that we could not 
tolerate any further increase in military strength, 

K 



136 ROUMANIA 

and he affirmed that to-morrow would bring about 
disarmament, if neutrality were the outcome." 

Czernin's impression was that the King hoped 
to retain his neutraHty, but possibly Bratianu might 
coerce him. In to-morrow's Crown Council the 
favourers and opponents of war would be more or 
less balanced. 

Czernin was convinced that the Entente and 
Bratianu were threatening the King with war; and, 
in the alternative, with allowing the Russians a 
passage through Roumania. 

The official paper Viitorul urged an expectant 
and quiet attitude, and gave the impression that 
Bratianu would waver a while yet. [No. 107]. 

At the interview with Czernin on the same day, 
Bratianu stated most definitely he wanted neu- 
trality and would and could remain neutral : the 
morrow would show he was speaking the truth. 
Probably Maiorescu wanted to succeed him in 
office. [No. 109]. 

On the 27th [No. no] Roumania declared war 
in the following terms: — 

The i\lliance concluded betv/een Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and Italy had, according to the 
declarations of the Governments themselves, only 
an essentially conservative and defensive character; 
its principal object was to guarantee the Allied 
countries against any attack from outside and to 
consolidate the state of things created by previous 
treaties. 

It was with the desire to harmonize her policy 



NEGOTIATIONS 137 

with these pacific tendencies that Roumania joined 
this alliance. Devoted to the work of her internal 
reconstruction, and faithful to her firm resolution 
to remain, in the region of the Lower Danube, an 
element of order and of equilibrium, Roumania has 
not ceased to contribute to the maintenance of peace 
in the Balkans. 

The last Balkan wars, by destroying the status 
quo, imposed upon her a new line of conduct. Her 
intervention hastened peace and restored equili- 
brium. For herself, she was satisfied with a recti- 
fication of frontier which gave her greater security 
against an aggression, and which at the same time 
repaired the injustice committed to her detriment 
at the Berlin Congress. But, in the pursuit of this 
end, Roumania was disappointed to observe that 
she did not meet from the Cabinet of Vienna the 
attitude which she was entitled to expect. 

When the present war broke out Roumania, like 
Italy, declined to associate herself with the declara- 
tion of war by Austria-Hungary, of which she had 
received no previous notice from the Cabinet of 
Vienna. In the spring of 191 5 Italy declared war 
on Austria-Hungary; the Triple Alliance no longer 

existed. 

The reasons which had determined the adher- 
ence of Roumania to this political system dis- 
appeared at the same time. Instead of a grouping 
of States seeking by common effort to work in 
agreement in order to assure peace and the con- 
servation of the situations de facto and de iure 



138 ROUMANIA 

created by treaties, Roumania found herself in pres- 
ence of Powers making war with the very object 
of transforming from top to bottom the old arrange- 
ments which had served as a basis for their Treaty 
of Alliance. These profound changes were for 
Roumania an evident proof that the object which 
she had pursued in adhering to the Triple Alliance 
could no longer be attained and that she must direct 
her views and her efforts towards new paths, the 
more so as the work undertaken by Austria- 
Hungary was assuming a character threatening the 
essential interests of Roumania as well as her most 
legitimate national aspirations. 

In presence of so radical a modification of the 
situation created between the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and Roumania, the latter has resumed 
her liberty of action. The neutrality of the Royal 
Government, imposed upon itself in consequence 
of a declaration of war made without reference to 
its will and contrary to its interests, had been 
adopted, in the first instance, as the result of 
assurances given at the outset by the Imperial and 
Royal Government that the Monarchy, in declaring 
war upon Serbia, had not been inspired by a spirit 
of conquest and that it was in no way aiming at 
territorial acquisitions. 

These assurances have not been fulfilled. To-day 
we find ourselves confronted by situations de facto, 
from which may arise great territorial transforma- 
tions and political changes of a character constitut- 
ing a grave menace to the security of the future 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 39 

of Roumania. The work of peace which Roumania, 
faithful to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, had 
endeavoured to accomplish has thus been rendered 
fruitless by those very Powers who were called 
upon to support and defend it. 

In adhering in 1883 to the group of the Central 
Powers Roumania, far from forgetting the ties of 
blood uniting the populations of the Kingdom with 
the Roumanian subjects of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, had seen in the relations of friendship 
and alliance which had been established between 
the three Great Powers a precious pledge for her 
internal tranquility, as well as for the amelioration 
of the lot of the Roumanians of i\ustria-Hungary. 
In fact, Germany and Italy, who had reconstituted 
their States on the basis of the principle of na- 
tionality, could not but recognize the legitimacy 
of the foundation on which their own existence 
rested. As for Austria-Hungary, she found in the 
friendly relations established between herself and 
the Kingdom of Roumania assurances for her tran- 
quility, both in her interior and on our common 
frontiers — for she was well aware to what an extent 
the discontent of her Roumanian population found 
an echo amongst us, threatening every moment to 
trouble the good relations between the two States. 

The hope which we had based from this point 
of view upon our adhesion to the Triple Alliance 
has been disappointed. For a period of more than 
30 years the Roumanians of the Monarchy not only 
have never seen a reform introduced of a nature 



140 ROUMANIA 

to give them any semblance of satisfaction, but 
they have, on the contrary, been treated as an 
inferior race and condemned to suffer the oppression 
of a foreign element which constitutes no more 
than a minority in the midst of the various na- 
tionalities of which the Austro-Hungarian State 
is composed. All the injustices which our brothers 
were thus made to suffer have fostered between our 
country and the Monarchy a continual state of 
animosity, which the Governments of the Kingdom 
only succeeded in appeasing at the cost of great 
difficulties and of numerous sacrifices. 

When the present war broke out it might have 
been hoped that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, at least at the last moment, would end by 
convincing itself of the urgent necessity of putting 
an end to this injustice, which endangered not only 
our relations of friendship but even the normal re- 
lations which ought to exist between neighbouring 
States. 

Two years of war, during which Roumania has 
maintained neutrality, have proved that Austria- 
Hungary, opposed to all internal reform which 
could ameliorate the life of the peoples which she 
governs, has shown herself as ready to sacrifice 
them as she is powerless to defend them against 
external attack. ^^^ 

134 F)vidence can be found to substantiate this charge. In Octo- 
ber, 19 1 5, there was a reign of terror in Transylvania [Echo de 
Paris, 10, X., '15]; so severe that the military were destroying 
the refugees' houses, imprisoning and deporting the population 
[Adeverul, 19. xj. '15]. In March, 1916, the paper Romdnul of 



NEGOTIATIONS 14I 

The war in which almost the whole of Europe 
is taking part revives the gravest problems affect- 
ing the national development and the very existence 
of States. Roumania, moved by the desire to con- 
tribute to hasten the end of the conflict and com- 
pelled by the necessity of safeguarding her racial 
interests, sees herself forced to enter into line with 
those who are better able to assure the accomplish- 
ment of her national unity. 

For these reasons she considers herself from this 
moment in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. 
Bucarest, 14/27 August, 1916, 9 p.m. 

Em. Porumbaru. 

What forced |ii. — The die was cast. 

Roumania j^ -^ (jiffic^^iit to summarize this im- 

into war on ^ ... r 1 . -^u 

27th August? perfect collection of documents with 

any preciseness. 

Probably Bratianu was genuine and sincere : he 
did not desire war and dreaded it : but he was 
impelled by the national feeling, and could not give 
way : whereas the pro-Germans, and Conservatives 
and anti-Russians inclined definitely either to 
collaboration with the Central Powers or benevolent 
neutrality. The example of Bulgaria is not to the 
point : she had no irredenta administered by 
Magyars. 

The King acted constitutionally. What induce- 
ments were offered or extorted in the way of terri- 

Arad was suspended ; and a number of writers on the paper Trihuna 
of Arad were condemned to death in their absence. They had 
fled to Roumania [AdevSrul, i6. iii. i6]. 



142 ROUMANIA 

torial concessions by Russia, or by Austria-Hun- 
gary, does not appear. ^-'^-'^ 

One gross piece of mis-statement must yet be 
added. 

On the 23rd Sept., 1916, Count Hadik, Austro- 
Hungarian Minister at Stockholm telegraphs 
to Burian to the effect that Czernin, on his way 
through Sweden sends a supplementary despatch 
— that on the 24th August Russia sent an ultima- 
tum : promising on the one hand large accessions 
in Transylvania, the Banat and Bucovina and the 
Delta of the Danube; on the other an invasion with 
100,000 men : Roumania must elect if they were 
to come as friends or foes. 

The Crown Council had to face war as a fait 
accompli. At the very time when it was assembl- 
ing, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was sur- 
rounded by a military cordon, " Bratianu gave 
me (Czernin) his word of honour to remain neu- 
tral, and put the responsibilty for any other course 
on the King. [This is only partly corroborated 
by the despatch No. 109 to which it refers. There 
is no mention of the King]. Doubtless he would 

135 Further evidence is La Trihuna, 15. viij. 15 (quoting Ixinte 
to the effect that Austria-Hungary offered territorial concessions 
in return for neutrality, but withdrew the offer, as it had not been 
accepted within the time fixed, viz, : July ; and also, Nieuwe 
Rotterdamsche Courant stated that Russia, before starting her 
offensive, demanded the dismissal of the German artillery in- 
structors in Roumania ; and Great Britain wanted to negotiate on 
the basis of a cession of territory in Bessarabia, to include Ki§inev 
and Mohilev, up to the river Kogilnik. 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 43 

rather have waited : but, as I anticipated, the 
Entente forced matters by a sudden action. "^^^ 

The members of the Legation and consulate and 
colony were interned at the Legation for ten days; 
and only provisioned at extortionate prices, — 
Czernin does not state that the Roumanian 
ministers were all sent through Russia and Sweden 
and detained on the Isle of Riigen for a similar 
period — ^and maltreatment of the Austrian Colony 
was general. 

This extraordinary despatch bears marks of 
fabrication. There is no evidence given of this 
maltreatment. The Neue Freie Presse of Vienna 
[i6th Oct., 1 91 6] corroborates and extends the 
story that Czernin was forced by pangs of starva- 
tion after ten days to visit Bratianu, who still tried 
to be friendly : saying that Czernin must not take 
it amiss that Bratianu had lied : it was for the 
weal of Roumania. Czernin rejoined that the fraud 
was in vain : Austria was ready, and Roumania 
would soon learn this to her cost. And Czernin 
loftily " refused to shake hands with Bratianu." 

The question remains, what of the Russian 
ultimatum. It is not mentioned in the Red Book 
in its place. Buri^n [No. 103] merely conjectures 
that a military convention has befen signed with 
Russia. It would be incomprehensible that Aus- 
tria, having early knowledge of this, should have 
failed to utilize so powerful an argument. 

136 Precedents for such promptness are rare. 



144 ROUMANIA 

Possibly, the next document, No. iii, is an after- 
thought and cloaks the fact that Austria acted on 
the threat contained in No. io8, that pressure 
should be put on Roumania : an insistence that 
Roumania should either side with the Central 
Empires, or be treated as an enemy would be the 
policy and interest of the Austro-German Alliance. 

Bratianu was not ready for war : it was expedient 
to force war on to Roumania before her time and 
put the obloquy of treachery on to her. Such any- 
how was the German precedent in creating war 
between Germany and Russia in 191 4, the 
Austrian in enforcing hostilities between herself 
and Serbia in 1914, not to go back to the precedents 
of 1864, ^^^ 1870, when the same manoeuvre was 
adopted. 

Anyhow this despatch is sO' inconsistent and so 
unreasonable, that it cannot be regarded as truth- 
ful. 

The question, however, of the responsibility for 
the ultimatum that made Roumania declare war 
on the 27th August, 191 6, is very doubtful. But 
since then there has been a revolution in Russia, 
and some of the veil of darkness has been lifted. 

General Iliescu in an interview in the Matin [3 
iv. 17] states that Roumania was not ready in 
August, 1916,1^^ and that " towards this period a 

137 Cf. Frankfufterztg (3. viij. '16) to the effect that Russia 
intended annexing Roumania up to the Sereth. This allegation 
corresponds with the Russo-German bargain suggested by Iliescu. 
So, too, Le Genevois (cit. Gazzetta Ticinese, 17. iii. 17) learns 
from a very respectable source that by Sturmer's Russo-German 



NEGOTIATIONS 1 45 

sort of summons from Russia reached us. ' Now 
or never,' said this document, the text of which I 
can put at your disposal." 

General Iliescu proceeds to show that the Rus- 
sians proposed a plan of campaign for their con- 
venience : and then withheld any support. "The 
defeat of Roumania was foreseen and organized 
by M. Stiirmer, who wished to finish the war by 
this striking fact. ... In my opinion, this was 
M. Stiirmer's plan, when he forced our hand and 
organised our campaign : — to allow Roumania to 
be invaded as far as the Sereth, to allow the 
triumph of the military power of the Central 
Empires, to conclude a separate peace in conse- 
quence of the defeat, which would not be a 
Russian defeat, and consequently would not shake 
either his power, or that of the Tsar at all." 

In the Gazette de Lausanne [7 iv. 17] N. P. 
Comneanu confirms this, adding that all Roumania 
knew of this betrayal; that he himself had seen the 

peace, Roumania was to be divided between Russia and Austria. 
Russia was to annex Moldavia, while Austria-Hungary took 
Wallachia, and that was why the armies of Falkenhayn and 
Mackensen came to a stop at the Sereth. 

For further confirmation cf. Berner Tagwacht (6. x. 16); that 
Roumania was the price of the Russo-German peace, and Berner 
Tagblatt, 20. x. 16. 

Mr. Dillon in the House of Commons [Hansard, 20. ii. 17, p. 
198 . . .] also corroborates the theory that Russia presented a 
premature ultimatum, when Roumania was unwilling and un- 
ready ; and when Sarrail had no men available to relieve the 
pressure. C/. also the Hannoverscher Kurier (18. iii. 17) quoting 
from the German-controlled paper Gazeta Bucurestilor an article 
bv Alexandru Beldiman. 



146 ROUMANIA 

French material of war held up by order on the 
Russian railways. 

If so, the statement in the Austrian Red Book 
[No. Ill; dated from Stockholm, 23 ix. 16] is 
borne out : but there still remains the curious fact 
that there is no mention in the text of the book, 
on the date specified, viz., August 24, 1916, of 
any report to this effect — nothing that could be 
" supplemented. "1^® This disparity is still un- 
explained. 

Either, such a report exists and has been sup- 
pressed; or the arrangement of Stiirmer and 
Protopopov with Berlin was negotiated, at any 
rate, over the head of Czernin at Bucarest. The 
object was to force Roumania into war to her own 
undoing and the easy victory of the Central 
Powers. 

The dismissal of Stiirmer soon followed, and 
Milyukov denounced his treachery in the Duma. 
[Birzevyya Vedomosti, 29 ix./i2 xij. 16]. That 
monstrous act of ill-faith has contributed towards 
the downfall of institutions older and greater than 
that ministry. 

But, to return to the question of this missing 
link; if this evidence were available, it would have 
been to the interest of the Austrians to proclaim 
it aloud in their Red Book : and therefore it is 
quite possible that the matter was engineered at 
Berlin, and Czernin himself was innocent and 

138 Zur Ergdnzung meiner Berichterstattung aus Bukarest. 



NEGOTIATIONS 147 

honestly surprised at the rapid and unexpected 
development. 

In the fearful story of Roumania's disaster, there 
may yet be this two-fold consolation : first, it was 
the result of an incalculable and wicked intrigue; 
and, secondly, that Germany, as ever, reckoned 
amiss; for the stout and desperate resistence of the 
Roumanian forces weakened the Central Empires 
beyond their estimate: whilst the Russian people 
revolted against the perfidy of the Court, and, a 
few months later, overthrew the system of govern- 
ment that rendered it possible. As usual, Germany 
with all the laborious ingenuity of her forecast was 
never able to understand the minds of those with 
whom she intended dealing, possibly in self- 
conscious disregard of any such factors. 
Summary. § i^.-It may be useful in conclusion to 
summarize these despatches which seem 
to throw some light on the course of events. 

First. Roumania was inclined to enter on the 
war in August or September, 1914, when hostilities 
between Turkey and Greece were anticipated over 
the questions of the islands fronting the coast of 
Asia Minor. Roumania was not assured of the 
benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria and was deterred. 
But she was rigidly neutral, and as far as she 
could, stopped the passage of munitions to Turkey. 
The doubt as to Bulgaria, prevented from engag- 
ing herself when Turkey entered the field. 

Second. The interval was apparently occupied 



148 ROUMANIA 

with bids from both sets of belligerents. Italy had 
failed to obtain compensations from Austria for 
the breach of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance, 
and there was every expectation that Roumania 
would strike in May with Italy. The danger was 
averted by the quasi-ultimatum of the 23rd May, 
1 91 5 [No. 31] : but the decision was no doubt in- 
fluenced by the ill-success of the Russian arms. 

Roumania could not be munitioned by sea and 
land, like Italy. The route to Archangel and 
Alexandrovsk was long and unreliable : supplies 
from Vladivostok were slow. The Quadruple 
Entente was bent on conciliating Bulgaria, and was 
niggardly in their offers in the Banat and Buco- 
vina. ^^^ They were insistent that the Treaty of 
Bucarest, 1913, should be revised. ^^"^ This was 
eminently just; but injudicious : Bulgaria did not 
deserve such punctilio. On the other hand the 
Central Powers were offering Roumania a, rectifica- 
tion of the Transylvanian frontier.^*! 

Third. Bulgaria entered the field against the 
Entente in October, 1915, and an effective invasion 
of Serbia was possible on two sides. On the 22nd 
Sept., 191 5, Roumania was intimidated, and the 
third imminent risk of Roumanian participation 
passed away. 

Fourth. Roumania armed herself anew, and in 

139 Corriere della Sera, lo. vj. 15 ; Berliner Morgenport, 22. 

vj- 15- 

140 Echo de Bulgarie, 23. vj. 15 ; Mir (Sofia), 23. vj, 15. 

141 La Trihuna, 27. vj. 15. 



NEGOTIATIONS I49 

August, 1916, joined the Allies. The circumstances 
are obscure. The Russian promises, as far as can 
be gathered, were more generous and included 
part of Bessarabia, besides Transylvania, the 
Roumanian Banat and the Bucovina, i*^ Possibly 
the Central Powers forced the pace with a summary 
ultimatum, knowing that Roumania was still in- 
sufficiently armed, and that the submarines off the 
Norwegian Coast were intercepting her supplies : 
or the Russians did present a demand for a free 
passage : but it was in collusion with the enemy. 

There was only one root and primal cause for 
the hagglings and bogglings during these two 
years, viz. : the injustice of the Treaty of Bucarest, 
1 913. Lord Grey, at the Conference of London, 
laboriously assigned just frontiers to Bulgaria and 
Greece and Serbia and Montenegro; he had modi- 
fied them justly, when the Central Powers insisted 
on creating Albania. He had defeated Austria by 
giving the Balkan League no excuse to dissolve. 

Austria instigated Bulgaria to attack her allies; 
miscalculated the result : and Bulgaria, crushed, 
was despoiled by Roumania, Serbia and Greece : 
and forfeited to Turkey Adrianople and the Enos- 
Midia frontier-line. On these rights Bulgaria 
properly stood firm, before October, 191 5 — on 
the restoration of her share. It was the impossi- 
bility of getting all of the other States to relinquish 
their portions of the Bulgarian boundaries (as 

142 Steagul, 15. vij. i6. 



150 ROUMANIA 

established at the Conference of London) that 
wrecked the schemes of the Entente : despite the 
allurement of compensation elsewhere. The wrong 
of the Treaty of Bucarest has exacted a frightful 
retribution. 

Since the ink was wasted on these despatches, 
the big guns have spoken. Roumania, taken 
unawares before her times ; with the diplomacy 
possibly mishandled by the Powers of the Entente, 
has suffered and lost. Very likely, too, she was 
hot-headed and plunged into a Transylvanian 
campaign instead of acting in concert with the 
Allies in Bulgaria. 

Essentially, the fight is for Transylvania. Pos- 
sibly — unless this is too Utopian — the time may 
come, when the wisdom of humanity may suffice 
to settle border disputes of neighbouring States by 
the wishes of these frontier-folk, by a kind of local 
option, or give-and-take, and not by the high rules 
of strategy, which scarcely seem to apply or meet 
the case. 

For this is the crux of the matter : the inherent 
right of peoples to govern themselves in freedom. 



APPENDIX 



THE DECLARATIONS OF WAR 

July 28th, 1914, Austria against Serbia. 

Germany against Russia. 
Germany against France. 
Great Britain against Ger- 
many. 
France against Austria. 
Great Britain against Austria. 
Great Britain, France, and 

Russia against Turkey. 
Italy against Austria. 
Italy against Turkey. 
Ultimatum, Bulgaria to Serbia. 
France against Bulgaria. 
Russia against Bulgaria. 
Great Britain against Bulgaria. 
Italy against Bulgaria. 
Aug. 27th, 1916, Roumania against Austria. 
,, 27th, ,, Germany against Roumania. 
,, 28tb, ,, Italy against Germany. 
,, 31st, ,, Turkey against Roumania. 
Sept. 3rd, ,, Bulgaria against Roumania. 



151 



Aug. 


I St, 


>> 


}f 


3rd, 


yy 


jy 


4th, 


yy 


f7 


loth. 


>j 


M 


i2th. 


JJ 


Nov. 


5th, 


> J 


May 


23rd, 


19^5 


Aug. 


20th, 


M 


Oct. 


6th, 


JJ 


yy 


6th, 


) J 


>> 


6th, 


>> 


>> 


15th, 


J) 


) J 


19th, 


)J 



SOME USEFUL DATES. 

These dates are generally chosen to illustrate 
Balkan history in relation to Turkish : they record 
in the main how these countries were conquered 
and redeemed. The authority is the Historian's 
History. 

wSoME Useful Dates in Balkan History. 

1258. Birth of Osman, the founder of the Osmanti 

or Turkish Empire. 
1326. Capture of Brusa. 
1330. Capture of Nicaea. 
1336. Capture of Pergamum in Mysia. 
1358. First Ottoman stronghold in Europe 

(Tzympe) captured. 
1364. Murad I defeats King of Hungary and 

Poland and Princes of Bosnia Serbia and 

Wallachia on banks of Maritia. 
1389. Battle of Kosovo. Murad defeats united 

forces of Serbia, Bosnia, Hungary, 

Albania and Wallachia. 
1392. Mircea, of Wallachia, submits to the Turks. 
1396. Battle of Nicopolis. Defeat of Sigismund, 

of Hungary, by Sultan Bayazid. 
1402. Bayazid defeated and taken captive by 

Timur; in Mongol invasion. 
153 



154 ROUMANIA 

1403-1413. Civil war in Turkey. Mohammed I 
wins. 

1442. Hunyddy defeats a Turkish Army at 

Hermannstadt. 

1443. Hunyddy routs the Turks at the Battle of 
■ Ni§. 

1444. Murad defeats the Christians at Varna. 
1453. Mohammed II takes Constantinople. 
1456. Siege of Belgrade. Mohammed II defeated 

by Hunyddy and Giovanni di Capistrano. 

1460. Mohammed conquers Morea and Athens. 

1461. Scanderbeg wins independence as Prince 

of Albania and Epirus. 
1475. Turks take the Crimea. 
1492. Bayazid II repulsed at Belgrade. 
1500. Turks take Lepanto, Modon, Corson and 

Durazzo from Venice. 

1520. Accession of Suleiman the Magnificent. 

1 52 1. Conquest of Belgrade. 

1526. Battle of Mohdcs, and subjugation of Hun- 
gary. 

1529. Siege of Vienna and repulse of Turks. 

1569. Turks repulsed by Russians at Astrakhan. 

1 57 1. Turks take Cyprus, but easily defeated at 
Lepanto. 

1596. Battle of Keresztes. Allied forces of 
Austria and Transylvania defeated. 

1606. Peace of Zsitvatorok between Turkey and 
Austria. Half of Transylvania redeemed ; 
and Hungary relieved of tribute, though 
still subject to Turkey. 



SOME USEFUL DATES 1 55 

1664. Turks defeated by Austrians. Treaty of 
Vasvar, Transylvania evacuated. Apdfi 
recognised as Prince, under Turkish 
suzerainty. 

Of the seven Hungarian Counties between the 
borders of Transylvania and the Theiss, 
three ceded to the Emperor, four remained 
Ottoman, as well as Novigrad and 
Neuhausel. 

1669. Candia (Crete) conquered by Turks. The 
Phanariots officially installed at Con- 
stantinople. 

1672. Podolia and the Ukraine surrendered to 

Turkey. 

1673. Poles, under Sobieski, defeat Turks at 

Chocz3^m. Ukraine and Podolia remain 
Turkish. 

1683. The second siege of Vienna: which is 
relieved by Sobieski of Poland. 

1686. Austrians recapture Budapest. 

1689. Austrians capture Belgrade. 

1697. Battle of Zenta on Theiss. Turks defeated 
by Eugene of Savoy. 

1699. Peace of Karlowitz. Turkey ceded Hun- 
gary and Transylvania to Austria, pre- 
serving the Banat. Poland recovered 
Podolia, Kamenec-Podolski and the 
Ukraine. Russia kept Azov. 

171 1. Turkish war with Russia. Turks recapture 
Azov. 

1 7 15. Turkey recaptures Morea from Venice. 



156 ROUMANIA 

1716. Beginning of Phanariot rule in Wallachia. 

1 7 18. Treaty of Passarowitz (Pozarevac). Cap- 
ture of Belgrade. Belgrade, Banat of 
Temesvdr, Wallachia to the Alt, and part 
of Serbia ceded to Austria. Sultan retains 
the Morea. 

1739. Treaty of Belgrade. Austria ceded to 
Turkey, Belgrade, Shabats, Serbia, 
Austrian Wallachia, Or§ova. Russia 
ceded Azov and the right of navigating 
in the Black Sea, or Sea of Azov. 

1761. First treaty between Prussia and Turkey; 
war projected against Austria. 

1767. War between Russia and Turkey. 

1770-71. Russians conquer Moldavia, Wallachia 
and Crimea. 

1774. Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji. Turkey 
ceded to Russia fortresses on Delta of 
Danube, and in Crimea. 

1788. Russo-Turkish War. 

1798. Napoleon invades Egypt. 

1804. Successful revolt of Serbia. 

1809. Russo-Turkish War. 

1 81 2. Treaty of Bucarest. Bessarabia ceded to 
Russia. 

1 82 1. Greek War of Independence. 

1829. Treaty of Adrianople. Russia secured 
Delta of Danube, and a Protectorate over 
the Roumanian principalities, which she 
occupied for six years. 

1832. Greece declared independent. 



SOME USEFUL DATES I 57 

1848. Revolt in Moldavia and Wallachia, which 
were occupied by Russia up to 1850. 
Revolt of Hungary against Austria. 

1853. Russo-Turkish War and Crimean War. 

1856. Treaty of Paris. Independence and in- 
tegrity of Turkey recognised. Bessarabia 
was restored to the Roumanian Princi- 
palities, over which the Russian protec- 
torate was abolished and replaced by the 
Collective Guarantee "of the Great Powers. 

1866. German dynasty established in Roumania 

under Prince Charles zu Hohenzollern- 
Sigmaringen. 

1867. Transylvania ceded by Austria to Hungary. 
1870. Russia repudiates neutrality of Black Sea, 

and England acquiesces. 

1875. Bosnia and Hercegovina revolt. 

1876. Bulgaria revolts. Serbia and Montenegro 

in arms. 

1877. Russo-Turkish War. 

1878. Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria created; 

Roumania made independent : Bessarabia 
re-ceded to Russia; Roumania, Dobrudja 
and Delta. 

1878. Congress of Berlin. Austria ''occupies 
provisionally " Bosnia-Hercegovina. 

1881. Roumania a Kingdom, under King 
Charles. 

1883. Great Britain administers Egypt. 

1883. Alliance of Roumania with Central Powers. 

1885. Eastern Rounelia revolts and joins Bul- 
garia. 



158 ROUMANIA 

1887. Bulgaro-Serbian War. Serbs defeated. 

1894. Armenian massacres. 

1896. Cretan revolt. 

1897. Greco-Turkish War. Greeks defeated. 

1898. Prince George of Greece, High Com- 

missioner of Crete, which is redeemed from 

Turkey. 
1902-3. Macedonian Massacre. 
1904. Macedonia placed under international 

control. 
1908. Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declares 

himself independent, and King. Austria- 

Hungar}^ annex Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
1911-12. Turco-Italian War. Italy annexes Tripoli. 
1912-13. First Balkan War. Turkey surrenders 

all of Macedonia and Balkans down to 

Enos-Midia line. 
Second Balkan War. Turkey recovers 

Adrianople. Treaty of Bucarest. Rou- 

mania extends her frontier in Dobrudja. 

1914. European War. 

191 5. Armenian massacres. 

August, 1 91 6 — Roumania enters the war. 



List of some of the Books referred to in the 
TEXT under Short Titles 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Die Sprachen und Nationalitatsfragen in Osterreich. von einem 
Romanen. Vienna, 1866. 

La Rumenia innanzi la Conferenza del 1876. per un antico 

diplomatico. 1876. 
Romer und Romanen. von Julius Jung. Innsbruck, 1877. 
Deutsche Antwort auf die orientalische Frage. Constantin 

Gustaf Adolf Frantz. Leipzig, 1877. 
Siebenbiirgen — Reisebeobachturgen und Studien. Gerhard von 

Rath. 1879. 
Die Rumanen in Ungarn, Siebenbiirgen und der Bukowina. von 

Joan Slavicl. Vienna, 1881. 
La Politique Etrang^re de la Roumanie. Take lonescu. Bucarest, 

1891. 
Les roumains hongrois et la nation hongroise. R^ponse an 

m^moire des atudi6nts universitaires de Roumanie. 

Budapest, 1891. 
The Roumanian Question in Transylvania [being the Roumanian 

Reply to the last]. Vienna, 1892. 
Mannal de istoria Rom^nilor. G. Tocilescu. Bucaresci, 1900. 
Venizelos. Crawfurd Price. 1917. 
Le Traits de paix de Bucarest du 28 juillet, 19 13. Ministerul 

afacerilor strSine. Bucarest, 1913. 

BeccapaSiH 1812-1912. H. B. JIaiii,E0B9 

Poccifl Ha JJ^yna-fe. JI. A. Kacco 1913. 

La Roumanie Contemporaine. Constantin D. Mavrodin. Paris, 

1915- 
Osterreich-Ungarisches Rotbuch — Diplomatische Aktenstiicke 
betreffend die Beziehungen Osterreich-Ungarns zu 

Rumanien in der Zeit von 22 Juli 1914, bis 27 August 
1916. Vienna, 1916. 

159 



INDEX 



Adalbert, Bishop, 3. 

Adrianople, Treaty of, 6, 51. 

Agriculture, 11. 

Akkerman, 7. 

Albania, 10, 98, 149. 

Alexis, Emperor of Russia, 5. 

Alliance of France and Sweden, 

21. 
Alliance with Austria, 9. 
Antwerp, 13. 
Apafi, 21. 



Bessaraba, 5. 

Bessarabia, 6, 8, 142 (note) ; 
annexation of, 30; history, 51 ; 
population, 51 ; ceded to Rus- 
sia, 51, 52 ; education and 
language, 54 ; Russification, 
57 ; promised to Roumania, 
92, 94, loi, 114, 121. 

Bibliography, 152. 

Bocskdy, Stephen, 20. 

Bogdan, 4. 

Bolgars, The, 2. 



Austria, 6; ultimatum to Rou- Bosnia-Hercegovma, 49. 
mania, 103 ; broke spirit of ^^^^f^' ^°/- 
alliance, 124; exerts pressure, Bratianu, 65, 71, 75 to 91, 105 to 

144. 
Austrian Red Books, 59. 



109, 114 to 136, 143. 
Brusilov, 118. 
Bucarest, Treaty of, 6, 10, 51, 

67, 77, 85, 148. 
Bucovina, 6, 45, 46, 92, 94, 
Balcik, 14. £21, 128. 

Balkan League, 9, 149. Budget, 11. 

Balkan States, Federation of, g, Bulgaria, 2, 4, 8, 9, 14 ; com 



B 



33- 
Balta Limani, Treaty of, 7. 
Bdnffy, Baron, 45. 
Banks, 11. 

Barbarian migrations, 15 
Bdthori, Andrew, 20. 
Bdthori, Stephen, 20. 
Basil the Wolf, 5. 
Battenberg, Prince of, g. 
Belgrade, Treaty of, 22. 
Berchtold, Count, 74. 
Berlin, Conference of, 8, 61. 
Berlin, Treaty of, 52. 



161 



mitted to Germany, 78 ; con- 
ceals her intentions, 78 ; mu- 
nitions, 92 ; promised Mace- 
donia, etc., 92 ; reconciled to 
Turkey, 96 ; Treaty with Cen- 
tral Powers, 97 ; to invade 
Serbia, 97 ; Treaty with 
Greece, 98 ; enters the field, 
106, boundaries, 149. 

Bulgarian Church, 2. 

Bulgarian language, 2. 

Buridn, Baron, 89, 109, no, 115, 
121, 127, 128, 131. 



1 62 



INDEX 



Calais, 13. 

Carp, 117. 

Carpathians, 107, 113, 117. 

Central Europe, 23. 

Charles, King of Roumania, 9, 

66 ; death, 83. 
Church, Uniate, Greek, 45. 

Orthodox Greek, 45. 

Church polity, 42. 

Clofca, 22. 

Colonizations, 30, 

Comneanu, 145. 

Constantine, King, 85, 87, 131. 

Constantinople, 51, 96, 114. 

Co-operative Societies, 11. 

Costinescu, 121, 123. 

Crown Councils, 73, 122, 134, 

142. 
Cuza, Alexander loan, 7. 
Cyprus, 97. 
Czernin, Count, 11, 65 to 143; 

" Roumania was justified," 69. 
Czernowitz, 94, 118, 120. 

D 

Dacia, i, 2, 15, 51. 
Daco-Roumanians, 2. 
Dalmatia, 62. 

Danube, Delta of, 7, 8, 52. 
Dardanelles, The, 94, iii. 
Declarations of War, 126, 136, 

151- 
Delcass^, 100. 
Democracy, 12. 
Dillon, Dr. E. J., 69, 106. 
Dobrudja, 8, 10, 52, 93, 102, 

US- 
Drama, 87. 
Dude§ti explosion, 122. 



Education, 37, 41, 42, 54. 
Electoral disabilities, 39. 
Elliot, Sir Francis, 87. 
Erd^ly (see Transylvania). 



Espionage at Bucarest, 86. 
Ethnological Boundaries, 18. 



Fasciotti, Baron, 71. 
Federated Europe, 12, 14. 
Ferdinand, Archduke, 67. 
Ferdinand, King, 10, 66, 82, 133 ; 

accession, 83. 
Filipescu, 90, 105, 114, 119. 
Finance, 11. 
Fonton, F. N., 30. 
Foreign trade, 11. 
FVantz, Constantin, 29. 
Friedjung trial, 65. 
Fiirstenberg, Prince, 67. 



Galicia, 80, 89. 

Galip, Effendi, 56. 

Geographical position, i. 

Germans, The, 44. 

Germany — looking for allies, 78 ; 
ultimatum to Roumania, 84 ; 
contradictory engagements with 
Greece and Bulgaria, 97 ; 
propaganda in Roumania, 105. 

Ghenadiev, 93. 

Glurgievo, no, 127. 

Goehen and Breslau, 78, 80. 

Gounaris, 87. 

Greece, 4 ; to oppose Bulgaria, 
77 ; anxious to intervene, 78 ; 
offered concessions in Asia 
Minor, 87 ; treaty with Bul- 
garia, 98. 

Greek Revolution, 6. 

Grey, Sir Edward, 78. 

H 

Hadik Count, 142. 
Hermannstadt, 16. 
Hohenlohe, Prince, 128, 129. 
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Karl 

Ludwig zu, 8. 
Horia, 22. 
Hungarians, The, 3. 



INDEX 



163 



Hungary, 4 ; province of Tur- 
key, 17. 

I 

Ia§i, Treaty of, 55. 

Iliescu, General, 108, 144. 

Industries, 11. 

Infant Asylums, 43. 

Infant education, 44. 

lonescu. Take, 9, 32, 56, 67, 77, 
83, 91, 105, 117, 119- 

Islam converts, 44. 

Ismail, 7. 

Italy, 59, 60 ; war with Turkey, 
61 ; declares for neutrality, 73 ; 
declares war, 89. (See also 
Negotiations). 

J 

Janissaries, Recruitment of, 43. 

Jung, Julius, 29. 

Justice, administration of, 47, 48. 

K 

Kaiser, The, 97; telegram to 

Queen Sofia, 97. 
Kalka, Battle of the, 16. 
Karlowitz, Peace of, 4, 21. 
Kasso, A. A., 53. 
Kavala, 10, 87, 97. 
Keleti, Kdroly, 35, 36. 
Kilia, 7. 

Kosovo, Battle of, 3. 
Kossuth, 38, 49. 
Kramaf trial, 65. 
Kronstadt, 16. 
Kutchuk-Kainarji, Peace of, 6. 



Local Government, 45. 

London, Conference of, 93, 150. 

M 

Macedonia, 87, 92 ; invaded, 

134- 
Magyar justice, 48. 

Magyar policy, 33. 

Magyarism, 28, 33, 36, 46, 58. 

Magyars, The, 3, 16, 24, 31, 42; 

concessions to Roumania, 68. 
Maiorescu, T,, 10, 117, 133. 
Mangra, Bishop, 45. 
Map of Roumania, Frontispiece. 
Maramures, 3. 
MdramArossziget, 3. 
Marghiloman, 83, 91, 116. 
Mavrocordato, Nicholas, 6. 
Mavrodin, 41, 53. 
M^rey, 129. 

Michael the Brave, 4, 20. 
Military credits, 133. 
Milos, 20. 
Milyukov, 146. 
Ministers detained, 143. 
Mohdcs, Battle of, 4, 17. 
Moldavia, 3, 4, 6, 7; tributary 

to Turkey, 17; ravaged, 51. 
Moldavians, The, 53. 
Monastir, iii. 
Mongols, The, 3, 16. 
Montenegro, 10. 
Moruzi Dimitri, 56, 
Moruzi, Panaiot, 56. 
Munitions, passage of, 85, 88, 89, 

91, 95, loi, 103, 114, 122, 133. 
Muntenia, 3. 



N 



Land tenure, 47. 

Languages, i, 2, 29, 32, 37, 40, Names transformed, 43, 49 



44, 45, 46, 47, 53, 54, "5 
Laskov, 54. 
Law of the Nationalities. 

The Nationalities). 
League of the People, 102. 
Lehovary, 91. 
Little Wallachia, 3. 



Napoleon III, 12. 
Napoleonic campaigns, 56. 
(v. National colours, 48. 
,, dances, 48. 
Nationalism, 12. 

Nationalities, The, 27, 32, 37, 39, 
40. 



164 



INDEX 



Naumann, Friedrich, 27, 44. 
Negotiations between Austria and 

Italy, 59, 62, 86, 88, 120 (note). 
Negotiations between Austria and 

Roumania, 59, 74, 107. 
Neutrality of Greece, 115. 
Neutrality of Roumania, 74, 81, 

89, 90, 92, 102, 115, 125, 128 , 

reasons for, 138, 142. 
Neutrality undesirable, 33. 
Nicholas, Tsar, 10. 
Nikussis, Paniotachos, 5. 

O 

Odessa bombarded, 84. 
Oil wells, II. 
Oltenia, 3. 
Orsova, 107. 

P 

Paniotachos Nikussis, 5. 

Panslavism, no. 

Pan-Turanianism, no. 

Paris, Treaty of, 7, 8, 51. 

Pasic, 77. 

Peace Terms and Rumours, 12, 

I4> 93. 102, 105, 145 (note)._ 
Peasant Co-operative Societies, 

II. 
Pecenegs, The, 3. 
Penalties, 49. 
People's Banks, 11. 
Persecutions, 47. 
Peter the Great, 5. 
Petrol, II, 103, 104. 
Phanar, 5. 

Phanariote Greeks, The, 5. 
Plevna, Battle of, 8. 
Poland, 6, 14, 16, 55. 
Policy, Foreign, 32. 
P61ovtsy, The, 3. 
Population, II, 34, 46, 52. 
Porumbaru, Em., 116, 141. 
Pozarevats, Treaty of, 22. 
Preparations for war, 131. 
Press, The, 47, 102, 109, 116, 140 

(note). 
Printing introduced, 5. 



Protopopov, 146. 
Prussia, 12. 
Prussian methods, 55. 
Pruth, The, 118. 

R 

Racial frontiers, 52. 

Racova, 4. 

Radoslavov, 95, 115. 

Ragusa, 4. 

Railways, 11. 

RAk6czy, Fracins, 21, 

Rdkoczy, I, George, 20. 

Rdk6czy, Sigismund, 20. 

Rebellion against Russia, 7. 

Reformation, The, 17, 

Religions, 34, 37, 42, 45. 

Reni, 7. 

Riga, III. 

Roman Church, 3. 

Rotterdam, 13. 

Roumanian army, 113. 

Roumanian cereals, in, 118. 

Roumanian wine, 113. 

Russia, 51 ; takes Bessarabia, 
56 ; advance in Galicia, 80 ; 
holds, Lemberg, etc., 86 ; mili- 
tary convention with Rou- 
mania, 130, 133 ; a reported 
ultimatum, 142. 

Russo-Turkish War, 8. 



Sanguna, 32, 38. 

Salonica, 98, 117, 131. 

San Stefano, Treaty of, 8. 

Saxons, The, 16. 

Schools, 37. 

Serbia, 4, 14, 49 ; ultimatum to, 
74 ; invaded by Austria, 84 ; 
gave up Macedonia, 106 ; over- 
run, III. 

Serbians, The, 20. 

Siebenbiirgen, 15. 

Sigismond, John, 19. 

Silistria, 14. 

Skoloudis, 115. 



INDEX 



165 



Skutari, 10. 
Slavic!, loan, 31, 42. 
Sleswig Schools, 55. 
Slovaks, The, 40, 44. 
Sobieski, Jan, 21. 
Stephen the Great, 4. 
Stephen the Saint, 3 
Strypa, The, 118. 
Stiirmer, 145, 146. 
Suffrage in Hungary, 39. 
Suppressed communiques, 91. 
Szdthmar, 22, 49. 



Treason Trial, 48. 

Trentino, The, 130. 

Triple Alliance, 60, 87, 137, 148. 

Tripoli, 61. 

Tunis, 61. 

Turkey, 4 ; cedes Bessarabia, 56 ; 
war with Italy, 61 ; proceeds 
to war, 78 ; treaty with Central 
Powers, 97. 

Turkish fleet, 78. 

Turkish suzerainty, 8. 

Turks, The, 3, 7, 16. 

Tyrol, 62. 



Talaat Bey, 78. 

Tatars, The, 3. 

Temesvdr, 4, 22, 45, 94. 

Teutonic Knights, Order of, 16. 

Thun, Count, 65. 

Tisza, 115. 

Tocilescu, 5, 55. ^ 

Town names, derivation of, 15, 
116, 148, 150. 

Transylvania, i, 4, 7, 15 ; 
separated from Hungary, 20 ; 
civil war, 21 ; independence, 
21 ; re-attached to Hungary, 
21 ; created Grand Duchy, 22 ; 
petition to Austria, 23 ; new 
charter, 24 ; grievances, 27 ; 
population, 34 ; wanted by 
Roumania, 80 ; promised to 
Roumania, 92, 94 ; terrorism, 
(40 (note). 



U 



Universities, 43. 



Venizelos, 77, 84 ; resignation, 

85, 87. 
Vienna, Peace of, 20. 
Vlakhs, The, 3. 



W 

VValdlhausen, von, 86. 
Wallachia, 3, 4, 7 ; tributary to 

Turkey, 17. 
Wallachs, The, 3. 
Warsaw, attacked, 88. 
Wiegand, Karl von, 133. 
VVitte, Count de, 82. 



Printed in Great Britain by Ebenezer Baylis Sr Son, Worcester. 



